

THE EFFECT OF THE 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS ON THE POLITICAL
ATMOSPHERE-
PARTY AND PUBLIC LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
IMMIGRATION ISSUES: THE CASE OF GERMANY

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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF THE 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS ON THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE- PARTY AND PUBLIC LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES: THE CASE OF GERMANY

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Over the last few years, the European Union has been experiencing a period of never-ending crises. The responses given by the EU and member states to these crises have shaped the EU and the political atmosphere in the member states. Analyzing the effects of crises on the EU and its member states is critical in understanding the changing dynamics of the European integration. Since 2015, the Refugee Crisis has dramatically affected and transformed European politics. Far-right political parties have grown more outspoken in shaping the political atmosphere as a response to the Refugee Crisis. The case of Germany shows that the Refugee Crisis has impacted the political atmosphere all over Europe, with increasing anti-immigration and anti-EU discourses in its aftermath. Furthermore, the competition among political parties has changed its shape and intensity, and far-right groups such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, which has begun to gain political influence, have

been regarded as influential in shaping immigration and EU policies. Such parties have instrumentalized the Refugee Crisis as a political opportunity to move towards mainstream constituents and enlarge their sphere of influence in domestic politics. Additionally, the rise of these parties has also limited the movements of mainstream parties and, therefore, played a crucial role in the emergence of more Eurosceptic and anti-immigration policies. In this regard, this dissertation aims to contribute to the literature on European integration by addressing the effects of the Refugee Crisis on the political atmosphere in Germany with the assumptions of the post-functionalist theory.

Keywords: Euroscepticism, Germany, Party Manifestos, Public Opinion, Immigration

ÖZ

2015 MÜLTECİ KRİZİNİN SİYASİ ATMOSFERE ETKİSİ- AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ VE GÖÇ KONULARININ SİYASİ PARTİLER VE KAMU DÜZEYİ ANALİZİ: ALMANYA ÖRNEĞİ

YİĞİT, Gökçe

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Avrupa Birliği (AB) son yıllarda biri bitmeden diğeri başlayan krizlerin etkili olduğu bir dönemden geçmektedir. Bu krizlere AB ve üye ülkeler tarafından verilen cevaplar, AB'nin ve üye ülkelerinin siyasi atmosferini ve Avrupa bütünleşmesi projesini şekillendirmektedir. Bu bağlamda, krizlerin AB ve üye ülkeler üzerindeki etkilerini incelemek Avrupa bütünleşmesini anlayabilmek açısından oldukça önem arz etmektedir. Mülteci Krizi, AB'yi ve üye ülkelerini siyasi anlamda fazlasıyla etkileyen ve dönüştüren bir kriz olmuştur. Bu tezde ele alınan Almanya örneği de göstermektedir ki Mülteci Krizi, üye ülkelerin de siyasi atmosferlerinde etkili olmuş ve bu kriz sonrasında göç ve AB karşıtı söylemler artmıştır. Bununla birlikte, siyasi partiler arasındaki yarış, Mülteci Krizi ile birlikte yön değiştirmiş ve tüm Avrupa'da zaten güç kazanmakta olan aşırı sağ partilerin göç ve AB politikalarının şekillendirilmesinde daha fazla etkili olmaya başladığı görülmüştür. Bu partiler, Mülteci Krizi'ni bir fırsat olarak görüp araçsallaştırmış, göç politikalarının oluşturulmasında merkez partilerin hareketlerini sınırlandırmış ve daha fazla Avrupa

şüpheci ve göç karşıtı politikaların ortaya çıkmasında etkili olmuşlardır. Bu noktada bu tez, Mülteci Krizi ile birlikte Almanya’da göç ve AB’nin belirginliğinin arttığı ve bununla beraber göç ve AB karşıtı söylemlerin yoğunlaştığı bir siyasi ortamın oluştuğu sonucuyla, krizlerin AB üyesi ülkelerde etkilerini herhangi bir teorik çerçeveye inceleyen Avrupa bütünleşmesi literatürüne bir katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa şüpheciliği, Almanya, Parti Manifestoları, Kamu Görüşü, Göçmenlik

To my parents

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative für Deutschland
CDU/CSU	The Christian Democratic Union in Germany/ The Christian Democratic Union in Bavaria
CMP	The Comparative Manifesto Project
DE	Deutschland (Germany)
DW	Deutsche Welle
EC	European Commission
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EUROSTAT	European Statistics
FDP	Free Democratic Party
FRONTEX	The European Border and Coast Guard Agency
GAL	Green- Alternative- Libertarian
LINKE	The Left
MRG	The Manifesto Research Group
PImPo	Parties' Immigration and Integration Positions Dataset
RRP	Radical Right Parties
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
TAN	Traditional- Authoritarian- Nationalist
UK	The United Kingdom
UKIP	UK Independence Party
90/ Greens	Alliance 90/ The Green

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to understand if the Refugee Crisis has affected the political atmosphere in Germany, including (i) the salience of the European Union (EU) and immigration and (ii) the positions towards the EU and immigration. In other words, this dissertation, first of all, aims to analyze if the salience of the EU and immigration changed after the Refugee Crisis. Secondly, it aims to find out if anti-immigrant sentiments at the public level and anti-immigrant positions at the party level changed. Finally, the question of whether or not party-based Euroscepticism and public Euroscepticism changed after the Refugee Crisis is addressed.

1.1. General Statement

The project of European integration has survived through many and diverse crises since the day it was launched. The responses given to these crises have also shaped the project throughout the years. Sometimes, these crises originated from the results of exogenous shocks, such as the large inflow of refugees coming to the borders of the EU (the Refugee Crisis). In other times, endogenous shocks were the underlying causes of the crises as illustrated by the empty chair crisis, several member states experiencing the collapse of financial institutions (the European Debt Crisis), or the UK withdrawal (Brexit). Despite the character of the crisis –whether internal or external- they all affected the EU and its member states in one way or another, and policies created as a result of these effects are still in effect. Therefore, even if the immediate impacts of crises fade over time, the responses of the EU to these crises define the EU in the long run, and so the crises' repercussions endure.

In this regard, it could be argued that crises have played a significant role in the history of European integration. However, despite this role of the crises, European integration theories do not have a comprehensive and precise analysis of what a crisis is, its causes, and its consequences. Accordingly, in this study, it is accepted that any European integration theory cannot fully explain the reactions of the EU as an international organization and the member states to any kind of crises, and it is necessary to examine the relationship between crises and European integration for a better comprehension of EU crises. Looking at the literature, it is possible to see that each integration theory has a different approach regarding crises. In this dissertation, post-functionalism is utilized as the theoretical basis. It is a relatively new approach interested in both public opinion and political parties, and therefore better equipped than the other integration theories in explaining the Refugee Crisis.

The Refugee Crisis is critical for the EU as it illustrates well that a crisis initiated by external factors might have severe impacts on the EU and the member states, how inadequate and dysfunctional the immigration and asylum policies of the EU are, and the limits of the Schengen system. In economic, cultural, sociological, and organizational aspects, even though it is an exogenous shock, The Refugee Crisis has resulted in new internal issues and the deepening of already existing ones in the EU. It also allowed the ascending populist parties to become even stronger in some EU member states. The rise of populist political parties and the resulting shift in party competition have resulted in the spread of populist parties' discourse on immigration and the EU, as well as the restriction of the EU and immigration policies of mainstream political parties. As it is seen, the Refugee Crisis began as an external shock in the first place and then affected the domestic politics of EU member states significantly.

In the literature, some studies attempt to explain the consequences of crises on the EU and member states with theories of European integration. An overview of these studies shows that they primarily focus on the effects of the Euro Crisis. The number of studies trying to explain the effects of the Refugee Crisis through European integration theories is very few compared to the studies that focus on the impact of

the Euro Crisis. Accordingly, this dissertation aims to fill this gap using the post-functionalist assumptions with a specific objective to understand the effect of the Refugee Crisis on the political atmosphere in Germany. On the other hand, the literature is composed of studies that focus on the effects of crises either at the public level or at the level of political parties. This dissertation is a product of a multi-level approach with a focus at the public and party levels simultaneously.

1.2. Research Questions

The research question of this dissertation is based on the following argument: crises bring changes from different aspects, including economic, social, political, cultural, etc. (Christensen et al. 2016, Anderson 2021, Haughton 2016, Grimm 2018, Riddervold et al. 2021, Nabers 2009, Schimmelfennig 2018, Gänzle et al. 2021, Hooghe & Marks 2018). Based on this argument, it is accepted that crises affect the political atmosphere at multiple levels, namely public and party levels. The dissertation focuses on the Refugee Crisis in 2015 and asks how this crisis affected the political atmosphere regarding the salience of and positions related to the EU at both public and party levels in Germany. The question has three components:

RQ-1: *Did the Refugee Crisis in 2015 affect the political atmosphere in Germany in terms of the salience of and positions related to the European Union at public and party levels?*

RQ-2: *If so, what were the direction and the magnitude of this effect, i.e., negative/positive, increase/decrease?*

RQ-3: *Are there any parallels between the public and party level effects?*

The hypotheses of this study based on these research questions are derived from the literature on European integration theories, the salience, party-based Euroscepticism, and public Euroscepticism. These hypotheses of the dissertation are analyzed with the theory and methodology mentioned below.

1.3. Theory and Methodology

This dissertation uses post-functionalism to comprehend the effects of the Refugee Crisis on Germany. It embraces the post-functionalist assumptions with their usefulness in explaining the Refugee Crisis, because the Refugee Crisis did not result in a significant deepening of integration (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 969), but instead, it resulted in a kind of disintegration. In this regard, no better theory of disintegration other than post-functionalism could be thought to explain the Refugee Crisis better. Post-functionalism, as a relatively new perspective to European integration, emphasizes the importance of politicization. Hooghe and Marks (2018a, 2018, 2019) argue that the politicization of immigration and the EU with the Refugee Crisis has led to an increase in Euroscepticism and has strengthened anti-immigrant ideas both at the popular level and the level of political parties. Thus, post-functionalism is also significant with its emphasis on the importance of public opinion in European integration. In this regard, this study benefits from post-functionalist assumptions to understand the effects of the Refugee Crisis on both public and party levels in Germany.

Using post-functionalist assumptions, this dissertation measures the political atmosphere in Germany in terms of salience of and position related to the EU and immigration by using two different data sources. The Manifesto Project and Eurobarometer surveys are used for the measurement at the party and public levels. The reason behind choosing Germany as the case country is that it is a country of immigration and one of the most powerful, founding member states of the EU. Therefore, it is an interesting country to analyze the effects of the Refugee Crisis. As 2015 has been singled out as the year of crisis for the EU due to the refugee and migrant influx into the continent, the time period to be used has been decided as between 2013 and 2017. Since 2015 is considered the year when the Refugee Crisis peaked, the last elections held in Germany before 2015, which were the 2013 elections, and the first elections held after 2015, which is the 2017 elections, are included in the analysis. The year 2013 is defined as the pre-crisis period, and 2017 is defined as the post-crisis period.

1.4. Chapters of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters, beginning with the introduction and concluding with the conclusion. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on public Euroscepticism and party-based Euroscepticism and therefore provides a theoretical background for the dissertation. The impacts of crises are examined in this dissertation under two headings: the salience and positions towards the EU and immigration. In this regard, this chapter includes the literature on the issue salience and Euroscepticism before analyzing the literature on crises and the Refugee Crisis.

Chapter 3 answers the questions of what a crisis is and how crises have been addressed in the literature. This chapter also discusses how theories of European integration explain crises. The crisis-related assumptions of three integration theories, namely intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, and post-functionalism, are discussed. The strengths and weaknesses of these theories in explaining EU crises are debated without going into detail.

Chapter 4 introduces the 2015 Refugee Crisis as an EU crisis. It explains how the Refugee Crisis, which began as an external shock, transformed into an internal issue for the EU and its member states and how it shaped the relationship between the EU and its member states. Chapter 4 also discusses the importance of post-functionalism in understanding the impact of the Refugee Crisis on the EU. Moreover, the chapter gives detailed information on the post-functionalist arguments about the Refugee Crisis.

Chapter 5 presents the research design chapter of the dissertation. After explaining the reasons for the selection of Germany as a case, the chapter discusses the research questions and details the rationale for the hypotheses of the dissertation. Furthermore, Chapter 5 goes through the data sources that were used as well as the reasoning behind their selection. Most importantly, it explains in detail how the data from these sources were utilized.

Chapter 6 presents the principal findings from the primary research. The findings from the data obtained by the Manifesto Project by analyzing the content of the electoral manifestos of political parties and the data obtained through Eurobarometer surveys provided by the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC) and other EU institutions to monitor public opinion will be presented.

Chapter 7 includes a discussion of major findings related to the literature on the effect of exogenous crises, how political parties' positions towards European integration changed after the Refugee Crisis, and how the Refugee Crisis affected public Euroscepticism. It also includes a discussion on the post-functionalist assumptions regarding the Refugee Crisis and its effects on Euroscepticism in Germany.

Chapter 8 reviews the research design, findings, and discussion of the dissertation. It acknowledges the theoretical and methodological limits of the study, but it also identifies possible research opportunities for the future.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

This chapter is designed to draw a functional theoretical and conceptual framework before looking at the impact of the Refugee Crisis on the salience of the EU and immigration and the party-based Euroscepticism and public Euroscepticism in Germany. The chapter is established on the conceptualization of Euroscepticism, understanding public Euroscepticism, the overview of party competition theories, and party-based Euroscepticism. It starts with a general discussion on theorizing Euroscepticism and how to conceptualize it. And then public (popular) Euroscepticism will be addressed. After that, in the next section of the chapter, the party competition theories- particularly the saliency theory- which helps understand the stances of political parties on European integration, and party-based Euroscepticism will be discussed.

Throughout this chapter, the overall aim is to understand, study, and analyze people's sentiments towards European integration, the stances of the political parties on European integration, and the variety of Eurosceptic positions. To achieve these aims, some of the questions that will be addressed in this chapter are as follows: how theories of party competition explain political parties' Eurosceptic stance; how to describe, analyze and theorize party-based Euroscepticism; if Euroscepticism has changed over time; if Euroscepticism has an influence on domestic political systems; if Euroscepticism is different in member states than candidate states; what role ideology and strategy play in political parties' response to the dynamic

multidimensional structure of European integration; and whether political parties are driven by strategic incentives or ideological commitments in the context of electoral competition.

2.2. Theorizing Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism was initially used in the British public discussion regarding European integration in the 1980s. This term publicly appeared first in *The Times* on 11 November 1985 and was initially used to characterize a sceptical opposition to the European Communities and its policies (Apodaca, 2013, p. 2). It was specifically used to refer to Conservative Party members who expressed their scepticism on the direction of the European integration project in the years after the adoption of the Single European Act; in other words, they were sceptical about European integration (Spiering, 2004, p. 128-129; Spiering 2015).

Across time and place, it is possible to find out different explanations and meanings attributed to Euroscepticism. It was mainly elite-driven and generally developed in national borders during the early stages of integration, but not entirely (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 163). In other words, it is 'strongly embedded in the national context' (Brack, 2015, p. 10), and issues are discussed mainly by national politicians in national contexts (Rovny, 2004, p. 36). Therefore, as a natural consequence of the term being defined nationally, it has different meanings in different countries. Thus, since Euroscepticism has been discussed in national contexts by national leaders and has been defined nationally, it could not be regarded as a separate ideology on its own. It mostly appears as a part of nationally defined party discourses or identities.

Before the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), which created a closer union among member states by creating especially the idea of the 'European citizen' and the single currency, Euroscepticism was widely limited to the margins (Brack & Startin, 2015, p. 239). That is to say, Euroscepticism used to be seen as something exceptional before the Maastricht Treaty. However, in the period after the Maastricht Treaty, Euroscepticism started to evolve into a transnational and shared political

language throughout Europe (FitzGibbon et al. 2016; Brack & Startin 2015; Usherwood & Startin 2013, Usherwood et al. 2018; Brack 2015a). The Maastricht Treaty is a critical turning point in the European integration history because the domestic policy and the European policy started to become more and more intertwined in the political, social, environmental, and economic areas and foreign affairs since then (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 3). The Maastricht Treaty is also a milestone in the sense that, for the first time, European political elites have publicly expressed their intention to shift authority from the national to the EU level in the fields of national politics, citizenship, foreign policy, finance, market policy, and currency which used to be carried out at the national level (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 159).

As mentioned above, the EU has changed remarkably and has expanded its capabilities through developments such as the Maastricht Treaty, the introduction of the single currency, the euro, the further enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004, and an unsuccessful attempt to initiate the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Even though some of these developments positively affected the roadmap of the EU, they have also created a more criticized atmosphere for the EU. The issue of European integration has become essential to national politics in many European countries with the failure of the permissive consensus, the increasing European economic and political crisis, and the entrance of radical left-wing and right-wing political parties into government (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2013, p. 17). In addition to these cornerstones, crises such as the Refugee Crisis, the Euro Crisis, and Brexit have recently made states face an increase in public Euroscepticism, Eurosceptic stances of political parties, and media Euroscepticism. In other words, such crises have made Eurosceptic actors more apparent and stronger at both the national and European levels. In this context, Euroscepticism has increasingly become more visible as there has been an upward shift in Eurosceptic discourse among political parties, in hostility towards the EU among people, and in support for political parties that are against deeper European integration. Therefore, it could be said that as European integration has deepened over time, Eurosceptic attitudes have also become gradually common.

While Euroscepticism is expanding its share in national and European politics, the term is also used to refer to different kinds of groups such as Christian conservatives in the Netherlands, communists in Greece, neo-conservatives in Germany as well as Greens, workers, and several other groups in other countries (Leruth et al., 2018a, p. 4). Such different groups also have divergent political activities, as expected. Those activities range from changing particular parts of EU law to significant amendments in policies and even withdrawing from the EU as a whole or a part of the EU system. To gather all these actions under one label and name all these activities as Euroscepticism brings the risk of not only simplifying but also misleading function. That is to say, even though it is practical to use Euroscepticism as an overarching term, it might also cause an overlook. That is why it is valuable to analyze and classify such different conceptualizations in the literature.

2.2.1. Conceptualizations of Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism is theoretically described as a term, which explains a negative stance on European integration. It refers to a suspicion or distrust in Europe in general or in the European integration and its policies in specific. As Nicoli (2017, p. 314) argues, it is more than a political ideology, and it apparently can be seen as having an indefinite description that requires different forms of opposition to the EU. Although Euroscepticism is usually defined negatively as opposition to European integration, there is not a general acceptance regarding the description of what Eurosceptics oppose (Leconte, 2015, p. 254). That is to say, Euroscepticism as a concept cannot explain strictly what to oppose and when that opposition exists. Scholars have their own ways to describe the term and to specify what Eurosceptics oppose. Moreover, it is a phenomenon that could be seen in almost every field of social sciences, having effects in various areas such as international relations, history, party politics, sociology, public policy, and more.

As Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008d, p. 240) argue, it has been challenging to define and analyze Euroscepticism since it has a multidimensional nature. Its meaning has been consistently modified as the answers given to the question of “what and to what degree to oppose in European integration” also keep changing. As a result, it is

possible to argue that Euroscepticism is a complex concept to explain, and therefore, its theorization is still incomplete in the literature (Leruth et al., 2018a, p. 5). Whereas some academics conceptualize Euroscepticism as a continuum, others conceptualize it in categorical terms (Vasilopoulou, 2018a, p. 26).

Paul Taggart is the first scholar who addressed how to define and conceptualize Euroscepticism theoretically. He has made one of the most cited definitions of Euroscepticism in the literature. He sees Euroscepticism as "an encompassing term" and argues that the term expresses "the idea of a contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (Taggart, 1998, p. 366). In his article, Taggart identifies three different Eurosceptic stances towards the EU. The first one is the anti-integration stance of those fundamentally against European integration as a concept and, therefore, against the EU. The second one is the stance shared by people who do not fundamentally reject the notion of European integration on a philosophical level on the one hand but on the other hand, who doubt that the EU is the highest form of integration. Their concern is that the current state of European integration is too inclusive. The final stance also shares the same scepticism with the second group, but their concern differs in that European integration is too exclusive (Taggart, 1998, p. 365- 366).

Flood (2002b, p. 3) defines Euroscepticism as

attitudes and opinions represented in discourses and behaviors (ranging from participation in organized political action to voting in elections or referenda and responding to public opinion polls) which express doubt as to the desirability and/or benefits and/or long-term viability of European or/and European Union integration as an objective or in the general framework created so far or in some important aspects of that framework of institutions, processes and policies and/or as it is anticipated to occur in the future.

Sørensen (2008, p. 6), on the other hand, describes Euroscepticism in a more general way, as "a sentiment of disapproval-reaching a certain degree and durability-directed towards the EU in its entirety or towards particular areas or developments." The common characteristic of all these descriptions is that they all require an opposition, an antagonistic stance, disapproval, or doubt. However, the way they define the

antagonist in their Eurosceptic position varies; that is to say, it is not common what they oppose and to what extent they oppose it.

As there is a diversity in the description of Euroscepticism, the classifications of Euroscepticism also differ according to each scholar. In other words, Euroscepticism is classified in different forms. Vasilopoulou (2018a) sums up these classifications, as indicated in Table 1 below. Whereas some scholars make classifications regarding what is opposed to, others make it with reference to who is opposed to or make it in relation to the level of Euroscepticism. After all, all these classifications help us not to overlook what Euroscepticism refers to.

Riishøj (2007, p. 508- 509) makes another classification that includes almost all of the above categories. First of all, (i) Identity-based Euroscepticism makes use of the conflict between national identity and European identity. (ii) Cleavage-based Euroscepticism focuses on the major disagreements in society including, but not limited to, religion-secularism, town-country, etc. (iii) Policy-based scepticism includes some opposition to particular policies and specific issues like common currency, and the euro, etc. (iv) Institutionally based scepticism consists of debate on the legitimacy of national versus EU institutions. (v) National interest-based scepticism points to a conflict between common European ideals and national ideals. (vi) Experience-based scepticism stems from the concern that the negotiations regarding the EU membership have been uneven and asymmetric. (vii) Party-based Euroscepticism is developed through a top-down approach in which political parties and their leaders use anti-modern, conservative, left-populist, or neo-liberal rhetoric. (viii) Atlantic-based scepticism means a conflict between pro-Europeanism and pro-Americanism. For instance, in a case like a common European defense policy. Finally, (ix) practice-based Euroscepticism does not imply a definitive rejection of the EU and Europeanization; however, to a different interpretation of Copenhagen criteria.

Table 1: Classifications of Euroscepticism

modes of opposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• diffuse• specific
targets of opposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• authorities• regime• community
intensity of opposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• hard• soft
indicators of opposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• principle• practice• future of integration
types of opposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• utilitarian• sovereignty-based• democratic• social

On the other hand, Leconte (2010, p. 43) suggests a simpler classification and claims that there are four different varieties of Euroscepticism. The first one is utilitarian Euroscepticism, which corresponds to the scepticism about the benefits at the individual or country-level emanating from being an EU member. The second one is political Euroscepticism that relates the worries about European integration's effect on national identity and sovereignty. The third one is value-based Euroscepticism that condemns the EU interference in normative issues. The last one is cultural anti-Europeanism that is established in a wider opposition to Europe as a whole and doubt about the social institutions and structures of the European countries.

Furthermore, Krouwel and Abts offer a much more complex classification and use a scale to display stances towards European integration. As mentioned below in Figure 1, they make this categorization, including political behavior as confidence and scepticism on the positive side, and distrust, cynicism, and alienation on the negative side (2007, p. 262- 263). Euro confidence refers to trust in the idea of European integration, the European regime, and the European authorities as a whole. It is the most positive point of the scale. Regardless of the negativity in most of the definitions

of Euroscepticism in the literature, Krouwel and Abts' definition of Euroscepticism has a small amount of positivity. Euroscepticism, for them, means a compromise between some discontent with the EU's present state of operation and trust in the whole European integration project. In other words, Eurosceptics do not support the EU unconditionally, but they also do not doubt the common principles of EU cooperation.

On the other hand, at the negative pole, Euro distrust signifies the disappointments originating from the anticipated failure of the EU to meet the demands and anticipations of citizens. Nevertheless, trust in the common principles of European integration continues, despite the disappointments. Euro cynicism, however, requires a widespread contempt for European authorities with an absolute doubt that the institutions of the EU perform honestly and ethically. Even though they oppose the European integration project as a whole, they also think that radical political change is possible. Lastly, Euro-alienation is the absolute rejection of the EU. For Krouwel and Abts, it means being completely against the main goals and principles, institutions, and processes of the EU.




Figure 1: The Scale on Attitudes towards the European Integration¹

¹ The figure was prepared by the author with the information obtained from Krouwel and Abts (2007, p. 262- 263).

To conclude, it is clear that there is no consensus on what constitutes Euroscepticism and how to classify it. Scholars consider different things as the reason for Euroscepticism, and there is also a divergence in the categorization of Euroscepticism. Furthermore, research on Euroscepticism in the literature is likely to see Euroscepticism as a dependent variable, so explaining this concept has become the ultimate goal. However, it is also significant to see Euroscepticism as a potential independent variable and use it to explain different political events in Europe, like national and European Parliament (EP) elections (Vasilopoulou, 2018a, p. 22). As a result of this viewpoint, research on Euroscepticism could be used to understand the sentiments and positions towards European integration and national politics regarding Europe.

2.3. Public (Popular) Euroscepticism

2.3.1. What is Public Euroscepticism?

Since the early days of European integration, a small group of elites has had a significant role in shaping the process. There was no need for the public to be involved in this system, where agreements were made between sovereign member states. In the first years of the European integration project, in the years of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), member states still protected their sovereignty; there were no kinds of limitations on their sovereignty. Thus, it was not relevant to study public opinion towards the European integration then.

Even though it would not be right to give an exact precise date when public opinion toward the European integration issue started to matter, it is possible to find some ideas in the literature. The view that the European integration affects the public could be the result of the effects of the customs union or the Single European Act, which removed barriers to free trade. However, there is a general acceptance in the literature that there is a significant change in the effect of public opinion on European integration after the Maastricht Treaty (see Eichenberg & Dalton 1993, 2007, Anderson 1998, Guerra 2020, Hooghe & Marks 2004, 2005, 2007). As Gabel (1998a, p.9) argues, public opinion became for the first time ‘both a measure and a

determinant of the process of European integration.’ Public attitudes towards the European integration issue started to matter after the Maastricht Treaty because this treaty brought an end to the era of a so-called permissive consensus on the European integration and heralded a start of a new age of constraining dissensus (Hooghe & Marks 2005). This change means the re-politicization of the European integration issue and the opening of a public debate on the legitimacy of the EU. With this change, public opinion on European integration and public Euroscepticism started to be studied much more.

The literature on public Euroscepticism shows that most of the studies in this area have been focused on the reasons for public Euroscepticism and why people have these Eurosceptic sentiments toward the European integration issue (See Janssen 1991, Anderson 1998, Gabel 1998a, Gabel & Palmer 1995, De Master & Le Roy 2000, Sørensen 2004, Lubbers & Scheepers 2001, 2007, Carey 2002, McLaren 2006, Luedtke 2005). This literature has expanded and increased based on Ronald Inglehart’s study *Silent Revolution* in 1977. As it is mentioned above, in the public Euroscepticism literature, whilst most of the studies focus on the reasons behind people’s Eurosceptic sentiments towards European integration (for instance, de Vries 2007, Tillman 2004, Hooghe & Marks 2005, Gabel & Whitten 1997), others are interested in the interaction between public and political parties, and how they influence each other (Steenbergen et al. 2007, De Vreese 2004, Steenbergen & Scott 2004).

As for what public Euroscepticism is, it is clearly seen in the Euroscepticism literature that studies on party-based Euroscepticism dominate the literature, and studies related to specifically describing or analyzing public Euroscepticism are rare in the literature. However, it is still possible to use and adjust descriptions of Euroscepticism in general and party-based Euroscepticism in specific to be able to define and analyze public Euroscepticism. The most commonly accepted definition of Euroscepticism in the literature is the definition made regarding party-based Euroscepticism, which could also be suitable to describe public Euroscepticism:

the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration' that can be 'on principle', too 'inclusive' or too 'exclusive' (Taggart 1998, p. 365-366).

To sum up, European integration had been an economic project at first and had little impact on people's lives in member states. The public was mainly not even aware of what European integration was. However, this situation has changed over time, and so it has an impact on public opinion. In this regard, studying public opinion towards the European integration has become quite significant, as European integration increases its control over member states, and the public is increasingly affected by this situation. It is accepted in the literature that referendums, as a reflection of public opinion, have the potential to have an immediate effect on the process of European integration. What happened in European politics and the public's reactions to these happenings are proof of this. The United Kingdom's EU membership referendum that was held on 23 June 2016, for instance, is excellent evidence for how public opinion is essential for integration. As Guerra (2020, p. 47) claimed, this referendum was a turning point since it was based on a construction that posits the Self vs. the Other. Before that, there were 2005 Dutch and French constitutional referendums. Consequently, there are clear occasions at which the public may have a significant impact on EU policymaking through referendums on EU-related issues.

2.3.2. Approaches to the Study of Public Opinion towards the European Integration

The literature on Euroscepticism has important theoretical debates at the party level on the one hand, and mostly empirical studies at the public level on the other. As mentioned above, studying public opinion towards European integration is relatively new. The process of integration is traditionally seen as being driven by elite actions. The traditional approach assumed that European citizens offered only a "permissive consensus" in which political elites could pursue the European ideal regardless of the will of the general population (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, p. 507). Classical European integration theories fail to take account of public opinion because they believe it to be irrelevant on the European level. For example, while neo-functionalists disregard the public's preferences, intergovernmentalists also ignore

European-level attitudes because the sole importance to the national level is beyond question (Sørensen, 2004, p. 3).

In contrast to this classic idea, public opinion has become much more important after the Maastricht Treaty with the increase in the effect of European integration on public and the involvement of the public in integration issues. Now it is generally accepted in the literature that public attitudes towards European integration are significant in the process of integration (Gabel & Whitten, 1997, p. 81). Furthermore, it is claimed that public attitudes shape and constrain the process of European integration (Gabel, 1998a, p.333).

Following the acceptance of the public opinion's importance, scholars mainly shape the literature on public Euroscepticism around a particular question: What are the reasons for the differences in attitudes towards European integration? Several studies have their own classification of public approaches to European integration. Scholars have explained these differences referred to as cognitive skills, ideology, political values, economic explanations, national identity, political performance, government support, income, principled opposition, etc. (See Duff 2013; McLaren 2002, 2006; Lubbers & Scheepers 2007; Lubbers 2008; Anderson 1998; Gabel 1998b; De Vreese & Boomgarden 2005; Gabel & Palmer 1995; Inglehart 1977; Easton 1975; Boomgarden et al. 2011).

As seen in Table 2, there are many different approaches to explaining public attitudes towards European integration. Although some approaches are common to almost all scholars, there are also distinctive approaches. For instance, as a distinctive approach, Hooghe and Marks' cue theory considers the EU an extension of domestic politics and suggests that domestic ideology and domestic political structures shape public opinions (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 424). The most significant cues for European integration tend to originate in member states. Given that the EU is a component of a multi-level governance structure that includes domestic political arenas, one could anticipate domestic politics to influence popular perceptions of European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2005, p. 425).

Table 2: Approaches to Public Attitudes towards the European Integration

Gabel (1998a)	Anderson (1998)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cognitive mobilization• Political values• Utilitarian Appraisals of Integrative Policy• Class Partisanship• Support for government	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The system support• The government support• Establishment party
Sørensen (2004)	De Vreese and Boomgarden (2005)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• National sovereignty• Ideology• Political performance• Economic utility• Affective pull• Principled Opposition	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Anti-immigration sentiments• Economic evaluations• Support for the domestic government
Hooghe and Marks (2005)	McLaren (2006)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Economic theories• Social identity theory• Cue theory	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Post-materialism• Cognitive mobilization• Support for governing party• Rationalism• National Identity
Lubbers and Scheepers (2007)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Economic explanations• Political explanations• National and anti-out-group explanations	

In this dissertation, it is argued that the attitudes towards European integration could be analyzed under four main headings, such as non-economic approaches- cognitive mobilization, cost-benefit (utilitarian) approaches, government support, and national identity- perceived threat from other cultures.

2.3.2.1. Non-Economic Approaches- Cognitive Mobilization

Studies on public attitudes toward European integration have been shaped mainly by David Easton's concept of political support and Ronald Inglehart's concept of cognitive mobilization. Easton argues that there are two distinct types of support such

as specific and diffuse support. First of all, specific support means that evaluations are related to what political authorities do and how, so it is a response to the authorities' decisions, policies, and actions. It, therefore, refers political awareness, which means that people are aware of political authorities (Easton, 1975, p. 437). Secondly, diffuse support is directed to basic aspects of the system, and is independent of performance in the short run. It develops as a result of childhood and continuing adult socialization, as well as direct experience (Easton, 1975, p. 440). Thus, Easton emphasizes the cognitive awareness of people.

Ronald Inglehart also emphasizes the importance of cognitive mobilization and claims that without cognitive skills, it is not possible for a person to remain in the political life of a modern nation-state (Inglehart, 1977, p. 295). People are increasingly interested in political participation and becoming a part of the decision-making process, because of rising educational levels, and electronic media. As a result of higher educational levels, cognitive mobilized people have a high level of cognitive skill such as political awareness, which is necessary for understanding European integration. He also hypothesized that post-materialist ideals are more likely to be developed in people who were raised in times of relative peace and prosperity. People who lived during World War II have different values than older and younger generations. Therefore, these different generations have different value priorities. While the World War II generation emphasizes the materialist values such as physical security and economic stability, younger generations would emphasize post-materialist values such as free speech, political participation, and the environment (Inglehart, 1977, p. 28- 29). Post-materialists are expected to have more positive ideas about European integration than materialists because of their different values. People with a value system, which prioritizes the improvement of environmental protection and democracy over other concerns, such as physical and economic security, are more likely to support European integration (Inglehart, 1977, p. 37).

The ideas of Inglehart were supported by scholars who thought that cognitive mobilization has a positive impact on public opinion towards European integration.

Gabel (1998a, p. 352) claims five explanations of public support for European integration. The first one is *the cognitive mobilization*, which means that as a citizen's cognitive mobilization increases, it is more familiar with and less threatened by the topic of European integration (1998a, p. 338). The second one is *political values theories* that assume that the degree to which a citizen supports integration is determined by his or her own particular political preferences. The third one is *utilitarian appraisals of integrative policy*, which was first proposed by Gabel and Palmer. Gabel and Palmer (1995, p. 4) argued that integrative policy has different costs and benefits for EU citizens in different socioeconomic situations. These economic welfare differences have an impact on EU citizens' attitudes toward integration, and their support for integration is correlated positively with their welfare gains as a result of integrated policy. Gabel (1998b, p. 949) also claims that variations in citizens' support for their countries to be a member of the EU is consistent with differences in their occupation-based economic interests. Therefore, continued support for integration will depend on the capacity of the European Communities to meet its citizens' economic expectations. Moreover, Gabel and Whitten (1997, p. 92) argue that the subjective economy influences support for integration, not objective economic conditions. The fourth explanation of public support for European integration is *class partisanship*, which supports the idea the political party, has an impact on the views on integration of its supporters irrespective of their personal characteristics, such as occupation, education, values and income, that may affect both their choice of political party and their support for integration. The last explanation is *support for government* that predicts voters' support for integration is inextricably linked to their support for the governing party. Even though these are different explanations to understand sentiments towards the European integration, the cognitive skills of people are the common feature of all these explanations.

The cognitive mobilization has been used as a potential explanation for sentiments toward European integration, so disparities in cognitive mobilization can be used to explain divergent attitudes toward European integration. According to the hypothesis of cognitive mobilization, those with greater cognitive skills should have lower levels of fear of the EU because they have become more familiar with it. Those who are not

cognitively mobilized are fearful of what they did not know about the EU (McLaren, 2006, p. 14). However, Inglehart's hypotheses related to cognitive mobilization and post-materialism have been criticized by scholars in public Euroscepticism literature. Janssen (1991), for instance, used the Silent Revolution theory and basic concepts- post-materialism and cognitive mobilization- to explain the differences in attitudes towards European integration. However, he criticized the ideas of Inglehart and concluded that post-materialism has no effect on attitudes towards European integration and that cognitive mobilization has no bearing on attitudes towards European integration at the individual level (Janssen, 1991, p. 443). Anderson (1998, p. 586) also found empirical proof for the claim that post-materialism was negatively correlated to support for EU membership.

2.3.2.2. Cost-Benefit Approaches- Utilitarian Approaches

Rational and economic cost-benefit approaches to research on public opinion on European integration have been leading approaches since the beginning of the 1990s. Utilitarian approaches are concerned with gains and losses experienced by respondents, as well as the anticipated impact of these on attitudes towards European integration. Utilitarian approaches started by focusing on views of increasing economic development, expanded trade, and industrial modernization. In addition, Eichenberg and Dalton's (1993) study revealed that support for the EU on an aggregate basis might be explained by inflation and intra-EU trade balances, but not by unemployment, GDP, or EU budget returns. They looked at macroeconomic indicators to see if support for European integration varies by country's economic performance. According to Eichenberg and Dalton (1993, p. 512), the public's awareness of EU issues might have some certain limits, yet the EU's significant influence on economic welfare should be acknowledged by the European public. They refer to the objective perceptions on European integration attitudes, such as inflation, gross domestic product, and unemployment as economic perceptions, and EC referenda, national traditions, European Parliament elections, and East-West conflict as political perceptions (Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993, p. 507).

Gabel (1998a, 1998b) took the analysis to a different level and claimed that some people are more likely to gain from the process of integration. He describes the public support for European integration in terms of what he calls a 'utilitarian model.' Gabel clarifies with this description why individuals who have better job skills, higher salaries, and more education should be more pro-European integration. In contrast, others who have these things in lower supply should be more anti-European integration. For Gabel (1998a, b), public opinion is contingent on the degree to which citizens believe the EU can improve the economic situation of themselves/their country/Europe. Whether or not citizens experience economic welfare from European integration may depend on several socio-demographic indicators, particularly their human and financial capital (education, income, occupational skill) and proximity to other EU markets (border region residence).

These studies mentioned so far demonstrate how wealth, education, and job skills all contribute to support for European integration. Utilitarian approaches generally focus on economic benefits, but not all of them. Some of these studies focus on EU efficiency, which is the EU's ability to present itself as an entity capable of carrying out its policies effectively. In sum, utilitarian approaches assert that whether a person will support European integration depends on the gain and loss from this process.

2.3.2.3. Government Support

The studies on cognitive and economic explanations of support for European integration mentioned above mostly presuppose that people are capable of understanding the concept of European integration and its implications for them. However, these approaches, which impose this awareness on people, have been criticized by some scholars. Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994), as one of these critics, argue that attitudes towards European integration tend to follow the political party in power. When a right-wing political party is in power, people who would support a left-wing party expound their discontent with the current condition of the national government indirectly through their views on the EU.

Anderson (1998) also refers to the importance of government support. He contends that people are not adequately informed about the integration process, so how could people support something they do not know anything about? Anderson uses the “proxy” approach to answer this question. He argues that without having information about the integration process, proxies, such as government support, influence people's attitudes towards the EU. Since citizens do not have enough critical knowledge regarding the integration process, they see the integration process through the lens of how they feel about their own political system, political parties, and their government (Anderson, 1998, p. 591). In this regard, he talks about three hypotheses: The first one is, “the system support hypothesis,” which means domestic system support is positively associated with support for EU membership. The second one is “the government support hypothesis,” which means those who support the current government also are more supportive of the integration process. The last one is the “establishment party hypothesis,” in which supporters of establishment parties display higher levels of support for their country’s membership in the EU. Ray (2003) also supports the idea of people using proxies to show their ideas about the EU. He argues that given the scarcity of real knowledge regarding the integration process, people are likely to formulate their opinions on integration via proxies, and these proxies are likely to be motivated by national political concerns.

Although domestic conditions are significant in understanding attitudes towards the European integration process, it is not possible to argue that only government support determines people’s attitudes towards European integration. This approach is criticized since it is a very reductionist approach to link people’s attitudes only with government support, and it underestimates all other factors’ effects. In this regard, it is significant to mention the issues of immigration and refugees and the national identity.

2.3.2.4. National Identity, Immigration and Perceived Threat from Other Cultures

Rational understanding of public opinion on European integration, which is the calculation of the pros and cons of European integration for an ordinary EU citizen,

has been dominant in the literature for a long time. However, at the beginning of the 2000s, this dominance started to change. Studies emphasizing the importance of national identity and related issues such as immigration and the perception of others in understanding attitudes towards the European integration have become more important since then. Carey (2002, p. 387), for instance, accepts that national identity is a significant factor in explaining attitudes towards the EU and studies national identity in terms of the strength of one's feelings for her or his country, the degree to which people are attached to their country and other territorial entities, as well as their concern that other identities and cultures would invade the country's main national culture. Højlund (2000, p. 59), at the same time, claims that non-western immigration and European integration could be perceived as highly related topics in the public perception since modern European societies become more multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multireligious because of these two topics (as cited in Roald, 2004, p. 43). De Vreese (2004) also confirms a robust statistical relationship between his measures of anti-immigrant sentiments and low support for the EU.

As McLaren (2002, p. 551) argues, the degree of hostility toward other cultures engendered by national feelings plays a significant role in determining levels of support for, or hostility toward, the European integration. National pride mostly brings a hostile perception of foreigners. Therefore, how people see foreigners, immigrants, and refugees, that is to say, others in their society, may potentially influence their attitudes towards the process of European integration. Since integration means more contact with "other" people coming from outside the national borders and the increase in the influence of foreign policymakers on domestic politics, this perception of others will affect attitudes towards European integration. Because each culture is comprised of its own distinctive features, people may have a fear that foreigners will come and change the existing domestic culture and dominate it (De Master & Le Roy, 2000, p. 425).

Marks and Hooghe also assert that citizens' attachment to the nation and the perception of threat can influence their support for EU membership. In the same way, McLaren accepts that people are afraid of integration because they believe it will

threaten their culture. McLaren argues that the changing character of the nation and the nation-state has caused many Europeans to be sceptical of the EU because this international organization has probably contributed to this transformation in the eyes of the public (McLaren, 2002, p. 554). She also points out that rather than only identity-based concerns, hostile public attitudes towards European integration occur because of the threat posed by foreigners (McLaren, 2002, p. 551). Hooghe and Marks (2005) also mention the social identity theory of Inglehart, which views the EU as a polity overarching established territorial communities and considers how public opinion is shaped by individuals' self-conceptions. They look at how national identities, as well as social identities such as ethnicity, limit support for European integration via the lens of group psychology. Multiculturalism is strengthened as a result of European integration. With European integration, there is less of a distinction between 'us' and 'them', which has existed since the founding of European sovereign nation-states. For example, those who have a strong affinity for their national group and adhere to exclusionary standards see European integration as a threat, according to Kriesi and Lachat (2004).

National belonging, other cultures seen as a threat, and immigration are related issues considering the issue of European integration, as mentioned above. As it is known, anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic views have been recently increasing in most countries in Europe. Populist parties supporting these ideas also have become more powerful than ever. In fact, this is the situation in many countries all around the world. The more likely a person is against immigration, the more likely they will be a supporter of a populist party and hold Eurosceptic views (Van der Brug et al. 2000, Lubbers et al. 2002).

In the realm of identity, Luedtke (2005, p. 86) argues that since immigration is so closely tied to the nation's definition, it is a 'special' policy issue. Immigration policy creates a divide between the citizens of a country and those from other countries. In this regard, how people perceive others is the main question while studying the relationship between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic views in the literature. Sniderman et al. (2000, p. 62- 68) argue that people are ready to classify themselves

and other people into groups, and this is the most significant causal factor for discrimination against immigrants. They also add that it is seen that people who lean to classify immigrants as outsiders- an outside group are also lean to classify all others into outside groups generally, and to express antipathy towards these “outsiders” (Sniderman et al., 2000, p. 87- 89). The recent rise in the support for populist political parties demonstrates the relevance and importance of immigration-related views in shaping political opinion on European integration (de Vreese & Boomgarden, 2005, p. 64). In short, national identity, immigration, and seeing “others” as a threat affect each other. And all these influence public attitudes toward European integration.

McLaren (2002) is one of the scholars who emphasize the significance of immigration issues in understanding the support for or hostility towards European integration. She criticizes the previous approaches such as utilitarian, cost-benefit, and cognitive approaches. According to McLaren’s study, support for the EU is negatively correlated with the attitudes of the great national group. She claims that when people consider European integration, they are not always concerned with the pros and cons of the EU for their lives, but rather with the deterioration of the nation-state. That is to say, the threat posed by integration is not so much to the lives of the individuals as it is to the country. There are many issues a person might perceive as a threat to the nation-state and the national unity, such as immigration, multiculturalism, globalization, and international organizations like the EU, etc. For example, people might worry about losing their country’s social welfare system benefits and sharing these benefits with outsiders. Moreover, they might worry about losing their jobs to outside-group people. These outside-group people could be from other EU member states or any other country. Citizens mostly do not think that these losses are for them, but other citizens. Thus, this makes them think for the group. In other words, the immediate effect on the majority of people is likely to be modest, and the primary consideration is often for the resources of the major inside-group, the nation (McLaren, 2006, p. 190). Therefore, it is possible to claim that people are afraid of, and worry about, the changes that might occur in the nation-state, making them critical of the EU as a contributor to this change. Because the EU, in particular, is seen as endangering the distinctiveness of national cultures and exclusive control

over resources by the nation-state (McLaren, 2002, p. 554). Individuals will be more inclined to oppose policies they see endangering their way of life if they feel this way. In the European context, European integration certainly does have the capacity to constitute such a danger (McLaren, 2006, p. 73).

Immigration policy defines who should be admitted to the nation-state and who should not be, as well as the character of that admission via the establishment of admission, expulsion, settlement, and citizenship criteria (Luedtke, 2005, p.88). It might be expected that public opinion on immigration policy to be influenced by globalization and/or Europeanization to some extent since immigration is so closely linked to a country's national identity. In other words, individuals with a solid attachment to their own country are more likely to want it to maintain control over its own historically based immigration policy, notwithstanding the competing forces of globalization, which have pushed immigration policies to become more global in scope (Luedtke, 2005, p.89).

In the literature, it is expected that a sudden sharp rise in the number of immigrants or refugees would lead to anti-immigrant views because this increase is expected to cause concerns over how scarce resources can be used. In this regard, this increase might cause a more competitive environment for the "in-group" people. Therefore, these "in-group" people could have more exclusionist reactions. Even when there is no rivalry for resources, members of groups tend to identify strongly with their own group and to derogate other groups (McLaren, 2006, p. 70). And since populist right-wing parties have these exclusionist views in their agenda, the likelihood of voting for these parties increases as the actual number of ethnic minorities grows (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001, p. 433) Eurosceptic views also increase. If we look at the situation from a different angle, it could be said that lower levels of fear of immigration are related to higher levels of support (De Vreese & Boomgarden, 2005, p. 65). In short, the willingness of people to define out-groups negatively, as indicated by their sentiments towards immigrants, affects support for European integration (De Vreese & Boomgarden, 2005, p. 72).

Lubbers and Scheepers (2007) also contribute to the literature with their national and anti-out-group explanations. Their study is on three levels: individual, region, and country levels. In the literature, in-group and out-group categorizations are based on the Social Identity Theory of Inglehart in 1970. As an acceptance of this theory, De Master and Le Roy (2000, p. 419) also claim that people from other countries may be viewed as a threat to their integrity since they are perceived as being different from the in-group. People could see themselves and their in-group people as superiors to out-group people. Immigration and the presence of foreigners may be seen as a threat to national traditions similarly, in turn inducing political Euroscepticism.

Using the premise that political Euroscepticism is fueled by nationalist and anti-out-group sentiment, Lubbers and Scheepers (2007, p. 646) hypothesizes that on the individual level, individuals with less education, manual workers, and those with lower incomes are more likely to be Eurosceptic, since they respect national traditions more, are hostile to immigrants from other European nations, and see immigration as a more significant threat. On the other hand, McLaren claims that group-level issues are distinct from personal concerns and likely to account for as much of the variance in sentiments toward personal concerns (McLaren, 2006, p. 109). It was concluded that EU individuals are concerned about the threat to group resources due to worries about their national economies, not their own economic problems. Therefore, according to McLaren (2006, p. 109), many people oppose European integration because of fears of losing group resources, group symbols, and individual level, non-utilitarian elements, which make respondents more tolerant of politics than self-centered utilitarianism.

In addition to these individual and group levels to understand the importance of national identity, there is a greater anti-EU sentiment in nations where citizens place a higher value on national identity. It is mostly expected that nations, where individuals are more exposed to cultural manifestations from their own country or region than they are to those from other countries, would have a stronger sense of national identity and, therefore, a greater proclivity for political Euroscepticism. At the regional level, the geographical distance might induce political Euroscepticism.

People who are wary of European immigrants and believe they pose a danger tend to be Eurosceptic. As social identity theory claims, these views are significantly associated with political Euroscepticism. As Lubbers and Scheepers (2007, p. 663) claim, national sentiments are generally strongly associated with out-group attitudes. Because of the presence of anti-out-group sentiments, this adherence to traditions is not linked to political Euroscepticism. Therefore, Lubbers and Scheepers concluded that political Euroscepticism is fostered by hostility against immigrants more than adherence to tradition.

2.3.3. Conclusion

Public Euroscepticism has been a relatively less studied area among studies on Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, it has been developing since public opinion has become steadily more important. In the literature, it is clearly seen that scholars mostly study the reasons for public Euroscepticism. And, while they study the reasons, they focus on the cognitive skills of individuals and the costs and benefits of European integration to these individuals. Then, rather than focusing on the characteristics of people or the advantages and the disadvantages, national identity and the perception of others have become important in the literature. In this regard, this dissertation posits that national identity and the perception of others and consequently issues of immigration and refugees are the significant constituents in understanding public opinion on the EU recently. Stronger emotions of national identity are anticipated to lead to a decline in support for European integration. National identity results in a preference for state-level immigration restriction. The stronger one's identification with his or her nation-state, the more likely one is to reject a unified EU immigration policy (Luedtke, 2005, p. 90), and therefore have a more Eurosceptic approach.

2.4. Party-Based Euroscepticism

2.4.1. Theories of Party Competition

It is helpful to use party competition theories to understand the positions of political parties on European integration. Discussion on party competition is based on whether parties could change their ideological stances freely or are constrained by the views of past voters (Green, n.d., p. 2). The debate on party competition underlies the discussion of party-based Euroscepticism, which is based on whether ideology or strategy can explain the Eurosceptic behavior of political parties. Therefore, it is significant to refer to party competition theories to understand the Eurosceptic stances of political parties. Two fundamental theories of party competition explain party behaviors in the literature: the spatial theory and the saliency theory. According to these party competition theories, political parties are expected to compete on three main aspects: issue salience; issue conflict; and issue framing (Vasilopoulou, 2018b, p. 6).

The rational choice tradition offers three models of competitive political party behavior: (i) The vote-seeking party; (ii) the office-seeking party; and (iii) the policy-seeking party. On this basis of rational choice tradition, the spatial theory argues that political parties pursue maximization of their electoral support for government power; accordingly, they are not only vote-seekers but also vote-maximizers (Strøm, 1990, p. 566). Downs, who is accepted as one of the most prominent scholars regarding the spatial theory, assumes that (i) there is a uniform distribution of voters over the so-called line between the most right-wing and the most left-wing positions, (ii) voters consistently vote for the party whose position is closest to their own on the line, and (iii) the party leaders do not have binding obligations but change their political positions so that they can gain a significant number of votes and therefore gain office (Downs, 1957, p. 115). In other words, there are two basic positions, being right-wing and left-wing, and people choose and vote for the political party that is nearest their positions. Moreover, according to the assumptions of the spatial theory, party competition is based on conflict over policy issues, so political parties adopt dissimilar policy positions to indicate the distinctions in their program to the

electorate, and political parties move towards the median voter position (Downs, 1957, p. 117).

On the other hand, Robertson (1976) and Budge and Farlie (1983), and Budge (2001, 2003) criticize Downs' spatial theory for making restrictive assumptions about the real world, and they offer saliency theory as an adjustment to traditional choice ideas. Robertson analyzed manifestos of political parties in the UK from 1922 to 1974 and suggested a policy classification including 22 categories, and this is called the purest examples of saliency codings by Budge (2015, p. 767). Thus, it could be said that saliency theory has been established in a close relationship with content analysis. The Comparative Manifesto Project is also an example of saliency coding. Robertson, in his study, chose to score the political parties only in terms of salience, such as the percentage of times that a particular policy issue was referred to out of the overall number of policy arguments mentioned in every manifesto. He claims that political parties have a limited ability to change their position on the left-right line and that they compete by emphasizing and de-emphasizing some issues and not others. Moreover, for Robertson, political parties' positions are not crucial per se, and that during an election campaign, different issues are significant for each political party (as cited in Zulianello, 2014, p. 1726).

Saliency theory suggests that political parties are more likely to describe their policies by stressing specific issues more than others, especially in public documents and debates (Budge, 2015, p. 761). Thus, saliency approaches examine issue emphasis and offer that political parties strategically manipulate issue salience. As Budge (2015, p. 766-767) argues, saliency theory makes three particular expectations regarding party strategic behavior. Firstly, political parties' discourses are primarily based on their emphasis on various issues instead of directly opposing other political parties on the very same issues. Secondly, political parties usually emphasize their own particular issues compared to others. Thus, there is an ongoing relationship between certain political parties and particular issues. Thirdly, political parties take advantage over other parties when the issues they emphasize become more critical in the public agenda, especially during election campaigns.

Regarding the issue emphasis, Budge and Ferlie (1983, p. 50) argue that election campaigns could be characterized concerning the supremacy of a political party's favorable issues over another's. They describe issues such as civil order, the constitution, foreign relations, ethnicity, socioeconomic redistribution, moral and religious issues, the military, defense, and more. Thus, each party has its own issues and is associated with different policy areas. In other words, in saliency theory, it is assumed that political parties differ considerably in their emphases. Accordingly, for a political party, even mentioning the topic of another political party could be dangerous because it brings that issue into prominence, and thus it could benefit its rivals. In this regard, Budge et al. (1987, p. 25) claim that rather than arguing about the issue of another party, the best plan is not to refer to it, or to deal with casually, if any reference has to be made in line with the view of public concern.

Furthermore, in contrast to spatial theory, saliency theory offers that if politicians cannot follow their policies at least to some extent, then the office is not a goal for most of them. Thus, they will not change their essential commitments considerably, but they will adjust their emphases somewhat if winning votes secures victory. It commonly includes de-emphasizing the common policy areas, as Robertson asserts (1976), and emphasizing non-partisan areas such as technology- but marginally (Budge et al., 1987, p. 29).

Moreover, Budge refers to another subject regarding the saliency issue. He argues that saliency is an issue linkage rather than an issue ownership thesis (Budge, 2015, p. 764). He means that political parties could have their specific issues, but these issues do not have to be inevitably the ones that bring in votes. For Budge, political parties have control over emphasizing and de-emphasizing issues for strategic advantage, among other things, as the saliency theory offers. Thus, he adds that political parties might only move to the center and emphasize the same issues if votes become of strategic importance. He asserts that, however, rather than owning particular issues, political parties could not refuse these issues, and all they have to do is try to play them to the best advantage (Budge, 2015, p. 766). He essentially argues that parties try to promote their issues to increase their votes, as expected.

However, even though their own particular issue is low on the public agenda, parties could not completely disregard it on purpose. That is to say, even if party leaders realize that their issue is not as essential as much as they would like, they could not completely turn their back on that issue. They could have to face challenges that occur after an election, not only for losing votes but also for abandoning the party's principles. In such a case, they can sustain minimal emphasis on their own particular issues. During that time, they can hope to increase votes by non-policy means such as adopting a new position regarding crises, running generally accepted candidates, crucial election alliances, etc. (Budge, 2015, p. 770).

On the other hand, Helbling et al. (2010) point out the issue framing. They argue that analyzing how political actors frame integration issues is significant; in other words, how political actors describe a specific issue and which reasons they relate to which positions matter (Helbling et al., 2010, p. 497). That is to say, knowing how political parties comprehend and describe European integration helps to explain these parties' positions towards it and to realize the reasons underlying their Eurosceptic stances. Helbling et al. (2010, p. 497) also argue that how political parties frame an issue is based on the national interests that they traditionally defend, their common positions towards European integration, and whether they are one of the mainstream political actors in their own countries or not. Thus, they assert that since political parties defend different interests in national politics, their expectation from European integration and their understanding of European integration differ. Moreover, they argue that marginal political parties located on the right and the left are essentially against European integration. In contrast, the more traditional ones are generally in favor of it.

As Helbling et al. (2010) assert that how an issue is framed is significant to understand the positions of political parties, they explain different political parties' perceptions of European integration to clarify the Eurosceptic stances of political parties. In this article, Helbling et al. study six Western European countries between 2004 and 2006. For instance, Helbling et al. (2010, p. 516-517) argue that while the left-wing political parties see European integration as a threat to the modern welfare state's existing

achievements, yet to differing degrees; the left socialists and communists oppose entirely to all features of European integration by referring to labor and social security. Moreover, Greens support European integration's institutional features because they determine that European integration could be useful in establishing a better awareness between peoples and removing cultural barriers. Social democrats, on the other hand, both support and criticize particular features of European integration in terms of economic prosperity frameworks. Besides this, the right-wing parties mostly use nationalistic frameworks to oppose European integration considerably, but to different degrees.

Additionally, the populist and radical right parties' rhetoric depends predominantly on nationalistic frameworks, independently of the subject at the center of the discussion. Whereas liberal parties barely use economic prosperity frameworks in their arguments quite surprisingly, conservatives and Christian Democrats frequently use these frameworks to criticize European integration instead of supporting it. It seems that they do not see European integration as an economic project. In a nutshell, these arguments show us how political parties understand European integration defines their positions towards it.

Helbling et al. (2010, p. 499- 503) categorize frames regarding European integration (Table 3). These are cultural, economic, and other utilitarian frames. There are also subsections such as nationalistic, multicultural-universalist under cultural frames; labor and social security, economic prosperity under economic frames; political efficiency and efficacy, and security and ecology under other utilitarian frames. The party family, which a political party is a part of, and its general positions on European integration affect its using of these frames (Helbling et al., 2010, p. 504). For instance, they argue that political efficiency and efficacy frames are two frames that the established parties mostly use. Established parties seem prone to manage specific European integration-related issues in daily politics more than marginal parties of the right-wing and left-wing do. Whereas green parties hardly have a significant function in domestic politics, they sometimes could be crucial actors in coalition governments.

Additionally, these parties are inclined to deal with issues related to European integration because of the utilitarian reasons they have (Hooghe et al., 2004, p. 139).

Table 3: Frame Categorization²

Cultural	Nationalistic
	Multicultural-universalist
Economic	Labor and social security
	Economic prosperity
Other utilitarian	Political efficiency and efficacy
	Security and ecology

In addition to issue saliency, issue conflict, and issue framing, De Vries and Hobolt (2012) refer to the strategy of issue entrepreneurship. They use this term, issue entrepreneurship, to signify the party strategy of actively using new policy issues, which have been mostly disregarded intentionally by the mainstream political parties or to signify the mobilization of a policy position on an issue, which is largely different from the current mainstream position (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012, p. 250). They claim that mainstream government parties are not expected to appear as issue entrepreneurs since they have political office already. They also add that since the potential election gains could not be guaranteed to offset the potential costs of losing future coalition partners, mainstream opposition parties might also refrain from an issue entrepreneurial strategy (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012, p. 251). In contrast, they expect challenger political parties to act as issue entrepreneurs because they have very little to lose with regard to the possible future coalition. Therefore, challenger parties have more potential than mainstream parties in terms of trying to activate European

² This table is taken from Helbling et al. 2010, p. 499.

integration-related issues and adopt a completely different position from the one before (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012, p. 252).

All in all, theories of party competition are significant in understanding the political parties' positions towards European integration. One of these theories, saliency theory, will be used as a background to comprehend and explain the party-based Euroscepticism in this thesis. Saliency theory will be a valuable tool to understand the Eurosceptic stances of political parties. It will be a guide for describing how the EU's crisis has affected the party-based Euroscepticism in Germany. In this regard, some of the basic assumptions of saliency theory are used to identify this dissertation's hypotheses. First of all, it is claimed that political parties' discourses are mostly based on their emphasis on different issues instead of directly opposing other political parties on the same issue. Thus, they compete by emphasizing and de-emphasizing issues. Secondly, political parties' positions are not the only important thing during an electoral campaign. At this time, different issues could be significant for each political party. They describe their policies by stressing some specific issues more than others. Therefore, they differ considerably in their emphases. Thirdly, political parties pursue different interests at the national level, so what they understand about the EU and their expectations from it differ. In other words, how political parties frame the EU as an issue defines their positions towards the EU.

2.4.2. What is Party-Based Euroscepticism?

Political parties have a significant function in the debates regarding European integration at the national level. Each political party perceives and analyzes European integration in different aspects. Whereas some of them oppose European integration for cultural arguments, others might support European integration for the same cultural arguments. Political parties could lead the debate on the European issues in a country and could affect other actors such as the public, media, and non-governmental organizations. They also could be affected by these actors. Therefore, Euroscepticism within and among political parties, in other words, party-based Euroscepticism, is significant to comprehend Euroscepticism in general.

As a sub-field of studies on Euroscepticism (Leruth et al., 2018a, p. 6), party-based Euroscepticism is one of the most studied fields in Euroscepticism studies. In the literature, studies are mostly on defining and conceptualizing party-based Euroscepticism. Since most scholars attempt to explain party-based Euroscepticism in their own way and prove that definition and conceptualization via case studies, there is no consensus on the definition and the classification of party-based Euroscepticism, as on Euroscepticism. In addition to the definition issue, measurement is another significant problem related to party-based Euroscepticism. While a group of scholars uses expert surveys, others use manifestos, leader statements, or parliamentary debates to measure party-based Euroscepticism. Another issue in the literature, on the other hand, is determining the reasons for party-based Euroscepticism. There are different reasons to take a Eurosceptic stance for political parties in the literature.

Overall, it could be said that these discussions have mostly shaped the literature on party-based Euroscepticism. Therefore, it is crucial to get these three related questions answered while studying party-based Euroscepticism. The first question, which is how party-based Euroscepticism is defined, is related to the definition and the conceptualization of party-based Euroscepticism. The second one is how party-based Euroscepticism is to be measured, so it is based on the measurement problem in the literature. And, the last question is related to causality: Why do political parties adopt Eurosceptic stances?

Party-based Euroscepticism has been considered as a 'touchstone of dissent' as Paul Taggart claims in his famous description of Euroscepticism. As mentioned in the section on Euroscepticism, in the beginning, during the 1980s, the Eurosceptic stance is not widespread among political parties. It was limited to the opposition parties. Therefore, in a case in which most mainstream or governing political parties support a pro-European position, for protest-based parties, opposition to European integration becomes a way to identify themselves differently from the mainstream parties. In this context, Euroscepticism is principally considered as the "politics of opposition" (Sitter, 2002). Accordingly, since the EU is realized through centrist politics, party-

based Euroscepticism has been analyzed as a product of ideological (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Ray 2007) or religious (Madeley & Sitter, 2005) extremism (Leconte, 2015, p. 252). However, over time, in the literature, it is seen that party-based Euroscepticism could not be limited to the political parties on the periphery. It is accepted that mainstream parties could also have Eurosceptic stances at different levels.

Conceptualizations of party-based Euroscepticism usually have been developed around the issue of what is opposed to and the intensity of this opposition. For instance, if a political party supports European integration in general and the EU specifically but opposes a particular policy of the EU, then that party is not usually accepted as a Eurosceptic party. However, opposition to some particular policies of the EU could make that party Eurosceptic at a level. As Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008d, p. 25) argue, when a political party opposed to the Economic and Monetary Union, which is a relatively more important policy area, it is more likely for that party to be labeled as Eurosceptic than another party that opposed to a less important policy area, such as the Common Fisheries Policy. Therefore, it is not the same thing to oppose the agricultural or the environmental policy of the EU and to be against the economic and financial policies of the EU.

2.4.3. What Causes Political Parties to Adopt Eurosceptic Stances? Ideology vs. Strategy

Various factors could explain a political party's position on the European integration issue. However, the literature primarily focuses on this crucial question: whether strategy or ideology helps to understand and explain party-based Euroscepticism. In other words, there are two approaches in the literature to explain why political parties adopt Eurosceptic stances: the approach, which focuses on ideology, and the approach, which focuses on strategy. As Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008b, p. 254) argue, the principal discussion in the party-based Euroscepticism literature is whether Euroscepticism is mainly clarified by 'ideological-programmatic party competition' or 'strategic-tactical party competition factors.' Whereas ideology is seen as the

principal determinant in the first approach, others analyze political parties' Eurosceptic stance through their strategic moves. Whereas some scholars assert that the main explanation for party-based Euroscepticism could be a strategy linked in particular to a party's position in the party system, others suggest that ideology plays the central role in this determining process.

It is mostly accepted that there are two approaches to explain why political parties adopt Eurosceptic stances towards the EU in the party-based Euroscepticism literature. According to Cas Mudde, it is possible to group these two approaches as the Sussex School and the North Carolina School. Mudde (2012, p. 193) argues that these are two major schools, which have been shaping the party-based Euroscepticism literature and Euroscepticism studies. While the Sussex School stresses the importance of strategy, the North Carolina School emphasizes the importance of ideology. For Mudde, these schools differ in the definition and the conceptualization of Euroscepticism, the methods they use, and the data they choose. While Taggart, Szczerbiak, Flood, Fuchs, Roger, Magni- Berton, and Kaniok are regarded as the representatives of the Sussex School; Hooghe, Marks, Ray, Hix, and Sitter are considered as the North Carolina School's proponents. These two schools based their studies on different analytical approaches. Although the Sussex School focuses on party programs/manifestos, leader statements, and parliamentary debates, the North Carolina School uses expert surveys and questionnaires to study party-based Euroscepticism (Mudde, 2012, p. 196). While the Sussex school depends mainly on qualitative case studies or comparative analyses, the North Carolina school prefers to use longitudinal, quantitative data (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). The Sussex school would generally argue that nationally-defined aspects such as the structure of the party system, the electoral system, probabilities to access office, and positions of major potential allies or rivals, would condition a political party's stance towards European integration. Alternative to this view, the North Carolina school focuses more on the impact of traditional socioeconomic divisions –as primarily indicated by cleavage theory– on party positions on European integration (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 156).

The competition between these two approaches- party-based Euroscepticism as an ideology and strategy- and these two schools- North Carolina and the Sussex- helps to develop the literature on what causes political parties to adopt Eurosceptic behaviors. This discussion on ideology and strategy provides the improvement in the literature since it also induces other issues such as the left/right dimension, GAL/TAN dimension, or the importance of the party system in determining Eurosceptic behaviors.

2.4.3.1. Ideology

The first approach refers to the significance of ideology (Ray, 1999; Marks & Wilson, 2000; Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Gabel & Hix, 2005; Hooghe et al., 2004; Hix et al., 2007; Flood & Soborski 2011). Ideology matters because the party politicians', essential members,' and supporters' common identities in the domestic arena are based on ideologies, that is to say, ideologies enable some alliances and obstruct others (Flood & Soborski, 2018, p. 45). According to this approach, whether or not a political party is Eurosceptic is influenced by the historical cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) as the origins of the main ideological party families like liberal, Christian democratic conservative and social democratic. This approach is essentially based on Rokkan's (1970) cleavage theory that categorizes parties and argues that in society, there are cleavages such as church vs. government, subject vs. dominant culture, primary vs. secondary economy, and workers vs. employers.

Then, scholars like von Beyme (1985) used the cleavage theory to identify different party families with distinctive ideologies such as bourgeois parties, workers' parties, Christian democrats, communist parties, protest parties, agrarian parties, and populist parties. In this regard, this approach accepts that ideology drives general attitudes towards European integration in principle, so ideology creates a party's support for the principles establishing the process of European integration (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 320). Furthermore, since it is argued that attitudes towards the EU evolve with ideologies, it is accepted that as a result of ideological change, European

integration might be seen in different ways by the same party at different times (Conti & Memoli, 2012, p. 92).

In addition to Lipset and Rokkan's approach, there is a relatively new argument that claims Euroscepticism represents a new social cleavage. This ideological approach to the party-based Euroscepticism argues that a new divide is emerging- one that is either unrelated to the already existing ideological poles (Hix 1999) or it is fused within an existing single dimension (Tsebelis & Garrett, 2000), or somehow partially related to the traditional left/ right divide (Marks et al. 2007) (Topaloff, 2018, p. 64). This approach that sees Euroscepticism as a new social cleavage is important since there is an increase in the numbers of Eurosceptic parties such as The UK Independence Party, The French National Party, and Syriza in Greece, etc.

2.4.3.1.1. Left/Right and GAL/TAN Dimension

Scholars who assert that ideological considerations matter in determining whether a party is Eurosceptic or not, claim that throughout Europe, two dimensions lead to competition between political parties. The first dimension is the Left and Right dimension, which is mostly about economic issues. It is argued that the position of a political party on the Left/Right dimension is closely related to a political party's position on European integration (Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002, p. 592). Besides, peripheral parties located on the Left & the Right extremes are significantly more Eurosceptical than mainstream parties such as Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, Conservative, and Liberal parties (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 968). At the same time, Helbling et al. (2010, p. 502) argue that because the European integration process contains an economic and cultural dimension, and political parties take different stances in accordance to the interests that they generally protect at the national level. Whereas the Left dimension gives precedence to economic equality, the Right one prioritizes individual economic freedom. Left-wing parties, for instance, see European integration as a threat to the accomplishments of the modern welfare state, but to different degrees (Helbling et al., 2010, p. 516).

European integration is primarily seen as an organization based on economic interests and as a liberal market project. For this reason, the Euroscepticism of these radical political parties on the Left/Right scale arises not only from their opposition to the EU's particular policies but also because they reject the basic ideology underlying the EU (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 969). Beyond economic concerns, it is argued that since radical Left and Right parties share elements of nationalist ideology in their peculiar ways, they share a common Eurosceptic stance. Even though left-wing and right-wing parties have different visions of national interest, it is claimed that these parties have shared concerns that are different from mainstream or governing rivals (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012, p. 505).

The second dimension is not economic but a cultural, ecological, gender-based, new-politics dimension. This dimension has much more diversity than the Left/ Right dimension. The poles of the dimension are described with these terms: green/ alternative/ libertarian (GAL) and transnationalism/ authority/ nationalism (TAN) (Marks et al. 2006, p. 156- 157). It is argued that political parties close to the TAN pole, which are radical Right and Right-populist parties, are Eurosceptic without exception. These parties are the most Eurosceptic party families indeed, and their relative electoral weight within their national party systems has grown considerably during the past two decades (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 977). What is common to all of these parties close to the TAN pole is the rejection of further political integration. They support the idea of national sovereignty, and that makes them prefer no more than an intergovernmental EU through holding the right of national veto. Euroscepticism of these political parties influences their perceptions and policies on other issues, such as their perception of nationalism and the immigration issue. They mostly consider themselves as protectors of their national culture against foreigners.

Moreover, Conservative parties with a TAN tendency are also likely to be Eurosceptical. Although their arguments are not as radical as those of radical Right and Right-populist parties', Conservative parties are also against conflicting sources of identity within their state, the influx of immigrants, and external intervention from other countries and international organizations for their national culture, sovereignty,

and community. The underlying idea of their nationality understanding is that the nation-state should protect its legitimate sovereign right to rule the people who live in its territory. Eurosceptics in conservative parties hardly attempt to withdraw from the EU, yet they advocate a looser confederation, which contains as much of Europe as possible (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 981).

Furthermore, another argument related to these dimensions is that the opposition to European integration has two sides: it is placed at both Left and Tan extremes since the EU is a centrist project. The EU is a political project initiated by the mainstream parties such as Christian Democrats, social democrats, liberals, and conservatives, having controlled national parliaments, national governments, the EP, and the European Commission. Therefore, many political parties, which are not located at the center of their party system, oppose European integration as a continuation of their domestic policies. European integration, according to the extreme Left, is an elite capitalist goal, which deprives the citizens of decision-making power on behalf of strong companies. Accordingly, radical TAN parties see European integration as an elitist supranational project that weakens national autonomy and traditional values (Marks et al., 2006, p. 163). On the other hand, Green parties, located close to the GAL pole, are regarded as more integrationist. This relationship between Green parties and the pro-European stance reinforces the relationship between the new politics dimension and the pro-European integration approach. GAL parties are not known for being anti-European integrationists. Nevertheless, Green Parties also have some Eurosceptic tendencies since the lack of democratic accountability in the EU is of concern to them. On the other hand, these parties take pro-integration stances on other issues such as environmental issues and asylum (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 984).

All in all, Flood and Soborski (2018, p. 39) argue that this GAL/ TAN dimension is a useful distinction since it allows the researcher to understand variation in stances by different sets of policy sectors, and it can highlight characteristic differences between political parties. That could be the case for the Left/Right dimension. However, there are also discrepancies in the position taken towards European integration by political parties from the same party family. Political parties from the

so-called same party family might react differently to the policies of the EU and/or the whole integration project. In this regard, it could be said that ideologies matter in political parties' positions towards European integration, but claiming that they are the only things that matter could be seen as reductionist. Therefore, the importance of strategy as a way to explain the political party positioning towards European integration should not be overlooked. However, this classification (TAN/GAL) that Hooghe and Marks use, as post-functionalists, could be a useful way to analyze political parties' stances towards European integration.

2.4.3.2. Strategy

The second approach that shapes party-based Euroscepticism literature focuses on the importance of strategy (Taggart 1998; Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008, 2018; Flood 2002a, 2002b). According to this approach, the party-based Euroscepticism is a question of strategic positioning. The explanation and change of positions towards European integration are considered as a matter of party strategy. The strategic approach tries to get an answer to the question of why parties adopt a Eurosceptic stance from a rational actor's perspective. There is no clear-cut direct relationship between the position of a political party on European integration and the generally accepted ideology in that party, according to this approach. That is to say, it is not possible to determine the position of a political party by only looking at which ideological family it is a part of.

Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008d, p. 256) argue that two factors determine fundamental party positions on the European integration issue: one of them is the party's widespread ideological profile and values and the other one is the perceived interests of its supporters. Therefore, ideology is not totally ignored, but it is argued that there are also other significant factors. For Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008d, p. 258), the relative significance of these elements depends on the type of party in question and whether it is basically a more value-based goal-seeking, a more pragmatic office-seeking, or an ideological party. A goal-seeking political party that has definite programmatic and ideological purposes will prioritize the ideology. In contrast, an

interest-based office-seeking party will apparently give precedence to the interests of its supporters and attempt to have a more straightforward economic cost-benefit analysis of how European integration is probably for the benefit of its supporters.

Sitter also accepts the importance of strategy in determining the positions of political parties, even though he has been recognized as a representative of the North Carolina School. He argues that the explanation of political parties' adoption of and changes in Euroscepticism, therefore, lies in party strategy, in terms of the mutual interests that shape competition between parties: survival of the party and its core identity, policy preferences, the pursuit of votes, and the quest for office (Sitter, 2003, p. 240-241). Therefore, political parties have to make strategic decisions to achieve these goals, and their decision to take or change a Eurosceptic stance is the result of these four strategic concerns. In each case, motivation for Euroscepticism might be changed.

Furthermore, three broad strategies that are defined by Sitter, the ones that are interest, protest, and catch-all, are related to different priorities and choices to the extent these four objectives above-mentioned are covered. As shown in Table 4, in the catch-all model, since vote-maximizing and the pursuit of office are primarily important, political parties pretend as if ideology and policy commitments were insignificant. Thus, these parties' Eurosceptic behavior- if there is- is driven by policy concerns. In this regard, changing positions on European integration might be explained with reference to the policy, particularly economics and foreign policy. On the other hand, in the interest model, the political party seeks to speak for the interests of a particular part of the electorate since they are organized around an accurate set of identities or interests. Lastly, in the protest model, parties are more prone to Euroscepticism. Since policy preferences and ideology correlate more strongly, Euroscepticism is regarded as an issue related to party strategy and within the parameters made up by the domestic party system, policy alternatives, and EU policy (Sitter, 2003, p. 250).

Moreover, Flood (2002b, p. 10) accepts that ideology matters in positions towards the EU, but he also argues that there is no single ideology guaranteeing that a party will be rejectionist, revisionist, or EU sceptical at all since ideologies are incredibly open to change and reinterpretation. He indicates that even a nationalist party may hold pro-EU stances if it believes that the EU can be structured to more efficiently promote national interests than the nation accomplishes by itself. Also, Rovny (2004, p. 36-37) asserts that Euroscepticism can be both ideologically and strategically driven. Ideologically driven Eurosceptic parties adopt Euroscepticism since it is indicated in their ideological base. They are not likely to give up their original values and essential principles to take a softer stance on Europe. In contrast to ideologically driven Eurosceptic parties, strategically driven Eurosceptic parties utilize Euroscepticism as a practical tool for their fundamental program. In other words, strategically driven Eurosceptic parties try to attract electorates and to make them sensitive to these issues. Therefore, they aim to increase their political influence and gain new voters through Eurosceptic discourses.

Table 4: Three Broad Party Strategies³

Catch-all:	major parties imitate each other's successful innovations
	maximizing votes and prioritizing the pursuit of office
	less ideological opposition to European integration
	soft Euroscepticism: policy-oriented
	pretending as if ideology is insignificant
Interest:	ideology is important
	representing the interests of a specific part of the electorate
	policy goals are more important than vote-maximization or the quest for office
Protest:	more prone to Euroscepticism
	ideology and policy preferences correlate strongly
	Euroscepticism as a part of party strategy

³ This table is prepared by the author based on the information taken from Sitter (2003).

To sum up, proponents of the strategic approach claim that strategic moves of political parties are significant in explaining their positions towards European integration. Even though they argue there is no direct relationship between ideologies and party positions, they do not totally ignore the significance of ideologies.

2.4.3.2.1. Party Systems in Europe

Sartori (2005, p. 39) argues that a party system is the system of interactions resulting from party competition. Thus, how a party reacts to another party, and vice versa, defines the party system. Topaloff (2018, p. 69) argues that the Eurosceptic universe is occupied with very different parties in terms of their political message, organization, the reason for being and strategies, and of whether they are small or large more established or not. Party-based Euroscepticism is shaped by the positions of the political parties in the party system, and also, those stances towards European integration define party systems in Europe. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002, p. 25- 26) claim that the emergence of the party-based Euroscepticism in the party systems of the candidate states and the differences between the states can be examined by looking at their party systems. Political parties that prioritize strategic reasons as the primary drivers of party positions have shifted their positions as they get closer to government participation (Szczurbiak & Taggart, 2008c, p. 7- 15). In other words, the more political parties are close to the center, the less Eurosceptic they are.

In this regard, Taggart and Szczurbiak (2008a, p. 348) argue that there are three patterns of the European issue contestation characterizing the party systems in Europe. The first one is limited contestation. In this system, major parties have an extensive commitment to the European project, and European integration is not an issue of party competition among the major parties. However, major party consensus over European integration does not necessarily mean the complete absence of Euroscepticism within the party system. There is usually a minimal historical record of Euroscepticism. France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Finland, and Slovenia have been labeled as having a limited contestation party system. The second one is open contestation. One or more

government parties have taken a position of soft or hard Euroscepticism in this system. European integration has been a significant element of party competition. Parties have defined themselves at some time, at least partially, in relation to each other regarding their position on European integration. The European issue has played an essential role in determining either the make-up of a government or the leadership of a major party. The UK, Greece, Sweden, Austria, Malta, Czechia, Denmark, and Norway have been categorized as the countries that have an open contestation system (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008a, p. 355). The last one is constrained contestation. European issues play a role in this system. There are parties that have declared their hostility towards European integration, but these issues relating to European problems do not affect the competition among national parties directly. Therefore, the European issue has such low importance in the countries that have this system. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have been seen as having a constrained contestation system (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008a, p. 350).

All in all, Taggart and Szczerbiak categorize the party systems in Europe on the basis of political parties' stances towards European integration. While they argue that the positions of political parties towards European integration have an impact on the party systems in Europe, they also claim that those political parties' locations in the party system have an impact on their positions towards European integration.

2.4.3.2.2. Location of Political Parties in the Party System

Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008a, 2008b) accept that some party families might have ideological tendencies to have a Eurosceptic position or not to take one. However, they also claim that they have found out from their early empirical survey data of parties that there is no linear relationship between Euroscepticism and political parties' type as the Right or Left. Thus, there is no correlation between if a party is Eurosceptic and it is a left-wing or right-wing party. Political parties from different party families could display the same Eurosceptic stance, whereas political parties from the same party family could display different stances. There are parties from

different points of the left-right spectrum expressing Euroscepticism. On the other hand, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001, p. 11-29) claim that the positions taken by political parties in the party systems are related to the level of Euroscepticism expressed. For instance, in the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe- now member states-, soft Euroscepticism tends to be mentioned by both governing parties and opposition parties. Conti (2003, p. 10) agrees with the idea that the location of a party stands within a party system and how it relates to the patterned interactions characterizing the system itself determines the attitudes developed by the party towards the EU. Thus, the position of a political party in the party system- whether it is a mainstream party or a peripheral party- has affected its stance towards European integration.

In this regard, extremist parties who are outside the center of their party systems tend to take Eurosceptic positions, so Eurosceptic parties are likely to be located on the peripheries of party politics. It could be said that all hard-Eurosceptic parties are peripheral to their party systems. In other words, a right or left political party does not necessarily have to be Eurosceptic, but Eurosceptic parties are usually located on the peripheries. Thus, it is argued that party ideology might make us understand common trends. However, it hides qualitative differences within party families (Szczurbiak & Taggart, 2008c, p. 257; Vasilopoulou 2011, 2016).

In Figure 2 below, Taggart displays ideologies, political party positions in the system, and party families in Western Europe. Even though party families change from country to country, Taggart (1998, p. 380) argues that this figure is a way to suggest a generalized picture. Party families outside the circle are regarded as Eurosceptic. Thus, this figure shows that party families that have different ideological principles could have the same stance on the issue of Euroscepticism. At the same time, it is possible to claim that party families, which have similar ideologies, like the Conservative and New Populist parties, do not have to have the same position on European integration. In this context, this figure supports Taggart and Szczurbiak's idea that only ideological factors are inadequate to explain parties' stances towards the EU. On the other hand, it is possible to claim that ideology is an essential

component determining the position towards the EU. It is because, as it is seen in Figure 2, only certain types of parties are declared as Eurosceptics. This figure also suggests that political parties located on the periphery of their party system explain their Eurosceptic stances. Finally, Taggart observes that when Euroscepticism occurs inside a dominant party variable of the diagram, it is more likely to occur in the form of factions within a major party (Taggart, 1998, p. 383).




Figure 2: Ideology, Party Position and Party Families in Europe⁴

Regarding the issue of political parties' location, Vasilopoulou (2018b, p. 6) also argues that mainstream parties are likely to be pro-EU; they are motivated to refrain from debating European integration-related issues. In this context, challenger parties challenge the status quo by emphasizing extreme positions on Europe. They try to distinguish themselves by strategically increasing the salience of the issue of Europe, that is, escalating conflict over the EU issue. This strategy of issue saliency is

⁴ This figure is taken from Taggart, 1998, p. 381.

expected to lead to an electoral advantage over their mainstream pro-EU competitors, in such a case of rising popular Euroscepticism. These expectations are also in line with Taggart's (1998) argument Euroscepticism is primarily observed among political parties that are peripheral to the party system. Sitter (2002) also supports this argument by arguing that as political parties become closer to the government, they are expected to modify or avoid Euroscepticism. Thus, it could be said that political parties compete on the European integration issue in different ways.

Moreover, Faye (2004) asserts in the horseshoe thesis, both ends of the political spectrum do show similarities in their belief systems (as cited in Visser et al., 2014, p. 6). That is to say, the goals of both radical ideologies on the edges could be quite similar, and these two ends seem closer to each other. In other words, political parties on the far-left and far-right are likely to be the most opposed to further integration, resulting in an inverted U-curve relationship between party positions on the left-right dimension and their stances on the European integration issue (Van de Wardt et al., 2014, p. 990). This U shape of party positions on European integration (Marks & Wilson 2000; Hooghe et al. 2004) implies that opposition to European integration comes from the far Left and the far right, while center parties generally take a pro-integrationist position. Nevertheless, while radical left-wing and right-wing parties oppose all aspects of European integration as a whole, established moderate left-wing and right-wing parties are frequently what Conti (2003, p. 17) has described as 'functional Europeanists.'

In this regard, Vasilopoulou emphasizes another factor, which is time. She argues that in relation to political parties, it is not limited to a certain value and belief systems, nor is the position in the party system is a definite sign of Euroscepticism. It is necessary to underline here the significance of the time factor (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 154). For instance, socialist parties had great doubts about the European integration project in the 1980s (Featherstone, 1998), but it is not the case anymore. Moreover, as Vasilopoulou argues and as indicated in this study before, since the process starting with the Maastricht Treaty, the opposition to European integration is much more different to its origin, and it is honestly articulated by several radical left

and radical right, green and single-issue anti-EU parties. Even though it is generally accepted that mainstream parties at the center do not take a Eurosceptic position, they also could oppose specific policies of European integration, mostly because of their political interests at the national level. Moreover, they are not as Euroenthusiastic as they once were, as Hooghe and Marks (2006) claim. In this regard, the character of Euroscepticism becomes much more multidimensional with changes in the understanding of Euroscepticism in time. It can be related to the system as a whole, to its organizational structure, specific policies such as enlargement or the euro, or to the perceived overall direction of the EU regulatory system, with the assessment of the latter being mostly subjective (Vasilopoulou, 2013, p. 155), and it can be expressed by all types of political parties currently.

That is to say, all types of political parties, nationalist, right or left extremist, mainstream, or any other type, have declared their Eurosceptic stances at different times. Thus, it is not possible to say that only a political party's ideology determines its positions towards European integration. Moreover, even though party families have been regarded as huge uniform entities in relation to their positions on European integration (Marks & Wilson 2000; Kopecký & Mudde 2002; Gabel & Hix 2002, 2004; Hooghe et al. 2004; Hix et al. 2007), they, however, usually have different levels of Euroscepticism. Therefore, it is not easily possible to claim that party families, which share an ideology, have to necessarily share their stances towards European integration.

After all, these two significant approaches based on ideology and strategy are not necessarily contradictory. As above-mentioned, some scholars adopt or call for a way that includes both the ideological and strategic aspects of party politics regarding European integration. They argue that ideology may be shaped by strategic concerns in the framework of party competition (Vasilopoulou 2009, 2013, 2018c; Mudde 2011; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; Rovny 2004, Halikiopoulou & Vlandas 2018). In this regard, these two approaches are not inevitably mutually exclusive. Neither approach has been completely excluded in this dissertation, and both approaches have been utilized.

2.4.4. Types of Party Attitudes to the European Integration

Scholars have categorized party attitudes to European integration differently. Some scholars are interested in levels of party-based Euroscepticism, whereas others focus on its causes or what the political parties oppose. In this regard, Taggart and Szczurbiak have made the distinguished and widely used classification, which is the distinction between soft and hard Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism refers to a principled opposition to the European integration in general and the EU in specific (Taggart & Szczurbiak, 2008, p. 7). Thus, it implies the absolute refusal of the whole European political and economic integration and also the opposition to a country being a new member or a remaining member of the EU. This principled objection has its roots in the acceptance that the EU is the opposite of deeply held national values or, more likely, is the representation of negative values (Taggart & Szczurbiak, 2002, p. 27).

Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, includes qualified opposition to European integration. It is contingent as it does not indicate an objection to integration on principled grounds but does indicate that if there were changes to either a policy area or a shift in the national interest (Taggart & Szczurbiak, 2002, p. 28). Therefore, European integration in its current form could be worth supporting, but only if improvements in these policies take place. In other words, soft Euroscepticism is a political stance without a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but with the expression of qualified opposition to the EU based on one (or a number) of policy areas or with a concern that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory (Taggart & Szczurbiak, 2008, p. 8).

Soft Euroscepticism might appear as policy Euroscepticism or national-interest Euroscepticism, even though they frequently coincide (Taggart & Szczurbiak, 2004, p. 4- 5). Policy Euroscepticism stems from opposition to means created to deepen European political and economic integration considerably or to a specific policy. However, it also requires support for the greater design of the European integration project. It is also very time- and country-specific. In contrast, national-interest

Euroscepticism includes following the national interest within the framework of debates over the EU. It is also compatible with the overall project of European integration. The accession process includes a degree of negotiation, and much of the compromise has candidate states giving up short-term national interests. The national-interest Euroscepticism is quite common in the candidate states since the transfer of authority from the national to the supranational has always been an issue.

Rovny mainly agrees with the conceptualization of hard and soft Euroscepticism that is made by Taggart and Szczerbiak and builds his Euroscepticism definition based on two continuums of magnitude and motivations. By the magnitude of Euroscepticism, he means that there are not just two levels of Euroscepticism like soft and hard Euroscepticism, and differences between those levels are not clear-cut, so there are different levels other than soft and hard Euroscepticism. Furthermore, the motivations of Euroscepticism, according to Rovny, corresponds to the question of whether Euroscepticism is ideological or strategic. For Rovny, the relationship between certain ideologies or party families and different Eurosceptic stances is not important. Still, the willingness of parties to hold on to their ideologies and assessing how it is related to the magnitude of their Euroscepticism are valuable. Therefore, purely and simply ideological or purely and simply strategic considerations are uncommon in the actual world, but for analytical purposes, they can be understood as polar opposites of a motivation continuum (Rovny, 2004, p. 35).

Besides, Kopecký and Mudde (2002, p. 301- 302) propose an alternative way of categorizing attitudes towards European integration by defining the term Euroscepticism in relation to other party positions regarding Europe. They criticize Taggart and Szczerbiak's hard and soft Euroscepticism distinction and offer diffuse and specific support as two types of approaches to European integration. By diffuse support, they mean backing for the fundamental values and objectives of European integration. Diffuse support separates the Europhiles from the Europhobes. Europhiles support the main principles of European integration. Such principles are regulated cooperation based on the principle of the sharing of decision-making powers between states and a liberal market economy. They are not interested in how

European integration is shaped. Thus, those who perceive the European integration project as being a supranational project and those who perceive it only in economic terms could be called as Europhiles. On the other hand, Europhobes do not support the main principles of the European integration underlying the EU because they might be nationalists, socialists, or isolationists or just because they think that European integration is a bad idea. However, this group seems very small since even nationalists also show some enthusiasm for the possibility of European states cooperating. After all, the important thing is that they do not accept one or more principles underlying European integration.

In contrast, specific support, according to Kopecký and Mudde, is the support for the general practice of European integration. In other words, it accepts the EU as it is and supports it as it is developing. It separates the EU-optimists from the EU-pessimists. EU-optimists accept the EU as it is and are optimistic about the general direction in which it is going. It is significant to indicate that opposition to a specific EU policy does not mean that an opposing party could not be an EU-optimist. If that party accepts the current EU as a whole, it is accepted as an EU-optimist even though it opposes some specific policies. On the other hand, EU-pessimists do not endorse the EU as it stands, and/or are not hopeful about its future. That does not inevitably mean that all EU-pessimists reject the idea of EU membership. Some of them just argue that the current EU is significantly different from their understanding of European integration's founding principles; still, they consider that the EU will change because they adopt the basic principles of the European integration.

Kopecký and Mudde argue that diffuse and specific support lead to four ideal-type categories of party positions regarding Europe. First of all, as Table 5 shows, Euroenthusiasts are a combination of Europhile and EU-optimism. They support the general principles underlying the European integration and consider that the EU is or will soon become the institutionalization of these principles. Secondly, Eurosceptics share both the ideas of Europhiles and EU-pessimists. Thus, whereas they support the general values of European integration, they are also pessimistic about the EU's current and/or future realizations of these values. Thirdly, Europragmatists connect

Table 5: Typology of Party Positions on Europe⁵

		Diffuse Support	
		Europhile	Europhobe
Specific Support	EU-optimist	Euroenthusiasts	Europragmatists
	Euro-pessimist	Eurosceptics	Eurorejects

the arguments of Europhobes to EU-optimists', so they do not have a strict ideological opinion on European integration. However, if they find the EU as profitable for their country based on their pragmatic considerations, they consider the EU in a positive way. Finally, Eurorejects, who are the most extreme negative point of this categorization, are against both the principles underlying the process of European integration and the EU itself (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, p. 303).

Flood (2002b, p. 5), however, makes another categorization independent of the question of how those positions are identified regarding ideological or strategic considerations. He presents a set of six categories as follows. The first one is the category of EU-Rejectionist, which includes the parties that are against being a member of the EU or participation in some particular institution or policy. The second category is EU-Revisionist, who advocate for a return to the state of affairs before any significant treaty revision, whether regarding the EU's overall configuration or

⁵ Table 5 was prepared by the author with the information obtained from Kopecký and Mudde (2002, p. 303).

specific policy areas. Thirdly, the category of EU-Minimalist refers to the political parties who support the status quo but oppose further integration either of the structure as a whole or of a specific policy area(s). EU-Gradualist is the fourth category corresponding to the parties with a support to the further integration either of the system as a whole or in some particular policy areas, so long as the process is taken slowly and with great care. The fifth one is the category of EU-Reformist emphasizes the need to improve one or more existing institutions and/or practices. The final group is EU- Maximalists, who are in favor of pushing forward with the existing process as rapidly as feasible towards a higher level of integration either of the overall structure or in some particular policy areas.

Conti (2003, p. 17) makes an alternative grouping of party attitudes towards European integration by using Taggart and Szczerbiak's hard and soft Euroscepticism distinction. This grouping includes hard Euroscepticism, soft Euroscepticism, no commitment/no mention, functional Europeanism, and identity Europeanism. As mentioned below in Table 7, Conti accepts the conceptualization of Taggart and

Table 6: Categories of Positions towards the European Union⁶

maximalist	pushing integration as far as possible towards the practical realization of a chosen model
reformist	endorsing advance of integration, subject to remedy the deficiencies of what has already been achieved
gradualist	accepting some advance of integration, as long as it is slow and piecemeal
minimalist	accepting the status quo, but want to limit further integration
revisionist	wanting to return an earlier stage, usually before a treaty version
rejectionist	the absolute refusal of integration and participation

⁶ Table 6 was prepared by the author with the information obtained from Flood and Usherwood (2007, p. 6).

Szczerbiak's hard and soft Euroscepticism. In addition to these types of party attitudes, according to Conti, whereas no commitment/no mention means an unclear position regarding the European integration; functional Europeanism signifies the support for European integration can be used as a strategy, serving national interests or a different party goal. There is no commitment to further integration unless it is proved that further integration would serve such interests in functional Europeanism.

The final group in Conti's categorization is identity Europeanism in which there is widespread support for the EU and European integration on a philosophical basis. Power shift from the national to the supranational sphere is favored since further integration is a fundamental goal in identity Europeanism.

Table 7: Main Components of Party Attitudes towards the European Integration⁷

	Kind of Approach	Final Goal	Modes of Integration	Language
Hard Euroscepticism	Principled opposition	The radical change of the EU trajectory or country withdrawal	Shift power back to member states	Protest-based
Soft Euroscepticism	Qualified opposition	Reform of the EU trajectory	Intergovernmentalism	Goal-oriented
Functional Europeanism	Qualified support	Status quo or further integration serving domestic/ party interests	Intergovernmentalism	Goal-oriented
Identity Europeanism	Principled support	Unconditional further integration	Supranationalism	Celebratory

⁷ Table 7 was prepared by the author with the information obtained from Conti (2003, p. 19).

Flood and Soborski (2018, p. 41) propose another typology of group position towards the EU and offer a more complex categorization (Table 6). Maximalists drive integration into the practical realization of a chosen model as far and as quickly as possible. Reformists endorse improvement of integration, subject to addressing the shortcomings of what has previously been accomplished. Gradualists accept some benefits of integration, as long as they are gradual. Neutrals choose not to take a stance against or in favor of further integration. Minimalists accept the status quo but want to limit deeper integration as far as possible. Revisionists want to go back to a time before the amendment of a treaty. Rejectionists, lastly, absolutely refuse the integration and oppose participation.

Even though different scholars have made distinctive categorizations of party-based Euroscepticism, it is seen that these categorizations are mostly based on the soft and hard Euroscepticism distinction of Taggart and Szczerbiak. This primary distinction, however, has been developed and diversified over time, obviously because it is seen as limited. The literature still seeks to answer developments regarding party-based Euroscepticism through making new categorizations and not to overlook any differences between positions towards European integration.

2.4.4.1. Types of Party-Based Euroscepticism

For Taggart (1998, p. 368), there are four ways in which Euroscepticism could be manifested in political parties. First of all, there are single-issue Eurosceptical parties whose existence depends on the opposition to the EU. They exist just for declaring their Eurosceptic stance and mobilizing electors on the European issue. The UK Independence Party could be accepted as a single-issue party. Secondly, there are protest-based parties that have had a certain anti-EU position beyond their opposition to all other political systems. The existence of these parties is based on protesting, and the opposition to European integration is one of these protests. The Green Party in the UK is labeled as a protest party by Taggart. Thirdly, there are established Eurosceptic parties who are defined as either parties of government or parties that have tried to improve their positions as worthy of support because of their closeness

to the political parties in the center of their party system. The Democratic Unionist Party is accepted as an established Eurosceptic party by Taggart. Finally, there are parties with Eurosceptic factions. An important faction within a party could express its opposition to European integration while the same party expresses its support for European integration as a whole. The Conservative Party has Eurosceptic factions in the UK.

Furthermore, Usherwood and Startin modify Taggart's classifications with changes in the structure of political parties. They identify four different classifications of Eurosceptic parties (Usherwood & Startin, 2013, p. 5-7). The first one is that single-issue pro-sovereignty parties, which follow a hard-Eurosceptic rhetoric and do not have any critical impact beyond the context of the European elections but are part of the national party systems. The UKIP (Whitaker, 2018, p. 103) and the Danish People's Movement have been accepted as examples of these types of parties. The second type includes the radical right parties (RRP). For those parties (like the British National Party), opposition to the EU is a principal strategy because they have tried to expand their power in domestic politics and to attract people by focusing on something beyond traditional anti-immigrant rhetoric. Another Eurosceptic party type involves left-wing parties (for instance, Eurosceptic green parties in the UK) that are against the neo-liberal progress of European integration, and they also assume that the EU is being run as a capitalist group to a greater extent. The final classification is the mainstream Eurosceptic parties, which are becoming more visible in European states' party systems. These parties, which seem to respond to negative and unstable public opinion on the EU-related issues, increasingly adopt a soft Eurosceptic rhetoric on subjects like the future of the monetary union, the EU budget, and the enlargement. Eurosceptic rhetoric has been mainly adopted by opposition parties in the past (see Taggart, 1998). However, this rhetoric has been followed by some government parties recently.

2.4.5. Member States vs. Candidate States

In the party-based Euroscepticism literature, it is seen that studies are mostly on the conceptualization of the term Euroscepticism, the levels of Euroscepticism, and types of Euroscepticism. Case studies are mostly on just one country, among member states or candidate states. There is a gap regarding the comparison between member states and candidate states in the party-based Euroscepticism literature. Even though it is generally accepted that Euroscepticism in member states meaning is different from Euroscepticism in candidate states, it is still possible and important to see this comparison. As Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008c, p. 17) argue, even though countries have different characteristics relating to their European agenda and their party system structure, it is still reasonable to make a comparison. They, on the other hand, emphasize the importance of being aware of the different contexts involved with these countries.

The most critical issue for candidate states relating to the EU is the principle of EU conditionality and the membership issue. The EU conditionality as a tool for the EU to impose its norms for candidate states affects the states' position towards the EU. That is because the EU conditionality is a way for interaction between the EU and candidate states. Political parties in the candidate states express their stance towards the EU through their opinions regarding the membership of their country. Therefore, the debate relating to European integration in the candidate states is naturally prone to be established on the issue of membership, as expected. Hence, the membership issue structures the divisions between pro-European and Eurosceptic stances in the candidate states. That is to say, if a party supports the membership, then it completely supports the EU, but if a party opposes the EU membership, then it completely opposes the EU.

Skinner (2013, p. 126), in this context, argues that soft Euroscepticism cannot be expressed in the candidate states since the subject of EU membership is now at the forefront of the public in these countries. However, in contrast to Skinner's argument, there could be political parties that do not oppose their country's membership of the

EU, that is, do not express absolute opposition but qualified opposition to the EU. Taggart and Szczerbiak have a different perspective than Skinner's regarding the soft and hard Euroscepticism in candidate countries. They argue that it is expected that hard Euroscepticism is less visible than soft Euroscepticism in the candidate states since there is a high level of elite consensus over the advantages of accession to the EU (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001, p. 27). Even though these two approaches seem to contradict each other, they have common ground. While Skinner emphasizes the idea that debate on European integration in the candidate states is always related to the membership issue, Taggart and Szczerbiak agree with that. However, they also argue that since candidate states consider membership as advantageous for their country, they do not oppose the idea of membership. Nevertheless, this does not mean that candidate states do not oppose anything related to the EU, so there could still be soft Euroscepticism in the candidate states.

In addition to that, the function of domestic politics in the candidate states is also critical since the enlargement must be approved by the European Commission and the current member states. Still, it also relies on the support of the ruling political parties in the candidate states, as well as their capacity to win referendums in their respective countries (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p. 25). In this context, political parties have the chance to use the membership issue for strategic electoral advantage in the domestic arena.

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the theoretical and conceptual background for this thesis. By reviewing the literature on theories of party competition, in this chapter, it is seen that the traditional cleavage theory, which is based on spatial theory, is less likely to explain the degree of opposition of a political party and to estimate various types of arguments within a certain party family. On the other hand, it has been claimed that saliency theory is the best suited to explain and comprehend the positions of political parties' stances towards European integration. In this regard, it is argued that political parties compete by emphasizing and de-emphasizing issues. They usually emphasize their own particular issues compared to others, so they differ considerably in their

emphases. Thus, there is an ongoing relationship between certain political parties and certain issues.

Furthermore, it is accepted that how political parties frame the EU defines their positions towards the EU. The change of positions towards European integration is considered as a matter of party strategy. Since political parties pursue different interests in domestic politics, their expectations from European integration and their perception of European integration differ. Accordingly, political parties take advantage of other political parties when the issues they emphasize become more important in the public agenda.

In addition to the hypotheses taken from the literature on the party competition theories, it has been argued that there is no straight link between a political party's stance towards European integration and its ideology, based on Euroscepticism and party-based Euroscepticism literature. That is to say, it is not possible to conclude that a party is Eurosceptic by only looking at which ideological family it is part of. Therefore, this chapter suggests that whether a political party is right-wing or left-wing does not determine that political party being Eurosceptic.

On the other hand, the location of a political party in the party system could have an impact on that political party's stance towards European integration. In the literature, it has been argued that political parties at the center -government parties- are more prone to be pro-integrationist in general, pro-EU in specific, or to be less Eurosceptic, whereas challenger parties are inclined to be more Eurosceptic. Political parties have changed their positions as they come closer to involvement in government. In other words, a party's position in the party system- whether it is a mainstream party or a peripheral party- has affected its stance towards European integration. A right or left-wing political party does not necessarily have to be Eurosceptic, but Eurosceptic parties are usually located in the peripheries. Even though it is generally accepted that mainstream parties at the center do not take Eurosceptic positions, on the other hand, these parties also could have negative tendencies towards European integration. However, these tendencies are mostly policy-based. In other words, they could

oppose some specific policies of European integration, mainly because of their political interests in domestic politics. Thus, they are not mostly hard-Eurosceptic. In this regard, it has been accepted that in time all types of political parties from any place in the party system could display Eurosceptic behaviors, either hard or soft. Therefore, it is significant to study the positions of all these political parties towards European integration in time and especially after the times of crisis that the EU faces in order to analyze changes in time.

CHAPTER 3

CRISIS

“Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises” (Jean Monnet, 1978, p. 417).

3.1. Introduction

The European integration project has been trying to survive by fighting crises that have occurred one after another in recent years. Dealing with these crises has become a routine for the EU today. That is, crises appear “to be the new normal for the EU” (Haughton, 2016, p. 5). The 2010s started with a financial crisis, which affected all member states. And then, the UK withdrawal crisis and the Refugee Crisis appeared. Recently, European integration has been struggling with the COVID-19 crisis as has the rest of the world. And these are the only the crises that have occurred in the last decade. However, crises are not something surprising or extraordinary for the European integration process. Crises have been very effective in shaping European integration since its very first day. On the other hand, the complexity, length and interdependence characterize the current crisis environment in Europe (Anderson, 2021, p. 765). The EU has been stuck in an endless and successive crises cycle.

Modern Europe has been defined as following in response to exogenous shocks (Anderson, 2021, p. 765). The European integration project as a whole is a history of struggle with crises (Schmitter 1970) and the project’s responses to crises such as the Empty Chair Crisis in 1966 as a result of De Gaulle’s boycott of European institutions, the decade of ‘Eurosclerosis’ in 1970s, the crisis that developed in the

aftermath of German reunification, the ratification crisis of the Treaty on European Union in 1992 and the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. The post-Maastricht period is subject to exogenous change from globalization to the enlargement of the EU (Bickerton et al., 2015, p. 707). Furthermore, after 2010, EU crises have consisted of several endogenous and exogenous shocks (Dinan, 2018, p. 21). The European debt crisis since 2009 is the longest lasting and most iconic of these. In addition, Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for the insurgency in eastern Ukraine; the Refugee Crisis, which is a massive influx into the EU of refugees and irregular migrants; and the Brexit, where British Euroscepticism has reached its peak. From the very beginning, how the project copes with these crises has determined the direction of the EU. In fact, the European integration project is one that is a result of crisis, and is created to ensure a perpetual peace and economic welfare after two World Wars, that is, to be able to cope with the effects of these crises. In short, crises have served as a catalyst in transforming the European integration project. As crises highlight, the EU and the member states face a variety of long-term difficulties with prosperity, identity, security and governance (Haughton, 2016, p. 5).

What distinguishes the current crisis environment from the previous ones is the fact that it is a period when more than one crisis is effective and these crises create an excessive burden on both member states and European institutions (Grimmel, 2018, p. 1). None of these crises- Euro Crisis, Brexit and the Refugee Crisis- has passed. They are now in a state of cumulative overlap, as Anderson (2021, p. 773) called as a "poly-crisis." Crises in recent years have played a key role during the politicization process, so the Euro and the Refugee Crisis considerably politicized European integration (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019, p. 1012). Also, these recent crises have made it apparent that the EU is unable to find solutions to handle these problems, and member states have made it known that they are reluctant and unable to cope with any crisis that threatens their particular interests. On the other hand, the current crisis situation shows that these crises are not just about the crisis itself, they cause problems in other areas as well. For instance, the Refugee Crisis is not only related to the migration policy of the Union. It is also related to economic, cultural and political issues. So, these crises have affected all member states and European institutions. Therefore,

these crises have led to the question of the existence of the European integration project.

3.2. What is a Crisis?

Crisis as a term has been used in many different areas such as history, sociology, economics, medicine, political science and international relations. In general, crisis has been defined as a time of great disagreement, confusion, or suffering. It could be said that it refers to disorder; that is to say, a situation which is abnormal or unstable (İşyar, 2008, p. 2). The discipline of International Relations sees crises as destabilizing features of the international system on global and regional level (Johannsen, 2011, p. 50). Therefore, a crisis is described as an unusual period during which the presence and functioning of the constitutional order are questioned. In other words, it is a watershed at which the interests, structures, and common identities that characterize and support the political system are challenged, and those guiding them are questioned (Ikenberry, 2008, p. 3).

A crisis represents “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions” (Rosenthal et al. 1989, p. 10). Moreover, as Rosenthal et al. (2001, p. 6) argues, politicization, complexity and interdependence are gradually defining characteristics of modern crises. In addition to these definitions, it is also described as “a situation of large-scale public dissatisfaction or even fear stemming from wide-ranging economic problems and/or an unusual degree of social unrest and/or threats to national security” (Keeler, 1993, p. 440). Brack and Gürkan (2021, p. 3) add that a crisis is a situation which cannot be resolved with existing rules or tools and which will lead to a change in the dynamics of integration or the shape of the system of governance in the EU. Even though these definitions have different aspects, they all have in common that crises refer to an unusual situation, which creates discontent.

Crises do not lead a definite outcome. Crises that cause the existing system to be called into question could either strengthen and transform this system in a way or cause this old system to collapse and disappear. While crises may provide public organizations an incentive to stabilize their activities, it may also bring pressure for a fast change at the same time (Riddervold et al., 2021a, p. 8). When there is an immediate reaction need in an unclear situation that might affect core values and vital systems, this is known as a crisis. Therefore, it could be said that they are significant in processes of change (Nabers, 2009, p. 193). Crises can cause sudden change, which in turn activates policy learning, so reversing the causal mechanism, as well as receiving feedback, helps to improve learning processes and locks-in change (Kamkhaji & Radaelli, 2017, p. 715). Crises also could result in an increase in domestic structural and policy reform demands. Therefore, it could be said that uncertainty, threat and urgency are essential characteristics of crises (Boin et al. 2005, p. 3–4). On the other hand, crises give states room to maneuver to act as they wish, since in times of crises, citizens are more willing to empower politicians to solve these crises. Not all crises are the same, of course. Not all of them necessarily lead to change or demand change. Even if they do, the effect of this demand might not be the same.

In the literature on crises, three approaches such as systemic, behavioral and sociological are interested in the causes of crises (Cross & Ma, 2015, p. 1054). First of all, *systemic approach* views crises as the consequence of developing events that allow destabilizing forces in the international system to disrupt established patterns, weaken institutions and eventually challenge the very essence of the current structure (Young, 1968, p. 6-15). It is assumed that when a crisis occurs, decision makers will have to find a method to restore stability that might need an entirely new system. Systemic approach presupposes that crises are objective, structural events that are not affected by human perspectives (Young 1968). Secondly, in *behavioral approach*, behavioral characteristics are given precedence when considering how they interact with the system around them, with special regard to the decisions that they are limited to making due to their utility-maximizing preferences (Cross & Ma, 2015, p. 1055). Crises could be studied in an objective manner, according to behaviorists, since

they are measurable occurrences with definite thresholds that can be identified by analyzing the observable facts. Since they describe loss as the change in one's condition before and after an event, the transformation of an event into a crisis can be measured. And lastly, *sociological approach* is concerned in how crises are socially constructed. For instance, Colin Hay (1999, p. 342) believes that calculating the cost or loss do not create crises, common narratives did. This approach could explain why some events become crises and others do not. When people recognize an event as dangerous to the prevailing order, then a crisis occurs; Ikenberry described it as 'extraordinary moment' (2008, p. 3).

In addition, Phillips and Rimkunas (1978) made another categorization. For them, the international relations literature has two basic approaches to crises: *the substantive* and *the procedural* approaches (Phillips & Rimkunas, 1978, p. 259). Firstly, the focus of the substantive approach is the meaning of every single crisis and its contents. Scholars who applied this term have been specifically concerned with the consequences of a specific policy, issue, or case (Phillips & Rimkunas, 1978, p. 259). Secondly, the procedural approach aims to develop general theories regarding crises in order to ascertain the procedural description of general crises, as well as focusing on the common characteristics of all forms of crises without analyzing their specific problems. When it comes to describing crises in international politics, adherents of the procedural approach have largely established two distinct theoretical views. First of all, in *the decision-making approach*, the government is considered to be the primary level of analysis and intra-unit situations are covered. Therefore, circumstances and procedures within the actor are the major subjects for this approach. Second, in *the international systems* approach, inter-unit situations are covered, and reciprocal changes among the actors are the main issues.

Scholars who adopt the decision-making approach are generally involved in the topics within the context of political processes, such as how policymakers perceive intentions, how they collect knowledge about reciprocal motivations, influence of public opinion on international politics, etc. The primary focus of decision-making based crisis analysis is defining what constitutes a crisis. According to policy makers,

a crisis occurs when the state's external world has changed in response to the actions of other states. And this situation makes them to take abnormal actions as a response to crisis. As one of the most important representatives of this approach, Charles Hermann argues that a foreign policy crisis is a scenario that jeopardizes the political unit's most significant and principal objectives, and reduces the time available for thinking, planning and responding in order to change the possible result. He also adds that a crisis is a scenario in which the decision-making unit's main objective is threatened; time is limited before the situation changes for action; and decision-makers are surprised (McCormick, 1978, p. 353). Therefore, it could be said that for the international system approach, an international crisis occurs when there is a dramatic change in the usual existing interactions between states. So, for McCormick (1978, p. 354- 356), an international crisis is a scenario between at least two countries defined by surprise, limited decision time and high threat as well as the behavioral conditions significant change in their interaction patterns.

Table 8: Approaches to Crises

Approaches to Crises		
a. The Substantive Approach	b. The Procedural Approach	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> contents of crises implications of a particular policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> forming general theories about crises 	
	Decision-making approach	International systems approach
	Level of Analysis	State: government
		System: global, regional systems
	Interests	Inter-unit situations
		International crisis
		Unexpected changes in a crisis
	Psychological management of crises	

3.3.Theories of European Integration and Crisis

By definition, a crisis requires an urgent response but the EU is incapable of acting urgently (Dinan, 2018, p. 22). Therefore, it is very important to examine how the EU struggles with crises and how it reacts to those. Schimmelfennig (2017, p. 316) argues that a crisis in European integration is a decision-making situation in which there is a clear threat and a perceived high possibility of disintegration. The disintegration refers to a decrease in the current degree, scope, and membership of integration (Leuffen et al. 2013, p. 8). Therefore, an integration crisis might cause a reduction in the degree and depth of relations between member states and their powers' transfer to the EU. A crisis could result in the repatriation of EU policy competences, or member states leaving the EU or giving up one of its integrated policies (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 969). In other words, a crisis might lead the integration process to strengthen or to end. Recent crises like the refugee crisis, Brexit and the euro crisis are such good examples for these descriptions of crisis. Whereas the euro crisis has led to a stronger integration process in a way, the Brexit crisis refers to a member state to exit, and the Refugee Crisis has revealed the management weaknesses and failures of the EU. Therefore, there is not only a definite end or process for crises.

As mentioned before, the history of European integration is full of crises and has been shaped by the responses of the integration process to these crises. Even though crises are of such importance in the history of European integration, it is not possible to claim that all theories of European integration have a detailed and clear understanding of what crisis is, and what the reasons and results are. However, although these theories are not sufficient on their own, they have dealt with crises from the very beginning even if a little. Academics have been more concerned with trying to understand the origins and consequences of the crises with the crisis period (Gänzle et al., 2021, p. 699). Theories in the early stages of integration, like federalism and functionalism accept the importance of crises but they have provided little details about crises. Later theories have dealt much more with crises, and crises have played a significant role in the development and shaping of these European integration

theories. Each theory has its own specific perspective on the reasons, processes and results of crises.

All three major schools of theorizing European integration, which are intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism and post-functionalism, view crises as an essential part of the European integration process (Lefkofridi & Schmitter, 2015, p. 4). While academics agree on the underlying nature of the crises, they differ on their consequences and the factors that contribute to their (non-)integration (including politicization) (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019, p. 997). While intergovernmentalism sees integration crises as mostly exogenous to the integration process, for neo-functionalism and post-functionalism, crises are the result of previous integration steps. Neo-functionalism, on the one hand, emphasizes spillover processes at the international level, post-functionalism, on the other hand, underlines domestic Euroscepticism toward integration (Schimmelfennig, 2017, p. 317). For post-functionalism, a crisis has a clearer role in the integration process, nevertheless an implicit role (Anderson, 2021, p. 768). Moreover, crises are significant in shaping new intergovernmentalism since it is a relatively new theory. Bickerton et al. (2015, p. 707), as new intergovernmentalists, see the post- Maastricht period as subject to exogenous shocks. They agree that the period after Maastricht has seen a significant exogenous transition, even transformation, though they claim that these external changes' effects are still indefinite. Jones et al. (2016, p. 1027), on the other hand, argue that whilst advancing integration through cycles of incomplete changes accompanied by more crisis can be politically expedient in the short term, but it weakens popular support for the EU over the long term. This recurring trend creates the perception among the public that the EU lack any clear aim, purpose or direction, and is perpetually in crisis. For intergovernmentalists, the primary emphasis is on the following internal crisis, while the exogenous crisis' details and effect are of secondary significance (See Table 9).

Table 9: Integration Theories and Explanations of Crisis⁸

	Intergovernmentalism	Neo-functionalism	Post-functionalism
Crisis Origins	Exogenous: international challenges, domestic change	Endogenous and international: spillover	Endogenous and domestic: Euroscepticism
Crisis mechanism	Bargaining	Path-dependency	Politicization
Conditions of Crisis Outcome	Intergovernmental preference and power constellation	Interdependence, supranational autonomy and capacity	Insulation
Typical Crisis Outcome	---	Positive feedback: Resilience, integration	Negative feedback: Stagnation, disintegration

To sum up, the EU has been struggling with crises since its establishment. Although European integration theories did not deal with crises in detail in the early days, crises have played a crucial role in shaping theories of European integration in recent years. As Sandholtz and Zysman (1989, p. 96) argue, the structure of European integration is built on an agreement hierarchy that consider the general fundamental characteristics of the international system. Thus, any major structural change in the international system, like the effects of an international crisis, can make European decision-makers to restructure the agreements that hold the European integration project together. That is to say, international crises, like the Refugee crisis and the financial crisis, have led to major changes in the international system, which the EU is a part of, and also in the EU. The refugee crisis, for instance, has resulted in important but somewhat understated reforms, such as the strengthening of external border controls, and the exchange of information on internal policing and intelligence (Anderson, 2021, p. 786). In this regard, it is significant to look at the arguments of some theories of European integration regarding crises in detail.

⁸ This table is taken from Schimmelfennig (2017, p. 317).

3.3.1. Neo-functionalism

One of the most important theories for European integration is neo-functionalism. Ernst B. Haas as a founding father of this theory explains the basics of European integration, and introduced the argument that government could be separated into its constituent actors. Haas never refused that national states pursue their own interests, though he was one of the first scholars who realized that regional integration could transform the inter-state system that had marked Europe for a long time and that was responsible for two recent World Wars by liberalizing trade, investment and people across previously well-protected borders (Schmitter, 2005, p. 256). The state, according to neo-functionalists, is an arena in which social actors pursue their own interests. Thus, a neo-functionalist sees international relations as an interaction of social actors rather than as a competition between states.

Neo-functionalism holds that both transnational society and supranational organizations are important players and that the earliest stages of European integration generate enough impetus to expand its functional scope, the level of centralization, and territorial extension beyond what governments expected (Schimmelfennig, 2017, p. 321). According to neo-functionalists, progress is made via a sequence of mutually reinforcing processes. These include spillover effects between policies that are only partially autonomous; an increased reliance on non-state actors to implement such policies; a shift in citizen attachment towards supranational institutions; and as a result of each of these, more intensive exploitation of the benefits of trade and, more broadly, of interdependence (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 1114). Although crises may cause integration to be delayed or even temporarily halted, the expectation is that in the long run, policy spillover and supranational activism will eventually result in an upward trend (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 1115).

Neo-functionalism is defined as a way of looking at European integration which views it as a long-term, gradual process, where political actors from different national places into aligning their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger center, whose institutions have or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing

national states (Haas, 1961, p. 366–7). For neo-functionalists, crises are inherent parts of the integration process (Schmitter 1970) and they focus on endogenous drivers of crises. It presumes that crises are generated by the integration process itself (Lefkofridi & Schmitter, 2015, p. 10), and have a tendency to recreate and reinforce integration through institutionalization (Sweet & Sandholtz 1997) and path-dependence (Pierson 1996). As a result, Neo-functionalism explains the differences in crisis-induced integration results by varying levels of transnational interdependence and a supranational capacity (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 974).

3.3.2. Intergovernmentalism/ Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism as a response to neo-functionalism that puts states at its center. For intergovernmentalists, European integration is an arena for national states that searches for mutually advantageous bargains. It sees integration as a zero-sum game, which means that one country gains all the benefits, arguing that integration can be possible only in areas where it does not violate state sovereignty (Hoffmann, 1982, p. 21). Moravcsik, then, created liberal intergovernmentalism to overcome the weaknesses of intergovernmentalism. Liberal intergovernmentalism, like intergovernmentalism, does not have a clear-cut theoretical framework for crises. National priorities, whether in crisis or normal times, represent the interests of dominant domestic groups; significant agreements represent the states' relative bargaining power in an asymmetrical interdependence scenario; and the structure of the European integration project is a result of the need of states to achieve intergovernmental commitments (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 3). According to the intergovernmentalist view, external factors drive changes in integration. In other words, the origins of change are exogenous to the process of integration. For Schimmelfennig (2017, p. 318), this could also be true for crises. So, international threats may produce crises in the EU because they could change the distribution of power between the member states and weaken the reason of the integration. The recent crises like the Euro Crisis, the Refugee Crisis, and Ukraine crisis with the except for Brexit could be seen as proofs for this argument.

According to the intergovernmentalist view, crises could cause a risk of disintegration. Intergovernmental bargaining and asymmetrical interdependence determine whether or not there will be disintegration. States, which are the most affected by a crisis, will be in a poor bargaining position and are therefore more likely to compromise (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 3). On the other hand, the states having the least impact from a crisis and most content with the current situation have the greatest chance of implementing their chosen policy (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 497–507). Moreover, crises are characterized by increased interdependence, which is obviously negative international policy externalities and creating specifically high need for policy coordination (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 485). However, there is often an asymmetrical interdependence. It means crises have a disproportionate impact on states and groups. That is, a crisis can affect some countries much more and others much less. Crises also have important distributional implications. Even though policymakers are able to reach an agreement on a collective solution to the crisis for everyone's advantage, uneven distribution is more likely to occur in terms of the costs of change (Moravcsik, 1993, p. 486- 487). Intergovernmental bargaining is a result of asymmetrical interdependence and uneven international distribution of the costs and benefits of integration. National states engage in intergovernmental bargaining in order to obtain the integration outcome that best serves their national interests.

3.3.3. Post-functionalism

Post-functionalism is a much more recent theory compared to the other two theories abovementioned. It underlines the disturbing potential of a conflict between functional pressures and exclusive identity, whilst neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism see the European integration as a process aimed at increasing efficiency, in which economic actors seek benefits (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a, p. 5). Post-functionalism, as a 'pessimistic' theory, has emerged to criticize neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism/ liberal intergovernmentalism, which are called as 'optimistic' theories by Webber (2019, p. 1). Post-functionalism was introduced by Hooghe and Marks to explain the changes that happened in the post-Maastricht period. This theory incorporates public opinion, political parties, and

elections to explain the European integration by going beyond the traditional elite-focused views of integration theories (Schimmelfennig 2014). Since European integration has intervened into national identity and sovereignty of nation states, and has a profound impact on national economic policies, public opinion became more Eurosceptic. Eurosceptic political parties and referendums have fueled this increasing Euroscepticism. Therefore, when it comes to European integration issues, pro-EU decision-makers now often face a 'constraining dissensus' (Schimmelfennig, 2014, p. 322). Post-functionalism's fundamental premise is that European integration is becoming increasingly politicized.

Hooghe and Marks (2009) established a connection between the EU's legitimacy issues, public opinion shifts and increase in the number of Eurosceptic parties. They basically claim that the period of 'permissive consensus' is over in Europe, and it is now a period of 'constraining dissensus' (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 5). Elections and referenda are a great deal for them since these are significant in determining preferences of public and political parties. A more responsive public has emerged in the light of the developments that occurred in the post-Maastricht period. In response to the increasing responsiveness of nation states to public demands on European integration, the domestic politics of member states and EU politics become more associated (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p.2). In other words, domestic politics and European politics have increasingly become more and more connected. Because of this, European integration became gradually politicized. In this regard, they create the term multi-level governance that means national governments are no longer the primary decision-making units, and supranational institutions no longer transmit national government authority (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, p.3).

Post-functionalist theory is based on three assumptions (see Hooghe & Marks 2006, 2009). First, it argues that transfers of political authority to the supranational level have intensified the politicization of European issues; second, it identifies several mechanisms which drive this politicization, in particular the upsurge in the popularity of populist radical right-wing political parties; and, third, it assumes that in terms of the integration process, politicization has mostly detrimental effects because of the

domestic disagreement's restricting impact on European policymaking (Grande & Kriesi, 2016, p. 299). Moreover, identity is significant in post-functionalist approach since it forms preferences over European integration. It means that the more exclusively a person identifies with a group, the less this person will be supporting the inclusion of outgroups (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). As a result, it could be said that if a person has an exclusive identity, that person is inclined to Euroscepticism.

Integration crises, from a post-functionalist viewpoint, are marked by politicization, that is, the increasing salience of European politics, the diversification of actors and audiences engaged, and the polarization of the views and sentiments about European integration (De Wilde et al. 2018; De Wilde 2021). There is no direct correlation between politicization and integration or disintegration. In other words, politicization does not always imply integration or disintegration. They are both possible. However, post-functionalism anticipates that politicization will authorize Eurosceptic political parties and diminish pro-European integrationist sentiments by mobilizing voters behind national identities. Hooghe and Marks "expect to see downward pressure on the level and scope of integration", a limitation of governments' room to manoeuvre, and a mismatch of functionally efficient and politically feasible solutions (Hooghe & Marks 2009, p. 21- 23). Therefore, low politicization is expected to lead stronger integration, since Eurosceptic parties and public could not be an obstacle for negotiations between governments, transnational pressures and supranational institutions in such a case. On the other hand, a highly politicized environment makes the elites less likely to make changes (Hooghe & Marks 2009). Accordingly, post-functionalism explains the changes in the integration process as a result of crises with politicization integration outcomes of crises by variation in domestic mass politicization (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 975).

The sources of crisis in the EU are domestic, according to post-functionalism. Thus, domestic changes are endogenous. It is the progress in integration that increases the salience of European integration, raises concerns about competitiveness, redistribution, sovereignty and immigration, and helps Eurosceptic parties mobilize voters (Schimmelfennig, 2017, p. 322). In this regard, political parties and citizens

are relevant actors. And these actors are more interested in losses in national identity and wealth than profit, efficiency, and institutional autonomy.

Post-functionalist theory remains the most decisive theoretical foundation for integration theory advancement. Politicization must be conceived as a strategic opportunity and, its use and effectiveness can be influenced by a large number of political factors. Most importantly, politicizing European issues can be highly risky and the outcomes of it are incalculable for political elites. Politicization has become a loose cannon in the integration process. Therefore, it is quite rational if political parties avoid politicizing European decisions and putting alternative options for decisions of great importance on the agenda, as criticized by Habermas (2011, p. 75) (as cited in Grande & Kriesi, 2016, p. 300).

Post-functionalists for their part postulate the primacy of domestic politics and, more particularly, highlight the politicization that has occurred. The increased politicization at the national level has led to a constraining dissensus: citizens have increasingly polarized opinions on EU affairs, and public opinion is now a constraining power on political elites. This politicization has limited the room for manoeuvre of national governments and EU elites (Hooghe & Marks 2009). Although scholars from various theoretical approaches agree that the politicization of economic issues and migration questions at the EU level has been high, post-functionalism is the only strand of research to consider that the framing of economic topics has been different than the migration ones and that this difference plays a key role in explaining the outcomes of the crisis. While both the debates on economic governance and on migration have revolved around the issue of identity, this very notion has been used differently. For the Eurozone crisis, talks of identity revolved mostly around the degree of solidarity required in a multilevel polity (Börzel & Risse 2018, p. 86). In this instance, politicization was framed around the idea of order within a political community, and culture was not so much at the forefront when debating the Eurozone crisis. National and EU elites managed to depoliticize the Eurozone crisis by delegating power to regulatory instances such as the Commission and the ECB. In contrast, during the Schengen crisis, cultural issues were central to

debates in many Member states, and attempts to depoliticize the issue through a delegation of power to a supranational structure failed. Indeed, Eurosceptic actors, especially on the right, saw an opportunity to fight against Brussels. Because the crisis touched a nerve in national identity (Hooghe & Marks 2019), they mobilized the public opinion around the dichotomy ‘us versus them’. The politicization of migration with this cultural framing narrowed the options for mainstream parties, and there was almost no counter-discourse to legitimize inclusive policies (Börzel & Risse 2018) (as cited in Brack & Gürkan, 2021, p. 12).

3.4. Conclusion

Crises have been on the agenda of the EU since the first day it was established. The EU has faced many different kinds of crises such as economic, social and cultural. The responses of both member states and the institutions of the EU to these crises, and how they cope with these crises have affected the direction of European integration. Studies on crises have always been crucial although scholars neglected to recognize the importance of crisis studies in the beginning. However, crises and their effects on the EU and its member states are frequently studied today. The crises that the EU has experienced in recent years on end have been effective in the increase of these studies. It could be said that the theoretical studies of crises also increased in similar periods.

Even though crises are so important in the history of European integration, it is not possible to claim that all theories of European integration have a detailed and clear understanding of what crisis is, and what the reasons and results are. However, although it is not very sufficient, integration theories have dealt with crises from the very beginning even if a little. Theories in the early stages of integration, like federalism and functionalism accept the importance of crises but they have provided little details about crises. Later theories have dealt much more with crises, and crises have played a significant role in the development and shaping of these European integration theories. Theories of European integration have focused on crises in recent years because of the Eurozone, Ukraine, Brexit and the Refugee crises, which

the EU has experienced simultaneously. It is expected for integration theories to deal with crises, as the EU has to deal with another crisis before it can overcome the impact of one crisis.

Neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism/ liberal intergovernmentalism are insufficient to explain the Refugee Crisis because they ignore the term of 'constraining dissensus' that results from the politicization of the refugee question by both political parties and public (Hooghe & Marks 2008). Neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, as Webber (2019) called as optimistic theories about the future of the EU, could not explain EU's recent crises (Webber, 2019, p. 16). Whilst neo-functionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists argue that crises positively affected the integration process, post-functionalists expect negative feedback weakening integration and possibly producing disintegration (Schimmelfennig, 2017, p. 322). Despite the economic implications, several Schengen member states reinstalled border restrictions. Where political or security factors conflicted with economic considerations, political or security considerations prevailed (Webber, 2019, p. 5).

No European integration theory can fully explain the responses of EU and member states to crises, and there is a need to analyze the relations between crises and disintegration to understand EU crises (Riddervold et al., 2021b, p. 59). In this regard, post-functionalism is well-suited and chosen for explaining the Refugee Crisis in this dissertation. Post-functionalism is relatively new and interested in public opinion, party competition, elections, referenda and politicization to understand European integration. This thesis supports this basic claim of post-functionalism and states that it would be useful to analyze the public, political parties and their manifestos to understand the European integration and the effects of the Refugee Crisis on the integration. Both public opinion and political parties are significant for European integration, as post-functionalism argues.

CHAPTER 4

THE REFUGEE CRISIS- AN EXOGENOUS SHOCK BECOMING ENDOGENOUS: THE POST-FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH

4.1. Introduction

The Refugee Crisis is an EU crisis that has started in 2013 and reached its peak in 2015. It is called a European crisis since it is characterized by high numbers of people arriving in the EU member and candidate states. As a result of this influx of people, the EU as an institution and its member states failed to work together, communicate, and share the burden and resources (Newsome et al., 2021, p. 443). And that chaotic environment makes it a crisis for the EU. The Refugee Crisis is not called a crisis related to refugees or the country of the origin of the refugees. This is a crisis for the source country in many other ways for sure. However, it is called as the Refugee Crisis, when we consider the countries, the crisis affects. This crisis was mostly driven by external reasons for the EU in the first place, but it was also caused by internal issues of the EU and disagreements in the aftermath of the sharp increase in refugees arriving in the EU (Riddervold et al., 2021c, p. 545). This crisis has caused many administrative, economic, sociological and humanitarian problems for the EU. The methods applied by the EU, and especially by most of its member states, to solve this crisis have resulted in the violation of core values the EU claims to be based on such as respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy. The crisis and the issues caused by the crisis have led some scholars, politicians and other people to question the existence of the EU, and cause rising Euroscepticism (de Wilde, 2021, p. 667).

4.2. The Refugee Crisis as a European Union Crisis

The Refugee Crisis, as an EU crisis, has revealed many inadequacies of the EU. It is neither the first nor the last crisis that the EU has experienced regarding refugees and migration. There is not only one crisis related to migration and refugees in the EU history, there are many crises. An analysis of these EU crises shows that they are both causes and consequences of EU policies, which can be seen in the wide gap in EU power and various divisions among member states (Schilde & Goodman, 2021, p. 451). For instance, the Refugee Crisis has shown that how inadequate and dysfunctional the immigration and asylum policies of the EU are, and the limits of the Schengen system. Since 2015, when the Refugee Crisis peaked, EU member states have agreed on many cooperative managements to share burden for the refugees who are already in the EU and are still arriving. It was attempted to prepare a common legal framework for refugees. However, member states have mostly opposed the EU's institutional reform demands during the Refugee Crisis. It demonstrates the member states' reluctance to solve this issue together, to share the burden of hosting people. The EU's effort to implement a common policy has been unable to achieve a fair distribution of responsibilities (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p. 90).

In addition to not supporting the reforms that the EU wants to make, the member states also disregarded existing laws, for example, the partial and temporary suspension of the Schengen system (Biermann et al. 2019, p. 247). It has shown that the member states ignore the decisions taken by the EU when they want and they can act on their own. Despite the agreement in the Council, in September 2015, to redistribute migrants from Germany across the EU on the basis of Member State quotas, few migrants were resettled. The Central and Eastern European countries are particularly hostile to resettlement and the acceptance of significant numbers of Muslim migrants (Dinan, 2018, p.23).

As an external shock, the Refugee Crisis was triggered by chaos occurring outside the EU's boundaries (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 975), and could not be absorbed by the EU's existing immigration regulations (Biermann et al. 2019, p. 254). Even

though it is an exogenous shock, it has resulted in the emergence of new internal issues and also the deepening of already existing ones in the EU. The EU member states have struggled to bolster the project of European integration as having to deal with so many severe political crises in such a short period of time. In addition to the EU's inadequate regulations on refugees, trying to deal with this crisis in such a short time made people to blame the EU for the Refugee Crisis. People began to see the EU as a part of the problem, not the solution in the process. In this regard, the member states tried to find the solution not in the EU, but in the national arena. In other words, because of the lack of a single feasible European solution, governments have resorted to far more severe national border control measures to maintain control of their borders. Therefore, the Refugee Crisis, as Webber claims (2019, p. 3), has resulted in sectoral and vertical disintegration. Because of member states' failure to follow current EU practices, the EU sought to achieve supranational centralization with European Union Agency for Asylum and EU Border and Coast Guard Agency (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p. 91). Although the EU tried to make significant efforts, their efforts were ultimately in vain, as the member states consistently opted for national solutions. As Di Mauro and Memoli (2021, p. 4) argue, EU institutions have influenced integration via policies on migration and refugees in response to the Refugee Crisis. They have conducted bilateral agreements like the EU- Turkey Migration Agreement, created missions such as Triton for border security, and new institutions like the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency.

Even though the Schengen area and the Dublin system offer a common system for the EU, the Refugee Crisis has shown that migration is a matter of national responsibility. The Schengen system was unprepared for a large influx of refugees. Under the Dublin system, asylum seekers get the same degree of protection in all EU member states, since the laws and procedures of EU are founded on the same criteria. However, this system has laid a burden on first countries that applicants enter to the EU. That is, the Refugee Crisis had different impacts on different countries, and that results in an asymmetric interdependence among EU member states (Biermann et al. 2019, p. 257). Although this system seems perfect, it has failed in practice since it was not planned to handle this high number of people coming. Thus, some member

states, like Italy and Greece, have also refused to implement the Dublin Regulations, and let people move to other countries, because the Dublin system has made the majority of applications fall on these countries. In this regard, Germany decided to suspend the Dublin Regulations for Syrians to provide European solidarity by easing the pressure on member states that felt the pressure most (Deutsche Welle (DW), 2015). Germany's decision to control its border with Austria in 2015 triggered a domino effect for other countries to close their borders as well. Therefore, rather than promoting unity among member states, this approach resulted in individual member states failing to execute the Dublin rules. Therefore, member states did not do what they were legally obliged to do, and they turned refugees back from their borders. As a result of the Refugee Crisis, immigration and refugee policies of the member states were renationalized, the authority of the EU was disregarded, and the EU repeatedly violated the principles which it was based upon while attempting to defend its borders via Frontex.

The Refugee Crisis provided a chance for populist parties in the EU, which were already on the rise in several member states, to become even more successful. The rise of populist parties and this change in party competition has resulted in the spread of populist parties' discourse on refugees and the EU and the restriction of mainstream political parties. These populist parties frequently used the Refugee Crisis in their campaigns and adopted an anti-refugee discourse. This anti-refugee atmosphere also contributed to the crisis being unresolved for a long time. Therefore, one might argue that the Refugee Crisis, which began as an external shock, has had a significant impact in shaping domestic policies of EU member states. The rise of populist anti-refugee rhetoric has resulted in significantly more restrictive national immigration policies and an exclusionary EU practice. Nationalists throughout Europe, especially countries such as Hungary, Czechia, Poland, Slovakia and host countries like Germany compelled governments to impose restrictions (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a, p. 11). However, there is no common practice among member states. Domestic laws, policies and practices varied to a large extent between countries, profoundly institutionalized, and less flexible than the EU member states' intergovernmental negotiating stances at the council level (Schilde & Goodman,

2021, p. 451). Consequently, the EU has evolved from a system in which each member state has a relatively consistent kind of integration to one in which each member state has a different type of integration- differentiated integration (Schimmelfennig & Winzen 2019; Schimmelfennig 2015; Leuffen et al. 2013). In this context, it has been discussed whether the EU will grow even looser with the crisis (Gänzle et al., 2021, p. 688).

As previously stated, the obscurity caused by the Refugee Crisis, along with the administrative inadequacies at the EU level, resulted in a decline in public and party support for the EU. As the EU became associated with the crisis, it became more salient and the support declined. However, when the refugee crisis became less discussed and less linked with the EU, the support for the Union started to increase. As De Wilde (2021, p. 673) claims, it means that crises have an impact on public opinion regarding European integration and these effects are temporary rather than permanent.

4.3. The Refugee Crisis and Post-Functionalist Approach

4.3.1. Why Post-Functionalism?

Each of the European integration theories provide a unique explanation for the Refugee Crisis. Whilst intergovernmentalism clarifies why the EU community failed to reach a consensus on who should bear the responsibility for refugees, neo-functionalism demonstrates supranational actors' unexpected ability to move gradually towards a more supranational and less intergovernmental Schengen system. Post-functionalism, on the other hand, emphasizes how the Refugee Crisis has fueled a division throughout Europe, pitting supporters of a pluralistic, open and multicultural Europe against those who advocate for a homogenous, restrictive Europe (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a, p. 12; Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 1122). Even though all integration theories have something to say about the Refugee Crisis, this thesis accepts the argument of Börzel and Risse (2018, p. 84), which is liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism fails to clarify why member states of

the EU have tended to maintain the status quo or prefer even disintegration at handling the Refugee Crisis, regardless of the shared interest in supporting the Schengen system in order to refrain from welfare losses as result of internal border controls. It is also argued that post-functionalism can explain why the EU could not take a common decision on what to do about refugee flows with its emphasis on the constraining dissensus.

As Schimmelfennig (2018, p.969) argues, the Refugee Crisis was exacerbated by exogenous shocks, which revealed the European integration project's flaws and resulted in intergovernmental disputes over crisis burden sharing and also unusual politicization of the integration in EU member states. With the Refugee Crisis, open borders that are one of the Schengen system's important public goods, are back under the control of member states, but no significant integration process has been made (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 970). Transnational interdependence was weak in the Refugee Crisis; so, it produced weak pressure for cooperation (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a, p. 9). In other words, the Refugee Crisis has resulted in less integration, not more.

In this dissertation, it is accepted that traditional European integration theories, which are intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism are inefficient to explain the Refugee Crisis since these theories could not explain the externalization process of the EU during the Refugee Crisis. On the other hand, post-functionalism offers the concept of constraining dissensus and politicization of the Refugee Crisis issue and the EU by Eurosceptic parties to clarify the reason of why there was no agreement among member states. As post-functionalism argues, the primary prerequisite for constraining dissensus is the politicization, which is mainly determined by issue salience. In 2015, with the Refugee Crisis peaked, the politicization of refugees and migration increased. Externalization policies of the Refugee Crisis were subsequently implemented because of the constraining dissensus. Thus, it is possible to claim that post-functionalism indicates the importance of the impact of public opinion on EU politics as a limiting force in EU politics (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p. 84).

Post-functionalism, put forward by Hooghe and Marks in 2000s, brought a new perspective to European integration when compared with traditional integration theories. One of the most important and distinctive features of this theory is the importance they give the concept of politicization, as mentioned above. The politicization of migration and refugees and the EU after the Refugee Crisis has led to increased Euroscepticism and the securitization of refugees and migration. In this regard, it is critical to analyze these essential concepts for post-functionalism such as politicization, constraining dissensus, identity, TAN-GAL parties and externalization with the Refugee Crisis.

Post-functionalism is useful in explaining the Refugee Crisis. As Schimmelfennig (2018, p. 969) argues, the Refugee Crisis did not result in a major deepening of integration. It has brought a kind of disintegration. Post-functionalism, as a (dis)integration theory, is instructive for understanding the Refugee Crisis. This theory is significant since it explains how the refugee crisis has exacerbated disagreements in the European public and that strengthened the anti-immigrants and anti-integrationists. Quiet supporters of the EU and the integration have begun to be more active and the EU issue has begun to feature prominently in national elections, according to Hooghe and Marks (2019, p. 4). They also added that since migration and refugees were highly politicized with the Refugee Crisis, it has had a significant impact on the electoral success of nationalist parties in both East and West Europe (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 1122). This crisis also exacerbated the transnational divide between nations, which has taken the form of a social cleavage (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 1122). The social cleavage that Hooghe and Marks mentioned has led to cleavage in other areas with discourses on protection of borders, negative reflection of refugees and ultra-nationalist rhetoric. Post-functionalism is a good tool for understanding these cleavages caused by the Refugee Crisis. Therefore, although other theories have also made significant contributions, this thesis employs a post-functionalist framework to analyze Eurobarometer data and political party manifestos.

All in all, this thesis uses post-functionalism theory to understand the Refugee Crisis. Since many of the post-functionalist theory's arguments regarding the Refugee Crisis have been confirmed (Webber, 2019, p. 8), it is considered important to test them on Germany as one of the most significant and influential members of the EU. Post-functionalism analyzes the Refugee Crisis in terms of domestic politicization to explain why transnational pressure was weak and member states were not cooperating during the crisis. By connecting immigration to European integration, the Refugee Crisis exacerbated a long-simmering transnational divide, which has some of the characteristics of a social cleavage capable of shaping political conflict (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a, p. 11). Post-functionalism is the only theory that emphasizes these cleavages in explaining the Refugee Crisis. As well, it increased the political salience of the migration and EU in member states while polarizing views on both issues (Grande & Kriesi 2016). None of the EU's previous crises has created more identity-based fears than the Refugee Crisis. Immigration became the most concerning issue on the minds of people across Europe for the first time in Eurobarometer's history in 2015. The high salience of migration, refugees and the EU, and widespread discontent with the EU's crisis management made Eurosceptic, anti-refugee political groups bigger and more powerful (Webber, 2019, p. 8).

As a disintegration theory, two most important weapons used by post-functionalism in explaining the disintegration created by the Refugee Crisis are politicization and constraining dissensus. Hooghe and Marks did not anticipate that disintegration would be a certainty, but they predict that there will be an increasing pressure in that direction since immigration and the EU are highly politicized and exclusive identity rises. In such a highly politicized political environment, Hooghe and Marks (2008, p. 22) claim that political leaders may attempt to 'work around' the increasing restrictions they face, by avoiding referendums, broadening the scope for 'opt-outs' and implementing differentiated integration, and delegating authority to 'non-majoritarian regulatory agencies'. Therefore, the arguments of post-functionalism will be examined in more detail in the following sections.

4.3.1.1. Politicization

Politicization of the EU and its related issues were hardly discussed subjects in the European integration theories almost two decades ago. However, since post-functionalists Hooghe and Marks associated politicization with European integration, it has become a contentious subject in the field of European integration theories. The EU has been increasingly become an important subject for the public and political parties during the period of crisis that the EU has experienced in recent years. This has led to the fact that the politicization of the EU is associated with the rise of Eurosceptic political parties and public. Therefore, with the emergence of the crises, the increase in the salience of the EU has led to the politicization of the EU, and the increasing awareness of the public opinion has also mobilized the political parties. It is controversial to answer which came first the chicken or the egg. In other words, it is difficult to answer whether the high level of public politicization of the EU issues affect the political parties or vice versa. However, it could be said that with the Refugee Crisis, the politicization of the EU has increased both at the popular level and at the level of political parties. Post-functionalism is of critical significance at this point, since it is the first theory to focus on the role and significance of public opinion in European integration.

Politicization can be defined as the process of making something political or emphasizing the political side of something. Hooghe and Marks (2009, p. 2) have developed the politicization understanding of post-functionalism as: First of all, there is a mismatch between the jurisdictional form and the functional efficiency- “reform impetus”. Then, the reform impetus leads to “issue creation”, in response to interest groups and political parties. Later, this determines the “arena choice”, which can be mass politics or limited to the interest group. Lastly, these arenas each have certain rules called as “arena rules” and the choice determines if the conflict over the issue is based on identity or distribution, so on an ideological ground or a materialistic- “conflict structure”. European integration became politicized, changing both the content and the process of decision-making (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 8).

Hooghe and Marks focus on the political parties' strategic actions within domestic party politics, implying a growing prominence for identity in debates about European integration (Statham & Trezz, 2015, p. 289). According to them, politicization has resulted in bad consequences, such as the growth of new populist nationalist parties that exploit the anti-EU and xenophobic sentiments of the public by encouraging anti-immigrant identity politics. These arguments of Hooghe and Marks on politicization can be tested in terms of the Refugee Crisis, because the Refugee Crisis led to a high salience of the EU, migration and refugees, and the politicization of these issues. The Refugee Crisis has made European integration a far more politicized issue (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019a, p. 1012). With the refugee influx reaching its peak in 2015, Eurobarometer shows that migration has become the most important issue for EU citizens. This concern maintained its importance for a while. The public in EU member states highly criticized the way the EU has handled the Refugee Crisis. The popularity of anti-EU, anti-refugee, and/or anti-Muslim political groups was boosted by the high salience of the Refugee Crisis and increasing discontent with the handling of the crisis (Webber, 2019, p. 8). The EU tried to depoliticize itself and migration and refugees through supranational delegations from the beginning of the Refugee Crisis. However, this effort of depoliticization failed. Rather, the EU itself and related issues became more politicized in this process. The Refugee Crisis was about the questions of who 'the others' are and 'who belongs to us?', i.e. the borders (Börzel & Risse, 2018, p. 85).

To sum up, the Refugee Crisis was highly politicized (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 978). Politicization is critical in understanding why the Refugee Crisis results in a kind of disintegration. Failure to manage the Refugee Crisis and the high salience of the EU and migration have led political parties and the public to be sceptical about the EU. Due to the EU's inability to depoliticize and the populist political parties' struggle for politicization, the immigration issue has become securitized, and refugees have been seen as a threat. Therefore, member states implemented their own national border policies and opposed common policies. As a consequence of this high politicization, political parties that tried to find an EU-wide solution to the Refugee Crisis were left with fewer choices. Throughout Europe, nationalist opponents pushed

their governments to impose limitations, even in member states, which have a more positive public opinion towards refugees. As a result of these pressures, the closure of borders became inevitable, and a strict asylum legislation was approved by the Merkel government in March 2016 and they negotiated an agreement to hold refugees in Turkey (Hooghe & Marks, 2019, p. 1122). So, the question arises at this point: what is the driving force for politicization? For post-functionalists the answer to this question is ‘constraining dissensus’.

4.3.1.2. Constraining Dissensus of the Post-Functionalist Approach and Externalization of the Refugee Crisis Management

Public opinion in the context of European integration has not been taken seriously for a long time. Traditional European integration theories, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, have analyzed the European integration through political elites and argued that public opinion does not have a decisive influence on European integration. For these theories, since the public does not have detailed information about the European integration, they do not affect party positioning on the subject. At the same time, because the public is not interested in European integration, it has a low salience for the public. Lastly, they note that issues related to European integration are unique issues so they are not related to fundamental conflicts that drive political rivalry. Lindberg and Scheingold (1970, p. 62) called this period as ‘permissive consensus’, which means the passive support of citizens and shows that European integration is an elite project.

As a consequence of the Maastricht Treaty Referendum’s failure, the idea of ‘permissive consensus’ began to be criticized along with the discussions on the ‘EU democratic deficit’. The assumption that the public will always support the EU was no longer the case; in fact, support for the EU decreased steadily from the 90’s. Hooghe and Marks (2009) called the period from 1991 as ‘constraining dissensus’ in their famous article. Party leaders from national governments are more aware of the fact that their actions are being strategically challenged in their own domestic political arenas while discussing European issues (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 9). In

contrast to the traditional approach, they claim that national voting is affected by public opinion on European integration, which is reasonably organized and linked to the fundamental aspects that shape conflicts in European societies. Constraining dissensus indicates a decrease in the average level of support for the EU that resulted in a loss of consensus as a result of the rise in Euroscepticism.

As a result of constraining dissensus in the EU, the EU has emphasized externalization measures to solve the Refugee Crisis. When there was a high influx of refugees and the Refugee Crisis broke out, the EU was caught off guard. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2018, p. 185) argue that the EU had four choices in this situation. The first one is further horizontal differentiation, which means EU Member States may reduce their losses and either leave EMU or Schengen or coerce others to do so. The second one is regulatory tightening that means EU Member States may strengthen regulatory compliance and eliminate regulatory gaps to achieve the policy co-ordination. The third one is European capacity-building, which means that in order to offer collective insurance mechanisms that Schengen and Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU) has previously failed to provide, the member states may establish European burden and risk-sharing agreements. And the last one is externalization of crisis management, which means the member states may use non-EU actors' capabilities to externalize some of the adjustment cost and avoid internal decision barriers. Since the member states being unable to reach an agreement on how to handle such a large influx of refugees and share the burden, they primarily focused on intergovernmental cooperation with third countries so that refugees would not reach the EU's borders (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 982).

4.3.1.3. TAN/GAL Parties

The classification of political parties as TAN/GAL parties has been made by the post-functionalist approach to the European integration. The poles of this dimension are described with these terms: green/ alternative/ libertarian (GAL) and transnationalism/ authority/ nationalism (TAN) (Marks et al. 2006, p. 156- 157). This classification reflects non-economic issues such as environmental, lifestyle, and

ecological since the European integration is not just an economic organization anymore. Marks et al. (2006) argue that these TAN/GAL dimensions are ways of summarizing how actors position themselves on major issues. Significant differences exist across nations and throughout time when it comes to the structure of political competition. However, it is still possible to make a fundamental and generalizable pattern.

Political parties, which see an opportunity to change the status quo and get more votes, foster politicization (Di Mauro & Memoli, 2021, p. 5). These parties, which mostly appear on the conservative traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN) and extreme right of the political spectrum, maintain control over the problem by advocating measures such as rejecting refugees and border closures (Yılmaz 2012), guaranteeing the priority of national citizens and the protection of national resources to comfort the population worried with huge flows of immigrants (Wodak 2015). It is argued that political parties close to the TAN pole, which are radical Right and Right-populist parties, are Eurosceptic without exception. These parties are the most Eurosceptic party families indeed, and during the last two decades, their respective electoral weight has increased substantially in their national party systems (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 977). They have gained more room in the discussion, asserting that they are the best solution to the issue. Immigration-related issues have been politicized, and as a result, anti-immigration parties have gained support (Dinas et al., 2019, p. 251). As a result of their nationalist stances, these parties use anti-immigrant rhetoric in combination with anti-EU views to formulate their nationalist and anti-global worldview (Conti, 2018). For the same reasons that they oppose immigration, they reject European integration: it weakens the national community (Hooghe & Marks, 2009, p. 17). This ‘perfect storm’, which they believe was losing votes and political capital, resulted in hesitation for pro-EU integration agents (Di Mauro & Memoli, 2021, p. 5).

Moreover, Conservative parties with a TAN tendency are also likely to be Eurosceptical. Although their arguments are not as radical as those of radical Right and Right-populist parties', Conservative parties are also against conflicting sources

of identity within their state, the influx of immigrants, and external intervention from international organizations and other countries for their national culture, sovereignty, and community. The underlying idea of their nationality understanding is that the nation-state should protect its legitimate sovereign right to rule the people who live in its territory. Eurosceptics in conservative parties hardly attempt to withdraw from the EU, but they advocate a looser confederation, which contains as much of Europe as possible (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 981).

Furthermore, another argument related to these dimensions is that the opposition to European integration has two sides: it is placed at both Left and Tan extremes since the European Union is a centrist project. The EU is a political project initiated by the mainstream parties such as Christian Democrats, social democrats, liberals, and conservatives, which have controlled national parliaments, national governments, the EP, and the European Commission. Therefore, many political parties, which are not located at the center of their party system, oppose European integration as a continuation of their domestic policies. The radical Left sees European integration as an elitist capitalist project that deprives the citizens of decision-making power on behalf of strong companies. Accordingly, European integration, according to radical TAN parties, is an elitist supranational movement that undermines national sovereignty as well as traditional values (Marks et al., 2006, p. 163). On the other hand, Green parties, located close to the GAL pole, are regarded as more integrationist. Opposition to European integration is not typical for GAL parties. Nevertheless, Green Parties also have some Eurosceptic tendencies, since the lack of democratic accountability in the EU is of concern to them. These parties, on the other hand, take pro-integration stances on other issues such as environmental issues and asylum (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 984).

To conclude, it is not always accurate to claim that one group of political parties is completely anti-European and other is not, since this can change over time and from subject to subject. For instance, whilst social-democratic and radical left parties dominated opposition before to the introduction of the single market, radical TAN parties had emerged as the most significant source of opposition after that (Hooghe

& Marks, 2009, p. 17). Since European integration is no longer just about economic subjects, Euroscepticism becomes more TAN, and politicization is more apparent in countries where populist TAN parties are in power (Hooghe et al., 2002, p. 981).

4.3.1.4. Unfortunate and Fortunate Governments and the Issue of Burden Sharing

When the Refugee Crisis broke out, EU immigration policies and regulations regarding refugees were not sufficient to manage such a major crisis. This scenario not only intensified the problem, but also led each nation to attempt to deal with it according to its own set of norms and procedures. For instance, transit countries, such as Hungary, Italy and Greece faced not only the challenges of humanitarian assistance and security, but also strong incentives to transfer refugees to destination countries, such as Germany, where problems with both the short- and long-term support and social integration erupted (Anderson, 2021, p. 778). Therefore, each country faced different kinds of problems, such as securing borders, supplying support for refugees or the temporary suspension of Schengen procedures.

The literature in general divides the countries affected by the Refugee Crisis into two categories such as advantageous and disadvantageous countries; fortunate and unfortunate countries; least affected and most affected countries, etc. Although this distinction is named differently, it is mostly based on the idea of who is affected more or less. According to Genschel and Jachtenfuchs' (2018, p. 187) categorization, unfortunate governments, which immediately faced the crisis, saw the crisis as a common problem, and considered crisis management as a shared duty for all EU member or Schengen states. For the fortunate governments, on the other hand, which was able to stay a little further away from the effect of the crisis, the crisis was not the result of a common policy failure but the individual member states' policy failures.

By and large, the fortunate states did not want to pay for what they saw as the fault of others. According to them, crisis management mainly requires implementing

country-specific policy changes in directly impacted states and a better adherence to EU regulations, rather than solidarity. As the unfortunate countries claims European burden-sharing, either through intergovernmental transfers or through the creation of supranational capacities, the fortunate states refused a common capacity-building and burden-sharing. Their alternative proposal was more strict European practices, which would force member states to change failed policies, as well as strengthen border security and the detention of refugees. Negotiations between the two camps were hindered by a zero-sum approach to the conflict and politicization of domestic politics at the highest levels. Politicization of domestic policies made it harder for consensus.

Despite the fact that nations are often studied in two categories in the literature, there are scholars who group countries into even more divisions in their research. For instance, Schimmelfennig (2018, p. 978) mentions four types of countries. He argues that the frontline states such as Italy and Greece were impacted by the influx of refugees quickest because of their location yet did not provide appealing asylum conditions. Secondary refugee flow affected the destination states like Germany and Sweden since they are wealthy countries with a comparatively liberal asylum regime and attractive conditions. Transit countries like Slovenia and Hungary were located along the migration routes connecting the frontline to the target countries. Bystander countries were located off-route and so not directly affected (Schimmelfennig, 2018, p. 978).

4.4. Conclusion

Crises have a significant impact on the formation of European integration. Since its inception, the EU has had to deal with many crises and this has had an impact on the degree and direction of integration. The economic and political crisis period of the EU in recent years has transformed the EU, the member states, as well as member states' relations with the EU. The Refugee Crisis has been one of the long-term crises affecting the EU and its member states. In spite of the fact that the Refugee Crisis is an exogenous shock for the EU in the first place, it has been extremely affected internal politics of the EU and member states' domestic politics. The difficulties

encountered by the EU and the member states in handling this crisis have deepened the crisis over time and caused the crisis to last for a long time. These difficulties that the EU had while managing the Refugee Crisis caused the EU to be heavily criticized, and the member states focused on their own national solutions rather than seeking a common European solution. This has led to an increase in Euroscepticism.

Despite the fact that crises have played a significant role in the history of the EU, European integration theories have not placed a strong emphasis on crises, especially until the crisis period in recent years. However, theories of European integration have shifted their focus to impact of crises in the wake of the EU's crisis period in which one crisis begins before the other one ends. Even though no single theory could give a full explanation for crises, this dissertation accepts that post-functionalist explanations of the Refugee Crisis are particularly well-suited. Basic explanations of post-functionalism are supported and it is argued that post-functionalism would be useful to analyze the public, political parties and their manifestos to understand European integration and the effects of the Refugee Crisis on the integration.

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH DESIGN

5.1. Introduction

Numerous researches in the literature establish a connection between the Refugee Crisis, anti-immigration attitudes and Euroscepticism. It is claimed that as the number of refugees or immigrants rises in such a short time, anti-immigrant sentiment and Euroscepticism will increase among the public and political parties. It is expected that the salience of immigration will increase in the face of a sudden and dramatic increase as in the Refugee Crisis. Additionally, the salience of the EU is also expected to increase in the literature since the Refugee Crisis is mostly seen as a problem of the EU. Furthermore, because the Refugee Crisis is negatively associated with the EU, that is, the EU is blamed for failing to handle and the crisis' growing severity, it is argued in the literature that anti-EU discourses have increased at the level of political parties and the public with the Refugee Crisis.

The anti-EU and anti-immigrant sentiments in the EU member states after the Refugee Crisis have been studied in the literature. In this regard, this dissertation aims to analyze the validity of these arguments by studying Germany as a case that is one of the most powerful and influential EU member states. In this part of the thesis, first of all, the following question will be answered: why is Germany chosen as a case? Then, the hypotheses will be explained. And lastly, the data used to understand the public's and political parties' response to the crisis will be detailed.

5.2. Case Selection: Why Germany?

As it is obviously known that the EU member states are not united under the EU in their responses to the Refugee Crisis, likewise, in Germany, each political party and each segment of society responded to the crisis differently. Therefore, it could not be said that the public or political parties act as a whole. While some believe the EU is to blame for the refugee issue becoming a catastrophe, others believe the EU should bring a common solution. While some criticize the Merkel government, others see the open-door policy of the Merkel government as a solution to this crisis. Even though it is not possible to claim that there is a unified German response to the crisis at both public and party levels, it is significant to analyze the effect of the Refugee Crisis on German Euroscepticism. Germany is an interesting country to analyze the effect of the crisis in many ways.

At the end of 2019, there were 26 million refugees and 45.7 million internally displaced people all around the world. Ten per cent of all these world's refugees and only a fraction of internally displaced people were living in the EU (European Commission, 2021). Therefore, the Refugee Crisis affected all EU member states in some way. However, it did not affect all countries in the same way. Germany was one of the most affected EU member state since it was the main destination for refugees and with the highest rate of refugee acceptance. During the Refugee Crisis, in terms of who took in the most asylum-seekers and refugees inside its own country and the EU obviously, Germany was the winner. According to Eurostat data, asylum and first-time asylum applicant numbers in 2015 were 476.510, and then it increased to 745.160 in 2016 in Germany. The decline in applicant numbers that started in 2017 has still continued and the number was 121.955 in 2020 (EUROSTAT, 2021). However, this is still the highest number among EU member states. Whilst the share of refugees in the EU is 0.6% compared its total population, in Germany, it is 1.4% compared its total population in 2019, and it is also the highest among EU member states (European Commission, 2021).

Germany is an interesting case not just because it is the country that accepts the most refugees, but also because it is one of the driving forces of integration- a traditional driver of European integration (Baluch, 2018, p. 113). As one of the EU's founding members, Germany has been a key actor in guiding the integration process from the very beginning. In this regard, as a leading motor of integration, both public and party support for the European project historically has been higher than any other EU member country. There is no other country in Europe where elite agreement on European integration has been as strong as it is in Germany, and the public has been in such a pro-European mood (Lees, 2002, p. 244). That being the case, it would be fascinating to see whether there has been any shift in public opinion and political parties in the wake of the Refugee Crisis, given that European integration has always had widespread support at all levels and that Euroscepticism is historically at low levels.

Another significant reason Germany is an interesting case for seeing the effect of the Refugee Crisis is the response of the German government to the crisis. No other EU member country has given the reaction of the Merkel government. Merkel took a pro-immigration stance and chose to leave the borders of Germany open to refugees. In order to alleviate the burden of border countries such as Hungary, which suffered most from this crisis, she suspended the Dublin Regulation that governs refugees' entrance to Germany from another EU member state. While this stance is appreciated by many, it has also been widely criticized for fear of attracting more refugees to the EU and Germany obviously. Also, some members of Merkel's own political party have criticized her reaction as "too generous" and warned that the situation is edging closer to being a "national catastrophe" (Frankfurter Rundschau, October 15, 2015, as cited in Holmes & Castañeda, 2016, p. 14). German Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to keep open the borders of Germany to refugees in the beginning of the European Refugee Crisis put immigration and refugees on the European and national agenda, and allowed populist groups like Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) an opportunity to boost their support among the electorate with their extreme anti-immigration stance (Mader & Schoen, 2019, p. 83). However, during the Refugee Crisis, Merkel changed her refugee policy and adopted a more restrictive approach

towards asylum-seekers when she saw the reaction from the public and faced a possible electoral loss (Zaun & Servent, 2021, p. 158). Therefore, it could not be said that a single opinion prevails on the Refugee Crisis, as in all other issues. On the one hand, whilst the general population was quite ready to support and protect refugees, on the other hand, the hostility against refugees and refugee settlements rose dramatically (Jäckle & König, 2018, p. 2). In this regard, policies have also changed over time. After all, Merkel's initial response to the Refugee Crisis and the subsequent shift in her policy make Germany an interesting case in terms of seeing the effects of the Refugee Crisis on Euroscepticism.

5.3. Research Questions

Based on the assumption in the previous literature, which is crises may result in social, political, or organizational change (Boin et al. 2009, Christensen et al. 2016, 't Hart 2014), it is argued that *crises affect the polity mood/political atmosphere at many levels, like public level and party level.*

Thus, the dissertation focuses on the Refugee Crisis in 2015 and ask how this crisis affected the political atmosphere in terms of the salience of and positions related to the European Union (EU) at both public and party levels in Germany. The question has three components:

RQ-1: *Did the Refugee Crisis in 2015 affect the political atmosphere in Germany in terms of the salience of and positions related to immigration and the European Union at public and party levels?*

RQ-2: *If so, what were the direction and the magnitude of this effect, i.e. negative/positive, increase/decrease?*

RQ-3: *Is there any parallelism between the public and party level effects?*




Figure 3: Research Design of the Dissertation

5.4. Hypotheses

In accordance with the research questions, the following hypotheses are presented. These hypotheses are derived from the literature on the salience, party-based Euroscepticism, public Euroscepticism, post-functionalism, and how the Refugee Crisis affects sentiments and positions towards the EU.

H.1.a: *The salience of the immigration issue increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

Since a high number of people came to the borders of the EU with the Refugee Crisis, and it was almost impossible to manage such a large crowd arriving in such a short time, an atmosphere of chaos occurred. In such an environment, it is expected that the salience of the immigration issue, which is the main subject of the crisis, will increase at the public level. In fact, Mader and Schoen (2019) explain the Refugee Crisis directly related to the saliency and define it as an event that extremely increased the saliency of immigration.

There are numerous articles in the literature that defend the assumption that the Refugee Crisis increased the salience of immigration at the public level. Dennison

and Geddes (2019, p. 2017), for instance, argue that since the Refugee Crisis, there is a high salience of the immigration issue. This increase in the salience of immigration is mostly related to the high influx of refugees. Hatton (2017a) also claims that migration movements and the number of applications for asylum have a positive correlation with the salience of immigration as a policy issue. Therefore, in the literature, it is expected that if there is a high influx of refugees, then the salience of immigration will increase. Moreover, Sola (2018, p. 9) emphasizes the consistency of the arrival of refugees in increasing the salience of immigration. Besides, Dennison (2020, p. 410) explains the increase with the help of Eurobarometer, and argues that as the number of immigrants in a country increases as a percentage of the total national population, the number of people who accept immigration as one of the two most significant issues facing their country rises as well. Glorius (2018, p. 16) also states that the salience of the immigration issue is related to refugee flows. To sum up, in the literature, it is mostly accepted that immigration became politicized and its salience increased with the Refugee Crisis.

H.1.b: *The salience of the immigration issue increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

Crises increase the salience of the issues related, as the literature offers (Mader & Schoen 2019; Dennison & Geddes 2019; Jabko & Luhman 2019; Hutter & Kriesi 2019; Kriesi et al. 2012; Pirro & Taggart 2018). Since crises in general offered opportunities for the mobilization of political challengers like Eurosceptic parties, the salience of the crises' subject has been increased by these actors (Pirro & Taggart, 2018, p. 258). Thus, political parties increased the salience of the immigration to make room for themselves in the political arena. They see and use the situation of crisis as an opportunity to show themselves. In this regard, political parties politicized the Refugee Crisis (Gianfreda, 2017, p. 16; Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017), and immigration issue became a central topic because of the Refugee Crisis (Meyer & Wagner, 2020, p. 666). Hatton (2017b, p. 469- 470) also accepts that the Refugee Crisis made a shift in salience of the immigration issue. Therefore, as at the public

level, it is also expected that the salience of immigration increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.

H.2.a: *The salience of the EU increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

When there is a crisis, which is an unexpected major event like a huge influx of people coming from another country in this case, it is common that people talked about and discussed it and related subjects. As Grande and Kriesi (2016, p. 279) argue, there is no single form of politicization of any issue. However, political actors use crises as strategic opportunities to politicize issues related to crises. In this regard, the salience of issues that are related to crisis are expected to increase at any levels, and the EU is obviously related to the Refugee Crisis. As Jabko and Luhman (2019) argue, European integration has become increasingly politicized, increasingly salient in crisis situations. The Refugee Crisis is such a great event that is a concern for all EU member states and the EU itself. The Refugee Crisis is considered as a problem of the EU. Thus, the salience of the EU at the public level is expected to increase with the Refugee Crisis. Stockemer et al. (2018, p. 328) argue that after the Refugee Crisis, Euroscepticism has become salient in public discourse in EU member states.

H.2.b: *The salience of the EU increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

As it is mentioned above, it is expected a crisis increases the salience of issues that are related to this crisis, and the EU has been salient in crisis situations. For instance, the Euro Crisis has led to a greater politicization of EU issues within national parliaments (Wendler, 2014, p. 23). Since the Refugee Crisis is a crisis related to the EU just like the Euro Crisis, this is expected to increase the salience of the EU at the party level. Therefore, it is accepted that the Refugee Crisis politicized the issue of European integration (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019, p. 1012). The most important thing in this politicization process is the role of populist political parties (Grande & Kriesi, 2016, p. 284). These parties connect the Refugee Crisis to the EU directly, and have

increased the salience of Euroscepticism with the Refugee Crisis (Pirro et al., 2018, p. 380).

So, in the absence of a properly developed Euro level party system (Bardi et al. 2014), parties are largely absent from the debate at the European level, while national parties are still crucial actors when it comes to the domestic debate on European integration. In this regard, in a crisis situation like the Refugee Crisis, it is expected that political parties at the national level talk much more about the EU that they associate with the Crisis.

H.3.a. *Anti-immigrant sentiments increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

In the literature, it is argued that the negative feelings towards immigrants have increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis. At the peak of the crisis, in 2015, refugees were mostly characterized with hostility, suspicion, and misunderstanding by the public (Renner et al., 2017). Since the differences between a refugee and an immigrant are not clearly known by the public, and even the media could not generally clarify this distinction (Stockemer et al. 2020, p. 889), it might seem normal that people tend to have anti-immigrant sentiments after the Refugee Crisis. In addition, as Sniderman et al. (2000) argue, when a society is exposed to an external shock like a refugee influx, anti-immigration sentiments will increase. In other words, as thousands, even hundreds of thousands of people came, and interactions with these people increase with the Refugee Crisis, it is expected that opposition to immigration increase. This is known as Blalock's (Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations: A Capricorn Giant, 1967) salience hypothesis, which concludes that any connection with immigrants will tend to emphasize the importance of nationality in the natives' identities and as a result there will be an increase in opposition to immigration (Davis & Deole, 2020, p.1).

Many studies in the literature analyze the effect of the Refugee Crisis at the public level. For instance, Simonovits and Bernát (2016, p. 47) show in their study that the

level of xenophobia in Hungary increased suddenly and substantially in April 2015. On the other hand, Sola (2018, p. 26) asserts the Refugee Crisis dramatically increased German people's fears about immigration. Hangartner et al. (2019, p. 453) argue that people exposed to a huge influx of refugees are more hostile towards immigrants. Furthermore, Bjånesøy (2019) is interested in how the Refugee Crisis affects Norwegian society and categorizes asylum seekers in the following ways. First of all, “undeserved”, is a group of people who come to Norway to abuse the system and are seen as financial burdens on society. Secondly, “deserving/ involved”, is a group of people who are seen as human beings in need of help, and it is an obligation to help them. Finally, “deserving/distance”, is a group of people who ran away from war, but it is not an obligation to help. In line with this categorization, Bjånesøy claims that after the Refugee Crisis, there is no increase in responses related to the first category. However, while more people think like in the second category before the crisis, much more people think like in the third category after the crisis (Bjånesøy, 2019, p. 234). It means that after the Refugee Crisis, more people accepted the situation of asylum seekers, but they do not feel compelled to help these people.

All in all, the Refugee Crisis is associated with the increase in anti-immigrant sentiments at the public level, since refugees are frequently introduced as a threat to the European way of life (Goodman et al. 2017, p. 106).

H.3.b: *Anti-immigrant positions increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

The 2015 Refugee Crisis was not the first time the migration became a part of Europe's agenda. The issue of migration was already part of the agenda even before the Crisis. However, with the Refugee Crisis, political parties have become much more easily able to declare negative words about immigrants. Therefore, it is accepted in the literature that the Refugee Crisis has led to more anti-immigrant positions at the party level. While some countries have been trying to limit the numbers of refugees they could accept into their country, others closed their borders completely. For instance, like many other European countries, the Refugee Crisis triggered heated

political debates in Germany and exposed contradictory attitudes toward migrants and refugees (Sola, 2018, p.9). Moreover, the Refugee Crisis accelerated the emergence of far-right politics that is a part of an anti-immigrant movement in Italy and France (Castelli Gattinara, 2018, p. 271).

Populist radical right parties, which have gained strength recently and have effectively determined the agenda, politicized the immigration issue with the Refugee Crisis (Pirro et al., 2018, p. 380). In Italy, as Castelli Gattinara (2017, p. 318) has asserted, the Refugee Crisis has also sparked controversy in many other areas, such as economic, social, and cultural. Political parties sowed the seeds of hatred and xenophobic reactions by relating migration to insecurity and by following 'the logic of exceptionality' under the public influence. In other words, political parties excluded refugees. Furthermore, some countries had a picky approach. For instance, Poland accepted refugees if only they were non-Muslim because Muslims were seen as a security threat for the country (Narkowicz, 2018, p. 357).

Therefore, it could be said that anti-immigrant positions at the party level have expected to increase after the Refugee Crisis, although it has different levels of impact in different European countries.

H.4.a: *Euroscepticism increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

The Refugee Crisis is not only about the practical management of the refugee influx into the EU. It is multifaceted and related to economic, social, cultural, educational, and other issues, which requires a much more complicated strategy. However, the Union could neither manage the crisis nor fairly distribute the refugees across the member countries. The EU also has not managed to develop common asylum legislation, which resulted in each country making its own rules. Despite the unilateral strategies of the member countries, those same countries still expect the EU to find a solution to the crisis. Therefore, the Refugee Crisis has stimulated the EU's several systemic deficiencies and provoked a state of crisis, which can seriously damage the overall project of EU integration (Niemann & Zaun, 2018, p. 3).

Since the Schengen Agreement makes it possible for people to move easily from one country to another within the external borders of the EU, after the Refugee Crisis, the border issues among the Schengen countries became even more controversial. As Hartevelde et al. (2018, p. 13- 18) claimed, the inflow of refugees into the EU and the consequences of these management weaknesses have caused a *de facto* decrease in support for the EU across the population as a whole. On the other hand, as De Vrees and Boomgarden (2005, p. 65) argue, since the European integration project consists of different cultures, religions, ethnicities, and countries, people easily could categorize the others. Thus, this intensified negative opinions of these groups, and, as a result, people with negative views towards immigrants are more likely to oppose European integration.

In this regard, it is expected that all these problems, which the Refugee Crisis created and the EU could not handle, have increased Euroscepticism at the public level.

H.4.b: *Euroscepticism increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

The EU's inability to make competent solutions to solve the Refugee Crisis and the fact that this situation turned into a management crisis for the EU caused political parties to seriously criticize the EU. Party-level Euroscepticism is expected to increase as the EU is in such a multifaceted crisis and has difficulties in handling this crisis. For political parties, the Refugee Crisis is directly related to the issue of EU legitimacy (Gianfreda, 2017, p. 19). Populist radical right parties fueled Eurosceptic sentiments with the Refugee Crisis (Pirro et al., 2018, p. 380). They had a chance to strengthen their nationalist position with this crisis. Whilst some political parties settled for just criticizing the policies of the EU, others rejected the EU as a whole. As Taggart and Szczurbiak (2018, p. 1206) asserted the Refugee Crisis more or less affected Euroscepticism at the party level in almost all European countries. They also added that different countries have been affected differently by crises. For instance, whilst in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, the Refugee Crisis led to a sharpening of Euroscepticism among mainstream political actors, in other countries, it makes already Eurosceptic parties more Eurosceptic, and makes

more centrist ones accept a more critical approach to the EU (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2018, p. 1208).

Therefore, with the Refugee Crisis, Euroscepticism was associated with immigration issues and party-level Euroscepticism was increased in the EU member states at many different degrees.

H-5: *Peripheral parties that are located in the Left and the Right extremes are significantly more Eurosceptical than mainstream parties.*

There are many studies in the literature that categorize political parties and assert that their positions towards European integration have changed as a result of this categorization. As Hooghe et al. (2002, p. 968) argue, peripheral parties that are located on the Left and the Right extremes are significantly more Eurosceptical than mainstream parties such as Christian Democratic, Social Democratic, Conservative, and Liberal parties. Beyond economic concerns, it is argued that since radical Left and Right parties share elements of nationalist ideology, they share a common Eurosceptic stance. Even though left-wing and right-wing parties have different visions of national interest, it is claimed that these parties have shared concerns that are different from mainstream or governing rivals (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012, p. 505). In this regard, extremist parties who are outside the center of their party systems tend to take Eurosceptic positions, so there is a tendency for Eurosceptic parties to be located on the peripheries of party politics. It could be said that all hard-Eurosceptic parties are peripheral to their party systems. In other words, a right or left political party does not necessarily have to be Eurosceptic, but Eurosceptic parties are usually located on the peripheries.

To sum up, it is possible to claim that the most Eurosceptic political parties are the most extreme ones, although it is not possible to claim that all extreme left and right parties are strictly Eurosceptic. Therefore, it is expected that political parties on the extreme right and left of a country's political spectrum would be the most Eurosceptic.

5.5. How to Measure Euroscepticism and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments and Positions at the Party and Public Levels?

To measure the polity mood/political atmosphere of Germany in terms of (i) salience of and (ii) position related to the EU and immigration, I have benefited from two different data. For the measurement at the party level, I have used the Manifesto Project Data. For the measurement at the public level, I have used the standard Eurobarometer surveys.

Germany has been chosen as a case country in this dissertation. As the year of 2015 has singled out as the year of crisis for the EU due to the refugee and migrant influx into the continent, the time period to be used has been decided as between 2013 and 2017. Since 2015 is considered to be the year when the Refugee Crisis reached its peak, the last elections held in Germany before 2015, which was 2013, and first elections held after 2015, which was 2017, are analyzed. The year of 2013 is defined as the pre-crisis period, and the year of 2017 is defined as the post-crisis period.

5.5.1. Party Level Measurement of Salience of and Position Related to the European Union and Immigration

5.5.1.1. How to Measure Party Level Salience of and Position Related to the European Union and Immigration?

Party-level salience of and position related to any issue, including the EU and immigration, can be understood and measured through a political party's public statements, the parliamentary voting on related issues such as treaties, and published party programs and manifestos (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008b, p. 5). This diversity of resources shows us that the researcher has the option of focusing on election campaigns, on party behavior in the parliamentary term, and combining both of them (Volkens, 2007, p. 117). Instead of focusing on party policy in the post-election period, it is decided to focus on electoral campaign behavior in this study because the elections enable the political parties to analyze and display their policies and core

ideology. Besides, elections provide an appropriate course of action to the voters with regard to party manifestos and proposed electoral campaigns. Thus, analyzing manifestos is an excellent way to understand political parties. It is therefore agreed that manifestos can give a powerful understanding of how any political party perceives European integration and immigration. In this regard, manifestos could provide an insight into party-based salience of and position related to the EU and immigration.

Party manifestos are political parties' official documents that give the reader detailed information regarding these parties' positions on any subject. They provide an official summary of the party's position at an exact point in time. There has always been doubt about whether these documents reflect the truth or not. Despite this veracity problem, the analysis of party manifestos is very likely to estimate the positions of political parties. Party manifestos and programmatic declarations as well are simply the top of the ideological iceberg, especially when compared to the tiny but still significant range of differing ideas, values, and attitudes within a single political party (Flood & Soborski 2018, p. 42). As Budge et al. (1987, p. 26) also argue, party manifestos reflect the overall party positions better than anything else. They are strategic documents written by politically sophisticated party elites with many conflicting goals in mind (Laver & Garry 2000, p. 620). They also offer historical evidence of the change of party policy positions and of party-level salience over time.

In addition to the veracity problem, internal party dissent is another issue regarding party manifestos. They are seen as a result of the party in the central office; thus, the positions articulated here should be specifically attributed to this element of party organization (Conti, 2010, p. 97). Even though manifestos do not identify internal party dissent, they still can provide objective data (Hooghe, 2007, p. 27) as they map the position of the party at each election on the basis of its own final policy statement (see Budge, 2002). Manifestos themselves are the population of official policy statements for each election made by political parties in compliance with specified procedures, often legally prescribed procedures. They are also profoundly and deliberately scrutinized so that every included statement is intentioned politically

(Volkens et al. 2013, p. 2). Even if internal party dissent could not be stated in party manifestos, they are still significant since they are essentially factual official statements that reflect the shared views of the party as a whole and demonstrate how the party chooses to represent itself externally. Such reports are presented in official party platforms and reflect the official party line and the party united as a whole. After all, party manifestos refer to a consensus in a political party and are essential resources for deducing policy positions from the political party electoral campaign discourse (Budge, 1994, p. 455). In this dissertation, they are accepted as a valuable way of measuring party-based salience of and position related to the EU and immigration since they are the most comprehensive policy statements that political parties make.

5.5.1.2. Analyzing Party Manifestos: The Manifesto Project

In the literature, party manifestos have been analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. While some studies focus on the interpretation of party manifestos by looking at words, sentences, and their meaning; others' center of attraction is the numbers of words used, coding them, and words' ratio and intensity in a manifesto. The latter one, which is the systematic analysis of political party manifestos, began at the beginning of the 1980s, when the European Consortium for Political Research funded the cross-national Manifesto Research Group (Mair, 2003, p. 16). This dissertation chooses to analyze party manifestos quantitatively by using the data provided by the Manifesto Project.

Initiated in 2009, the Manifesto Project inherits the previous work of the Manifesto Research Group (MRG 1979-1989) and the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP 1989-2009). As of 2020, the dataset includes scores for over 1000 parties that participated to general elections in 56 different countries. These countries are mostly European but the dataset also includes parties from different geographies such as the United States, South Korea, South Africa, New Zealand, Mexico, Israel, Canada and Australia. The election year range is between 1920 (the US elections) and 2020 (elections in Montenegro).

The Project has made the creation of its own original coding scheme and has utilized expert coders who are mostly native speakers in the manifesto language, looking at every sentence and assigning each of them an appropriate category in the coding system. The coding instructions have evolved over time. In the fifth revised edition, it is argued that the project covers over one thousand parties in over fifty countries on five continents.

The Project had to choose a coding unit and develop a classification system as all human coded content analysis has to. The original contribution of the Project is using the so-called 'quasi-sentence' as a coding unit. The Project used 'quasi sentences' as its fundamental unit of analysis. A quasi-sentence is defined as a statement that is the verbal expression of a single political idea or issue (Volkens, 2003, p. 34). In the simplest terms, a sentence is the basic unit of meaning. A quasi sentence is a word string, which is either a full sentence or a partial sentence that would have the writer selected, have been a complete sentence (Laver & Garry, 2000, p. 624). The main logic behind the quasi-sentence is that party manifestos could have long sentences. And there may be more than one statement in those long sentences. That creates a problem while coding that sentence. In such a case, coders could not decide how to code that sentence. In this regard, the CMP solves this problem by breaking up long sentences' quasi-sentences'. There must be only one argument or message that one quasi-sentence contains (Werner et al., 2015, p. 6).

Besides this, the Project developed its own category system. According to that system (Werner et al., 2015, p. 7), every single quasi-sentence of a manifesto is coded into only one of 56 standard categories. All of these categories are categorized into seven major policy areas and are designed to be comparable between countries, political parties, elections, and across time. In addition, 12 categories are classified into two or more subcategories that cover particular aspects of these categories. The coder must decide between the subcategories in these situations and may not want to use the main category.

As mentioned before in this dissertation, there are two rival theories about how political parties present themselves in their manifestos. The first one is Downs' rational choice model of parties (1957). Downs' model assumes that political parties are stimulated by winning more and more votes and thus moves to an ideological position that maximizes the voting share. This feature of Downs' model was criticized by Robertson (1976) and Budge et al. (1987). They argue that political parties do not compete in a confrontational manner by taking different stances on the very same subject. This criticism leads us to the second theory, the saliency theory of party competition, which is represented by Robertson, 1976; Budge et al., 1987; and Budge, 1993. According to this theory, political parties emphasize the issues on which they think they have a good reputation while downplaying others (Van der Brug, 2003, p. 118). As an ancestor of saliency theory, Robertson's analysis was instrumental at theoretical and text-coding levels. In terms of textual analysis, Robertson's analysis revealed that documents could be precisely measured all together, the main documents were party manifestos or similar official documents, and formed the base for a coding framework. This approach has been followed by the Manifesto Project and its predecessor (Budge et al. 2001; Volkens et al. 2013; Klingemann et al. 2006).

The theory behind the Project was the saliency theory of party competition, in which political parties compete as a result of the salience of distinct issues in the party manifestos they offered to voters. Saliency theory, in other words, has an emphasis-based approach, which means that the most critical side of the documents is the degree of emphasis placed on certain broad policy areas, rather than the support or opposition of each party to a specific policy in these areas (Budge, 1987, p. 24). According to the understanding of the Project, party rhetoric can be conceptualized in terms of the issues they emphasize rather than the pro and con positions they adopt on them (Budge, 2015, p. 766). In other words, political parties compete by highlighting the policy areas that they think to provide them electoral benefits and by glossing over or disregarding those areas that they believe favor their rivals (McDonald & Mendes, 2003, p. 91).

The emphasis placed on a subject in the electoral program of a party is believed to be a sign of the priority of the significant policy area for the party. Differences in these priorities are, to some degree, driven by the ideological beliefs of parties. To the degree that ideological principles are able to identify issues or political problems of political importance, differences in these emphases reflect ideological differences. Thus, coded manifesto data on policy emphases helps us to evaluate ideological distances between parties (Van der Brug, 2003, p. 118). The Project enables to measure the relative importance placed on an issue by a party in a manifesto, not the party's substantive position on this issue. Position and emphasis are very different parameters of party policy. Two political parties may have completely divergent substantive positions on the same issue, but emphasize this issue to precisely the same extent in their respective manifestos (Laver & Garry, 2000, p. 620). As a result, the classification scheme that the Project provides makes three types of comparisons possible: first, comparisons of changes in policy positions or emphases over time within specific parties; second, differences in policy positions or emphases across parties; and, third, differences across countries (Volkens, 2003, p. 36).

5.5.1.3. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Manifesto Project

In terms of strengths, analysis of party manifestos enables access to objective data, produces time series data, allows the separation of preferences from behavior, and provides direct evidence of issue salience for political parties (Marks et al., 2007, p. 26). The study of party manifestos benefits from having clear access to information on political party positions from the parties themselves. However, it is evident that manifesto data shows only the officially stated salience of an issue. On the other hand, since party manifestos are generally approved by party conventions, they are official declarations of party policies and represent the whole party, not just a faction or a leader (Volkens, 2003, p. 34). Thus, they do not display any kind of internal party dissent. Even though manifestos are products of dominant groups in a political party, they do not necessarily imply a contradiction in a party. In the end, manifestos are political parties' official documents and a result of compromise.

In addition to these problems of the declared salience of issue and internal party dissent, there is also a subjectivity problem. The data provided by the Manifesto Project is criticized as being subjective since it depends on the evaluations of individual readers, not on the computer. However, the content analysis of manifestos involves the elaboration of a strict coding scheme that all coders must follow if the findings are to be reasonably replicable across coders. Such a method is expected to minimize difficulties arising from the subjective reading of texts (Ray, 1999, p. 284-285). The Project considers words as data. That consideration allows the use of conventional methods of statistical analysis, allowing inferences to be drawn about unobservable underlying characteristics of a text's author, for example, policy positions, from the observable content of the text. This statistical approach, which the Project has, eliminates both subjectivity and the tendency for human error, making results of text-based analysis easily replicable (Mikhaylov et al., 2012, p. 84). Party manifestos are coded once and only by a single expert in the Project, and that prevents human coding errors.

Furthermore, all experts are native speakers or fluent in the language that the manifesto is written, and they are supposed to be citizens of the country in which they code the manifesto of the party (Werner, 2015, p. 13). That makes the data more reliable because there could be sentences that may imply a meaning even if a particular word is not used. In such a case, a computer-coded analysis might not see that meaning. Since they are citizens, they have the advantage of having information about their country, which includes the history, social and economic problems, electoral issues, the party system of the country, and party ideologies. Coders also take a severe training process before coding a manifesto in order to provide reliable and comparable data.

Another criticism of the data provided by the Project is related to that elections are held at different times in different countries. Party manifestos are published before every election, so they vary from country to country. However, rather than creating problems, the Project provides data to estimate the political parties over a long period of study and across many countries (König et al., 2013, p. 469). Thus, the ideological

movements of political parties can be studied over time (Volgens, 2003, p. 34), and change in political parties' stances could be analyzed. Moreover, election manifestos also have different lengths. Whereas the number of sentences for each issue is deemed to be a percentage score of the total, some manifestos can be very short, which affects whether it is possible to identify the difference between parties (Marks et al., 2007, p. 26- 27). In such a case, it is possible to identify differences between parties because even if a manifesto is very short, it still mentions some issues and not others, and it means something about that party.

5.5.1.4. How does the Study Benefit from the Manifesto Project?

The Manifesto Project, like any other manifesto research, has a background idea that the party preferences and policies advocated in parliaments can be understood by studying the party manifestos prepared for elections (Budge et al. 2001). Though one can argue that manifestos are instrumental tools prepared for campaign purposes, researchers have shown that "election manifestos reflect the official position a party assumes on specific issues ahead of the election (...) even if only a negligible fraction of citizenry actually read these manifestos" (Braun et al. 2019, p. 801). Therefore, in this study, I also share the assumption that party manifestos represent a party's intended position.

Since the Manifesto Project studies the manifestos prepared for general elections, there was a natural limitation while selecting the dates to study. Since 2015 has been accepted as the year when the Refugee Crisis reached its peak, in order to see the effect of the crisis, it is aimed to analyze the last election before and the first election after 2015. Therefore, the election dates of 2013 and 2017 in Germany were chosen.

As the Manifesto Project provides individual scores for the general election manifestos of those parties that have won one or two seats in the respective national elections to the lower house (Volgens et al. 2013, p.2), there was a need to find a way to generate aggregate country scores. Instead of simply calculating the arithmetic average of party scores – to prevent the unproportioned effect of the marginal parties

– the scores of each party have been weighted to their percentage of seats in parliament. In other words, each party has affected the country score in accordance with its success in the general elections.

Six categories in the Manifesto Project construct are utilized in this thesis:

1. per108 European Community/Union: Positive

Favorable mentions of European Community/Union in general. May include:

- Desirability of the manifesto country joining (or remaining a member);
- Desirability of expanding the European Community/Union;
- Desirability of increasing the ECs/EUs competences;
- Desirability of expanding the competences of the European Parliament.

2. per110 European Community/Union: Negative

Negative references to the European Community/Union. May include:

- Opposition to specific European policies, which are preferred by European authorities;
- Opposition to the net-contribution of the manifesto country to the EU budget.

3. per601_2 National Way of Life: Immigration: Negative

Statement advocating the restriction of the process of immigration, i.e. accepting new immigrants. Might include statements regarding:

- Immigration being a threat to national character of the manifesto country;
- 'the boat is full' argument;
- The introduction of migration quotas, including restricting immigration from specific countries or regions etc.

(Only concerned with the possibility of new immigrants).

4. per602_2 National Way of Life: Immigration: Positive

Statements favoring new immigrants; against restrictions and quotas; rejection of the 'boat is full' argument. Includes allowing new immigrants for

the benefit of the manifesto country's economy. (Only concerned with the possibility of new immigrants).

5. *Parties' Immigration and Integration Positions Dataset (PImPo)*

PImPo includes data on parties' immigration and integration positions and saliency in 14 countries including Germany between 1998 and 2013 based on crowd coding of parties; election manifestos. The data set entails variables on immigration and integration positions and saliency for each party in one election. This data is used to analyze the positions of political parties on immigration and integration in Germany before the Refugee Crisis.

6. *Per7062 Refugees: Positive*

Favorable mentions of, or need for, assistance to people who left their homes because of the war (for instance, on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia) or were forcibly displaced.

Based on these categories, scores are generated for political parties in Germany and Germany in general at the election years of 2013 and 2017 based on the Manifesto Project Data. Two of these scores aim at measuring the EU-related issues, namely salience of EU and position regarding the EU. Other two scores are presented to measure the migration-related issues, again in terms of salience and position. Below, I explain the way in which I have calculated these four scores. Table 10 presents all related scores for Germany in 2013 and 2017.

- **eusaliience**

Originally, The Manifesto Project calculates the European Integration (Saliience) score as the sum of *per108* and *per110*. In line with this logic, eusaliience of each party in this study is calculated as the sum of *per108* (European Community/Union: Positive) and *per110* (European Community/Union: Negative) scores.

For the calculation of the country score, eusalience of each party is calculated as the sum of weighted *per108* (European Community/Union: Positive) and weighted *per110* (European Community/Union: Negative) scores. Arithmetic average of the party scores for the related year is taken as the country score.

Please note that if both *per108* and *per110* scores are equal to zero, which means that the manifesto did not include any reference to European integration in either negative or positive direction, then the eusalience score is also equal to zero. An eusalience score of 0 is meaningful and it was included in the calculations for eusalience.

- **euposition**

Originally, The Manifesto Project calculates the European Integration (position) score as the subtraction of *per110* from *per108*. In line with this logic, euposition of each party is calculated through subtracting the *per110* (European Community/Union: Negative) score from the *per108* (European Community/Union: Positive) score.

For the calculation of the country score, euposition of each party is calculated through subtracting the weighted *per110* (European Community/Union: Negative) score from the weighted *per108* (European Community/Union: Positive) score. An arithmetic average of the party scores for the related year is taken as the country score.

Please note that if both *per108* and *per110* scores are equal to zero, which means that the manifesto did not include any reference to European integration in either a negative or positive direction, then the euposition score is also equal to zero. Calculating an euposition score through *per108*=0 and *per110*=0 is not meaningful and it can be misleading. Therefore, such euposition scores were not included in the calculation of the aggregate country score for euposition.

- **migsalience**

The Manifesto Project measured the parties' immigration and integration positions and saliency in certain countries between 1998 and 2013 through Parties' Immigration and Integration Positions Dataset (PImPo). However, this was unfortunately a one-time calculation. And yet, apart from this calculation, a new calculation covering other years has not been made. So, this data can be used only for the pre-crisis period in Germany. Migsalience in 2013 is given by PImPo. On the other hand, though there is no specific calculation method for migration saliency by the Manifesto Project out of this calculation, imitating the above-mentioned formula applied for European Integration saliency, migsalience of each party in 2017 is calculated as the sum of *per601_2* (National Way of Life: Immigration: Negative) and *per602_2* (National Way of Life: Immigration: Positive) scores.

For the calculation of the country score, migsalience of each party is calculated as the sum of weighted *per601_2* (National Way of Life: Immigration: Negative) and weighted *per602_2* (National Way of Life: Immigration: Positive) scores. An arithmetic average of the party scores for the related year is taken as the country score.

Please note that if both *per601_2* and *per602_2* scores are equal to zero, which means that the manifesto did not include any reference to immigration in either a negative or positive direction, then the migsalience score is also equal to zero. A migsalience score of 0 is meaningful and it was included in the calculation of the aggregate country score for migsalience.

- **migposition**

As mentioned above, PImPo is used to analyze the migration positions for political parties in Germany for the pre-crisis period. Therefore, migposition in 2013 is given by PImPo. Since there is no specific data showing the immigration positions of political parties other than PImPo, imitating the above-mentioned formula applied for the European Integration position, migposition of each party in 2017 is calculated

through subtracting the *per601_2* (National Way of Life: Immigration: Negative) score from the *per602_2* (National Way of Life: Immigration: Positive) score.

For the calculation of the country score, the migposition of each party is calculated through subtracting the weighted *per601_2* (National Way of Life: Immigration: Negative) score from the weighted *per602_2* (National Way of Life: Immigration: Positive) score. An arithmetic average of the party scores for the related year is taken as the country score.

Please note that if both *per601_2* and *per602_2* scores are equal to zero, which means that the manifesto did not include any reference to immigration in either negative or positive direction, then the migposition score is also equal to zero. Calculating a migposition score through *per601_2*=0 and *per602_2*=0 is not meaningful and it can be misleading. Therefore, such migposition scores were not included in the calculation of the aggregate country score for migposition.

Table 10: All Related Scores for Germany (2013 and 2017 Elections) from the Manifesto Research Project Dataset

	Party Name	per	per	eu_	w_eu_	eu_	w_eu_	per	per	per	mig_	w_mig_	mig_	w_mig_
		108	110	sali	_sali	pos	_pos	7062	601_2	602_2	sali	_sali	pos	_pos
2013	Alliance'90/Greens	2,652	0,147	2,799	0,279	2,505	0,250	0	0,635	1,565	2,2	0,219	0,93	0,092
	The Left	0,485	0,607	1,092	0,110	-0,122	-0,012	0	0,36	1,08	1,44	0,146	0,72	0,073
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	2,622	0,414	3,036	0,928	2,208	0,675	0	0,09	0,88	0,97	0,296	0,79	0,241
	Free Democratic Party	1,59	0,969	2,559	0	0,621	0	0	0,51	1,43	1,94	0	0,92	0
	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	2,02	0,66	2,68	1,320	1,36	0,670	0	0,55	1	1,55	0,763	0,45	0,221
	Pirates	0,334	0,78	1,114	0	-0,446	0	0						
	Alternative for Germany	1,37	13,699	15,069	0	-12,329	0	0						
2017	Alliance'90/Greens	4,155	0,026	4,181	0,395	4,129	0,390	0	0,026	1,29	1,316	0,124	1,264	0,119
	The Left	1,092	0,025	1,117	0,108	1,067	0,103	0	0	0,33	0,33	0,032	0,33	0,032
	Social Democratic Party of Germany	4,461	0	4,461	0,962	4,461	0,962	0	0,605	0,907	1,512	0,326	0,302	0,065
	Free Democratic Party	6,596	0	6,596	0,744	6,596	0,744	0	0,096	1,011	1,107	0,124	0,915	0,103
	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union	1,639	0	1,639	0,568	1,639	0,568	0	1,49	0,373	1,863	0,646	-1,117	-0,387
	Alternative for Germany	0	5,876	5,876	0,779	-5,876	-0,779	0	7,968	0	7,968	1,056	-7,968	-1,056

Table 11: Comparison for the Overall Scores Generated for Germany

	2013	2017
weighted_eu_sali	0,659	0,593
weighted_eu_pos	0,395	0,331
weighted_mig_sali	0,356	0,385
weighted_mig_pos	0,157	-0,187




Figure 4: Comparison for the Overall Scores Generated for Germany

5.5.2. Public Level Measurement of Salience of and Position Related to the European Union and Immigration

5.5.2.1. How to Study Public Opinion

In the literature, it is generally accepted that there are four formal methods to assess the public mood: survey research, focus groups, experimental research, and the analysis of mass media content (Glynn et al., 2018, p. 57). Scholars who argue that public opinion is an aggregate of individual opinions accept survey research as a way of assessing public opinion (Glynn et al., 2018, p.85). Therefore, since public opinion

is a collection of individual opinions, surveys applied to a statistically valid sample represent public opinion, and it is the prevailing way to reflect public opinion.

As the main purpose of this dissertation is to see the impact of the Refugee Crisis at the public and party level, it is necessary to observe the changes in public opinion before, during and after this crisis. Thus, a longitudinal design has been chosen to see changes over time. There are different types of longitudinal designs in the literature. However, all of these designs have two things in common: measuring change over time and collecting data concerning at least two time points (De Vaus, 2001, p.113). Trend study as a kind of longitudinal design collects data material from comparable random samples over a period of time, but not necessarily from the same group of individuals. This design allows the tracking of changes in attitudes and behavior over time. Eurobarometer surveys could be used for longitudinal research (Bethlehem, 2018, p.11), and are examples of trend studies in which similar questions are directed to a new sample each year (De Vaus, 2001, p.113).

5.5.2.2. Eurobarometer

The European Commission has collected public opinion data throughout the whole European Community (and the candidate countries) and has published Eurobarometer data since 1974. As it is claimed in the Eurobarometer no.1 in 1974 (p. 2), a barometer can be used to measure the atmospheric pressure and thus to give a short-range weather forecast. Accordingly, this Eurobarometer can also be used to observe, and to some extent forecast, public attitudes towards the most important current events connected directly or indirectly with the development of the European Community and the unification of Europe. In brief, Eurobarometer surveys provide a cross-national and cross-temporal comparative social analysis to study social and political attitudes.

Eurobarometer surveys currently come in four different forms: Standard Eurobarometer, Special Eurobarometer, Flash Eurobarometer, and Qualitative Eurobarometer. I will use Standard Eurobarometer since it covers the questions that

I would like to use. Each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country (except small countries, namely Luxembourg, Malta, and Cyprus). Reports are published twice a year. As the number of member and candidate countries have changed over the years, the number of surveys have increased and the scope of Eurobarometer has expanded in accordance with this change. While some questions remain the same over time, different questions have also been added in line with current developments.

Even though there are criticisms regarding the methodology of Eurobarometer (see Nissen, 2014), the Eurobarometer data has become the prime research tool in two main areas: the empirical study of the politics and sociology of European unification; and the comparative study of public opinion and political behavior at the domestic level in Europe (Schmitt, 2003, p. 245). There is no other cross-national survey programme as comprehensive as Eurobarometer (Schmitt, 2003, p. 246). The Eurobarometer surveys are the only source for survey data based on identical question wording over time and covering a large, theoretically meaningful collectivity of countries - the members of the European Community (Kuechler, 1991, p.275). This data set is valuable, first of all, because the same questions are asked to individuals in all sample countries, and this makes comparison possible. Secondly, key questions are repeated on several occasions, some in every single survey, and it makes charting short-term and long-term trends in public opinion possible (Hewstone, 1991, p. 81).

The Eurobarometer data is collected through face-to-face interviewing. To select a sample of address randomly, each country is divided into a number of geographical areas. In each geographical area, a number of small geographical units are randomly selected. In each cluster, a random starting address is selected. Further addresses are selected by a random route procedure. This comes down to taking a walk from the starting address and knocking at the door of each *n*th address. At each selected address, a random respondent is drawn using the first birthday rule, that is, the person is selected with his or her closest birthday. If no contact is possible at an address, two recall attempts are made. Sampling and interviewing are continued until the prescribed sample size was reached (Bethlehem, 2018, p.12).

Eurobarometer surveys make it possible for this dissertation to follow the same questions before, during, and after the refugee crisis for Germany, because of its longitudinal comparison feature (van der Eijk & Schmitt, 1991, p. 257). Since it contains an extensive set of questions on policy performance and issue saliency (Di Mauro & Memoli, 2016, p. 30), it supplies suitable questions for the dissertation.

5.5.2.3. How does the Study Benefit from the Standard Eurobarometer?

Though the Eurobarometer provides public opinion data for every European country and twice a year, I limited the public opinion aspect of our research to the specific countries in specific years for the sake of internal validity, i.e. to match with the party-level data explained above. Therefore, for example, Eurobarometer data for Germany is included in this study between 2013 and 2017, when Germany had general elections.

Corresponding Eurobarometer questions to the four country scores generated above through party-level salience of and position related to the EU and immigration are summarized in Table 12.

The questions numbered 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 3a and 3b are present in each of the ten standard Eurobarometer surveys conducted between 2013 and 2017. The question numbered 1 is missing in one standard Eurobarometer survey, that is the Autumn 2013 survey. In addition, as the question numbered 4 was started to be included in the surveys in the Autumn 2014 survey, it is missing in the previous surveys.

Below, I explain the way in which I have calculated eusalience, euposition, migsalience and migposition scores for countries using the Eurobarometer questions. Table 11 and Figure 4 also present the detailed country scores.

1. eusalience

In the literature, the public salience of the EU is calculated with the question “*when you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about European political matters?*” To calculate the eusalience score based on the standard Eurobarometer surveys conducted in a specific year, I first divided the sum of percentages for the “*frequently*” and “*occasionally*” answers given to that question by the sum of percentages for the “*frequently*,” “*occasionally*” and “*never*” answers given to the same question. This division provided scores for individual surveys. Since this question is not covered for Germany in Eurobarometer 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84, I use other years’ Eurobarometer surveys to calculate.

2. euposition

To calculate the euposition score based on the standard Eurobarometer surveys conducted in a specific year, four different questions can be used, each corresponds to different levels and types of Euroscepticism. Instead of combining the scores for these four questions into one overall score, I will analyze each of them separately, which will enable us to discuss the issue in terms of different levels and types of Euroscepticism.

2a. euposition based on trust to EU

The first question to be used to calculate the public-level euposition of a country in a specific year is the question “*I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions (the EU). For each of the following institutions (the EU), please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.*” The percentage for the “*tend not to trust*” is subtracted from percentage of “*tend to trust*” answer and the result is divided by the sum of the percentages for “*tend to trust*” and “*tend not to trust*.” This division provided scores for individual surveys. Since this question is related to trust or not trust the EU, it could be said that it refers to soft Euroscepticism.

Table 12: Eurobarometer Questions Used to Measure EU Salience, EU Position, Migsalience and Migposition

Score	Eurobarometer Question	Answers
eusalience	1. When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about European political matters?	frequently, occasionally, never, don't know
	2a. I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions (the EU). For each of the following institutions (the EU), please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.	tend to trust, tend not to trust, don't know
euposition	2b. In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?	very positive, positive, neutral, fairly negative, very negative, don't know
	2c. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU.	totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally disagree, don't know
	2d. At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in the European Union?	things are going in the right direction, things are going in the wrong direction, Neither the one nor the other (SPONTANEOUS), don't know
migsalience	3a. What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?	multiple preset options (including don't know, none, other)
	3b. What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?	
migposition	4. Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. "Immigration of people from outside the EU"	very positive, fairly positive, fairly negative, very negative, don't know

2b. euposition based on EU's image

The second question to be used to calculate the public-level euposition of a country in a specific year is the question "*In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?*" The sum of percentages for the "*fairly negative*" and "*very negative*" answers is subtracted from the sum of percentages of "*very positive*" and "*positive*" answers and the result is divided by the sum of the percentages for "*very positive*," "*positive*," "*fairly negative*" and "*very negative*" answers. This division provided scores for individual surveys. Since this question is related to the image of EU, it could be said that it also refers to soft Euroscepticism.

2c. euposition based on EU's role in providing a better future

The third question to be used to calculate the public-level euposition of a country in a specific year is the question "*Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU.*" The sum of percentages for the "*totally agree*" and "*tend to agree*" is subtracted from the sum of percentages for the "*tend to disagree*" and "*totally disagree*" answers, and the result is divided by the sum of the percentages for "*totally agree*," "*tend to agree*," "*tend to disagree*" and "*totally disagree*" answers. This division provided scores for individual surveys. Since this question is about a country's presence in the EU, it could be said that it refers to hard Euroscepticism.

2d. euposition based on the EU's direction

The last question to be used to calculate the public-level euposition of a country in a specific year is the question of "*At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in the European Union?*" The percentage for "*things are going in the wrong direction*" answer is subtracted from the percentage for the "*things are going in the right direction*" answer, and the result is divided by the sum of the percentages for "*things are going*

in the right direction” and “*things are going in the wrong direction*” answers.” This division provided scores for individual surveys. Since this question is related to the direction of the EU, it could be said that it refers to soft Euroscepticism.

3. migsalience

In the literature, issue saliency in a Eurobarometer is operationalized through questions, asking which is the most important issue facing the respondent's country at that moment (Di Mauro & Memoli, 2016, p. 31). I have calculated the migration salience at two different levels, one is for the national level and the second one is for the EU level.

3a. migsalience at the national level

At the national level, to calculate the migsalience score of a country based on the standard Eurobarometer surveys conducted in a specific year, I simply calculate the percentage of those who listed *immigration* as one of the two most important issues their country was facing at that moment. (Question: *What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?*)

3b. migsalience at the EU level

At the EU level, I did the same calculation for the answers given to the “*What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?*” question.

4. migposition

The answers given to the question of “*Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you.*” Immigration of people from outside the EU” have been used to calculate the migposition score for a country. The sum of the percentages for the “*fairly negative*” and “*very negative*” answers is subtracted from the sum of the percentages for the “*very positive*” and “*fairly positive*”

answers. This calculation provided scores for individual surveys. Since this question is not covered for Germany before Eurobarometer 82, the migposition for Germany at the public level is calculated starting with Eurobarometer 82.

Table 13: All Related Scores for Germany (from 2013 to 2017) from the Eurobarometer Surveys

	eupos1-trust		eupos2-image		eupos3-outside-better		eupos4-direction		eusalience		migsallience-country level		migsallience-EU level		migpos	
	DE	EU	DE	EU	DE	EU	DE	EU	DE	EU	DE	EU	DE	EU	DE	EU
Spring 2013	-0,32	-0,29	0,05	0,01	0,34	0,23	-0,22	-0,26	0,78	0,62	0,14	0,1	0,09	0,1	NA	NA
Fall 2013	-0,3	-0,27	0,11	0,03	0,38	0,23	-0,18	-0,21	NA	NA	0,16	0,12	0,22	0,16	NA	NA
Spring 2014	-0,38	-0,25	0,16	0,1	0,47	0,25	-0,12	-0,13	NA	0,62	0,22	0,15	0,28	0,21	NA	NA
Fall 2014	-0,19	-0,13	0,18	0,17	0,46	0,28	0,06	-0,14	NA	0,63	0,37	0,18	0,37	0,24	-0,32	-0,22
Spring 2015	-0,09	-0,06	0,28	0,22	0,47	0,28	0,1	-0,07	NA	0,63	0,46	0,23	0,55	0,38	-0,16	-0,22
Fall 2015	-0,35	-0,23	0,07	0,14	0,33	0,21	-0,38	-0,2	NA	0,66	0,76	0,36	0,76	0,58	NA	NA
Spring 2016	-0,32	-0,22	0	0,07	0,41	0,22	-0,22	-0,32	0,84	0,65	0,56	0,28	0,57	0,48	-0,23	-0,24
Fall 2016	-0,16	-0,18	0,16	0,1	0,57	0,26	-0,34	-0,33	0,84	0,67	0,45	0,26	0,5	0,45	-0,13	-0,19
Spring 2017	0,02	-0,05	0,3	0,19	0,57	0,3	-0,26	-0,19	0,86	0,67	0,37	0,22	0,4	0,38	NA	NA
Fall 2017	0,05	-0,07	0,29	0,19	0,57	0,29	-0,2	-0,17	0,84	0,67	0,4	0,22	0,47	0,39	-0,13	-0,15

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS

6.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the principal findings from the primary research. The findings from the data obtained by the Manifesto Project by analyzing the content of the electoral manifestos of political parties and the data obtained through surveys provided by the European Parliament, the European Commission and other EU institutions to monitor public opinion will be presented. The data from the Manifesto Project and the Eurobarometer will be used to understand the research question of this dissertation, which is basically how the Refugee Crisis has affected Germany. This research question has three components; whether the Refugee Crisis in 2015 affected the political atmosphere in Germany in terms of the salience of and positions related to the EU at public and party levels; if so, what the direction and the magnitude of this effect was; and lastly, if there is any parallelism between the public and party levels. In order to address this research topic, this section will state whether the hypotheses put forward on the basis of the literature have been confirmed or not.

6.2. Hypotheses Revisited

H.1.a: *The salience of the immigration issue increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

The salience of immigration in Germany and in EU member states in general was obtained in order to see the place of Germany among the EU member states.

Table 14: Public Level Immigration Saliency- Country Level

	DE	EU
Spring 2013	0,14	0,1
Fall 2013	0,16	0,12
Spring 2014	0,22	0,15
Fall 2014	0,37	0,18
Spring 2015	0,46	0,23
Fall 2015	0,76	0,36
Spring 2016	0,56	0,28
Fall 2016	0,45	0,26
Spring 2017	0,37	0,22
Fall 2017	0,4	0,22


**Figure 5:** Public Level Immigration Saliency- Country Level

Table 14 was prepared according to the question of “What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?” While the second column indicates the percentage of Germans who identify “immigration” as their country’s first problem when asked what their country’s biggest problem is, the third column shows the EU average for the immigration response to this question.

Table 14 shows that while the immigration saliency in Germany steadily increased from Spring 2013 to Fall 2015, it started to decrease after this date. This applies both Germany and the EU in general. When examining the EU as a whole, a softer increase

was seen, but a more rapid increase was noted in Germany, particularly between Spring and Autumn 2015.

Table 15: Public Level Immigration Salience- EU Level

	DE	EU
Spring 2013	0,09	0,1
Fall 2013	0,22	0,16
Spring 2014	0,28	0,21
Fall 2014	0,37	0,24
Spring 2015	0,55	0,38
Fall 2015	0,76	0,58
Spring 2016	0,57	0,48
Fall 2016	0,5	0,45
Spring 2017	0,4	0,38
Fall 2017	0,47	0,39

Table 15 was prepared according to the question of “What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?” While the second column gives the percentage of Germans who see immigration as the biggest problem of the EU, the third column shows the EU average.




Figure 6: Public Level Immigration Salience- EU Level

Table 15 shows that the percentage of people who see immigration as the most important problem of the EU in Germany has increased continuously from Spring 2013 to Fall 2015. This is also the case for the percentage of those who see immigration as the most important issue of the EU in EU member states. There is a gradual decrease after Fall 2015.

Both of Table 14 and Table 15 show that since the beginning of the Refugee Crisis in 2013, the immigration salience has steadily increased at the public level. This increase reached its highest point in 2015, when the Refugee Crisis peaked, and started to decrease after that date. Therefore, the first part of first hypothesis of the dissertation, which is “The salience of the immigration issue increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.”, is *confirmed* for both the German public and the European public.

H.1.b: *The salience of the immigration issue increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

This hypothesis was established in order to understand whether the Refugee Crisis affects the salience of immigration in Germany at the party level.

Table 16: Party Level Immigration Salience

	2013	2017
90/Greens	2,2	1,316
LINKE	1,44	0,33
SPD	0,97	1,512
FDP	1,94	1,107
CDU/CSU	1,55	1,863
AfD	NA	7,968
Country Score for Germany*	0,356	0,385

*Calculated as the weighted average of those parties that gained seats in the parliament.




Figure 7: Party Level Immigration Saliency

Table 16 was prepared according to the coding of the Manifesto Project, which shows that how often political parties in Germany mention immigration in their manifestos, good or bad.

Table 16 shows that while there was an increase in the saliency of immigration in the manifestos of two political parties (SPD and CDU/CSU), there was a decrease in the saliency of immigration in the manifestos of three political parties (90/ Greens, LINKE and FDP). However, the weighted average of political parties in Germany in Table 16 shows that there is an increase in the saliency of immigration at the party level. It could be said that this hypothesis is confirmed for some political parties but disapproved for others. Even though the weighted average of political parties in Germany slightly increases, it is still an increase. All in all, Table 16 shows that the second part of the first hypothesis, which is the saliency of immigration increased in Germany after the Refugee Crisis is *confirmed*.

H.2.a: *The saliency of the EU increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

This hypothesis is formulated to see the changes in the saliency of the EU in the German public and the EU public in general.

Table 17 was prepared according to the question of “When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about European political matters?”. While the second column shows that the percentage of Germans who claim they talk about EU political matters, the third column shows that for the EU average. Since this question is not covered for Germany from Fall 2013 to Fall 2015, this data for these years were not available. However, it was still possible to make comparison of the change in the salience of the EU in Germany because the data for Spring 2013 and after the Refugee Crisis was available. On the other hand, it is also possible to deduce for Germany since this data was available for the EU average.

Table 17 shows that there was an increase in the salience of the EU at the German public level after the Refugee Crisis. This is also the case for the EU average. Even though it was seen that this increase was very small for both Germany and the EU, it was still an increase. This table also shows that the increase in the salience of the EU was continued since the beginning of the Refugee Crisis. In this regard, Table 17 shows that the first part of the second hypothesis, in which if there was an increase in the salience of the EU at the public level after the Refugee Crisis is *confirmed*.

Table 17: Public Level EU Salience

	DE	EU
Spring 2013	0,78	0,62
Fall 2013	NA	NA
Spring 2014	NA	0,62
Fall 2014	NA	0,63
Spring 2015	NA	0,63
Fall 2015	NA	0,66
Spring 2016	0,84	0,65
Fall 2016	0,84	0,67
Spring 2017	0,86	0,67
Fall 2017	0,84	0,67




Figure 8: Public Level EU Salience

H.2.b: *The salience of the EU increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

This hypothesis is formulated to see the changes in the salience of the EU at the party level in Germany.

Table 18: Party Level EU Salience

	2013	2017
90/Greens	2,799	4,181
LINKE	1,092	1,117
SPD	3,036	4,461
FDP	2,559	6,596
CDU/CSU	2,68	1,639
AfD	15,069	5,876
Country Score for Germany*	0,659	0,593

*Calculated as the weighted average of those parties that gained seats in the parliament.




Figure 9: Party Level EU Salience

Table 18 was prepared according to the coding of the Manifesto Project, which shows that how often political parties in Germany mentioned the EU in their manifestos after the Refugee Crisis.

Table 18 shows that while there was an increase in the EU salience in the manifestos of most of the political parties (90/Greens, LINKE, SPD and FDP), there was a decrease in some political parties (CDU/CSU and AfD). Although the salience of the EU was increased in the manifestos of most political parties in Germany, there was such a great decrease in the AfD's manifesto, so that had a huge effect on the weighted average. Whilst this hypothesis is confirmed for four political parties in Germany, it is disproved for two political parties and the weighted average. Therefore, Table 18 shows that the second part of the second hypothesis, which is there was an increase in the salience of the EU at the party level after the Refugee Crisis is *disapproved*.

H.3.a. *Anti-immigrant sentiments increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

This hypothesis is formulated to see the changes in the anti-immigrant sentiments in the German public and the EU public in general.

Table 19 was prepared according to the question “Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. “Immigration of people from outside the EU”. Unfortunately, since there was no data available before Fall 2014 for both Germany and the EU, I could not use that. However, it is still possible to make comparisons between years. The second column shows that the percentage of people in Germany who argue that immigration from outside the EU is a negative thing to them. The third column shows that the EU average.

Table 19: Public Level Immigration Positions

	DE	EU
Spring 2013	NA	NA
Fall 2013	NA	NA
Spring 2014	NA	NA
Fall 2014	-0,32	-0,22
Spring 2015	-0,16	-0,22
Fall 2015	NA	NA
Spring 2016	-0,23	-0,24
Fall 2016	-0,13	-0,19
Spring 2017	NA	NA
Fall 2017	-0,13	-0,15




Figure 10: Public Level Immigration Positions

Table 19 shows that there were constant ups and downs in anti-immigrant sentiments in the both German and the EU public. While the percentage of people who thought that immigration from outside the EU is a negative thing was -0,32 in Germany in Fall 2014, there was a small decrease in Spring 2015. And then, it increased in Spring 2016, and decreased in Fall 2016 again. This was also the case for the EU average. While it remained the same between Fall 2014 and Spring 2015, it increased in Spring 2016, and decreased in Fall 2016 again. There was not a steady increase in anti-immigrant sentiments; it was more of an instantaneous effect. Therefore, the first part of the third hypothesis, which is anti-immigrant sentiments increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis, is *confirmed*.

H.3.b: *Anti-immigrant positions increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

This hypothesis is formulated to see the changes in the anti-immigrant positions at the party level in Germany after the Refugee Crisis.

Table 20: Party Level Immigration Positions

	2013	2017
90/Greens	0,93	1,264
LINKE	0,72	0,33
SPD	0,79	0,302
FDP	0,92	0,915
CDU/CSU	0,45	-1,117
AfD	NA	-7,968
Country Score for Germany*	0,157	-0,187

*Calculated as the weighted average of those parties that gained seats in the parliament.

Table 20 was prepared according to the coding of the Manifesto Project, which shows that the percentage of the statements against the immigration. As the numbers went down toward the minus, it means that anti-immigration discourses increased, and as the numbers went up toward the plus, it means that these discourses decreased.




Figure 11: Party Level Immigration Positions

Table 20 shows that there was an increase in the anti-immigrant positions of four political parties (LINKE, SPD, FDP and CDU/CSU), on the other hand, there was a decrease in one political party (90/Greens). The weighted score also shows that there was an increase in the anti-immigrant discourses. To conclude, the second part of the third hypothesis, which is anti-immigrant positions increased at party level in Germany after the Refugee Crisis is *confirmed*.

H.4.a: *Euroscepticism increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

This hypothesis is formulated to understand if there is a change in Eurosceptic sentiments of people in Germany after the Refugee Crisis.

Table 21 was prepared according to the question “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions (the EU). For each of the following institutions (the EU), please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.” The second column shows that whether the German public was inclined to trust or not to trust the EU in the years between 2013 and 2017. The third column shows the EU average.

Table 21: Public Level EU Positions 1- Trust

	DE	EU
Spring 2013	-0,32	-0,29
Fall 2013	-0,3	-0,27
Spring 2014	-0,38	-0,25
Fall 2014	-0,19	-0,13
Spring 2015	-0,09	-0,06
Fall 2015	-0,35	-0,23
Spring 2016	-0,32	-0,22
Fall 2016	-0,16	-0,18
Spring 2017	0,02	-0,05
Fall 2017	0,05	-0,07




Figure 12: Public Level EU Positions 1- Trust

Table 21 shows that the German public was mostly inclined to not to trust the EU. This trend has changed over the years, albeit with small differences. From Spring 2015 to Fall 2015, it seems that the tendency to not to trust slightly increased, but after this date, people tended to trust more and more. This trend was also observed as same in the EU average. Although the EU average never tended to fully trust the EU between these dates, the German public switched to the positive side with Spring 2017. As a result, Table 21 shows that Eurosceptic sentiments of the German people or the EU as a whole never changed sharply. Even though minor changes were observed over the years, and Eurosceptic sentiments increased especially from Spring 2015 to Fall 2015, it could not be said that there was an atmosphere of distrust towards the EU all the time. However, Table 21 shows that there was an increase in the distrust of the German people to the EU after the Refugee Crisis.

Table 22: Public Level EU Positions 2- Image

	DE	EU
Spring 2013	0,05	0,01
Fall 2013	0,11	0,03
Spring 2014	0,16	0,1
Fall 2014	0,18	0,17
Spring 2015	0,28	0,22
Fall 2015	0,07	0,14
Spring 2016	0	0,07
Fall 2016	0,16	0,1
Spring 2017	0,3	0,19
Fall 2017	0,29	0,19

Table 22 was prepared according to the question of “In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?”. The second column shows that if the EU was seen negatively or positively by German people. The third column shows the EU average.




Figure 13: Public Level EU Positions 2- Image

Table 22 shows that the EU always had a positive image for the German people. It is also the case for the EU as a whole. However, this positive image decreased immediately after the Refugee Crisis in Fall 2015 and then in Spring 2016 both in Germany and the EU. After Spring 2016, people started to see the EU in a more positive way again. In this regard, it could be said that the Refugee Crisis had an effect on the image of the EU, especially at its peak. Therefore, it could be said that the Refugee Crisis was effective in reducing the positive image of the EU. It even dropped to zero in Spring 2016 in Germany. Even though it was never negative, the Refugee Crisis still caused a decrease.

Table 23 was prepared according to the question of “Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. (OUR COUNTRY) could better face the future outside the EU.” The second column shows that if the German public thought that their country would be better outside the EU. The third column shows that if people in any EU member state thought that their own country would be better outside the EU.

Table 23: Public Level EU Positions 3- Outside Better

	DE	EU
Spring 2013	0,34	0,23
Fall 2013	0,38	0,23
Spring 2014	0,47	0,25
Fall 2014	0,46	0,28
Spring 2015	0,47	0,28
Fall 2015	0,33	0,21
Spring 2016	0,41	0,22
Fall 2016	0,57	0,26
Spring 2017	0,57	0,3
Fall 2017	0,57	0,29


**Figure 14:** Public Level EU Positions 3- Outside Better

Table 23 shows that if people thought that their country could not be better outside the EU. In other words, if they disagree with the statement of our country could be better face the future outside the EU. Since there was always a tendency to think that this was a bad idea to be outside the EU for Germany and for the EU as a whole between the years abovementioned, the level of disagreement was observed. Therefore, Table 23 shows that people who thought that Germany could not be better outside the EU rapidly decreased in Fall 2015 for the first time. After this time, it

started to increase again. This was also the case for the EU. As a result, the Refugee Crisis, at its peak, has led to an increase in the number of people who think that Germany could be better outside the EU. Although the number of people who think that Germany could be better outside the EU was never been higher than the number of people that were against it, it was seen that the Refugee Crisis had an impact on this number.

Table 24: Public Level EU Positions 4- Direction

	DE	EU
Spring 2013	-0,22	-0,26
Fall 2013	-0,18	-0,21
Spring 2014	-0,12	-0,13
Fall 2014	0,06	-0,14
Spring 2015	0,1	-0,07
Fall 2015	-0,38	-0,2
Spring 2016	-0,22	-0,32
Fall 2016	-0,34	-0,33
Spring 2017	-0,26	-0,19
Fall 2017	-0,2	-0,17




Figure 15: Public Level EU Positions 4- Direction

Table 24 was prepared according to the question of “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in the European Union?”. The second column shows that if the German public thought that the EU was heading in the wrong or the right direction. If the numbers went towards the minus, then it means that the public thought that things were going in the wrong direction, and if the numbers went towards the plus, then it means that the public thought that things were going in the right direction.

Table 24 shows that the German public mostly thought that things were going in the wrong direction between Spring 2013 and Fall 2017. In addition, the EU average shows that they always thought that things were going in the wrong direction. According to Table 24, people who thought that the EU was moving in the right direction were increasing from Spring 2013 to Spring 2015. However, after this date, there was a dramatic change in Germany. After the Refugee Crisis, more people thought that things were going in the wrong direction. At this point, the impact of the Refugee Crisis was clearly visible.

All of these four tables show that there was an increase in Euroscepticism in the German and the EU public after the Refugee Crisis. Even though this increase was a short-time thing, it happened after the Refugee Crisis’ peak in 2015. Therefore, the hypothesis, which is Euroscepticism increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis, is *confirmed*.

H.4.b: *Euroscepticism increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

This hypothesis is formulated to see if there is a change in Eurosceptic positions of political parties in Germany after the Refugee Crisis.

Table 25: Party Level EU Positions

	2013	2017
90/Greens	2,505	4,129
LINKE	-0,122	1,067
SPD	2,208	4,461
FDP	0,621	6,596
CDU/CSU	1,36	1,639
AfD	-12,329	-5,876
Country Score for Germany*	0,395	0,331

*Calculated as the weighted average of those parties that gained seats in the parliament.


**Figure 16:** Party Level EU Positions

Table 25 was prepared according to the coding of the Manifesto Project, which shows the positions of German political parties towards the EU. As the numbers increase, it means that political party has a more positive position towards the EU, and as the numbers decrease, it means that political party has a more negative position towards the EU.

Table 25 shows that there was an increase in positive discourses towards the EU in the manifestos of German political parties from 2013 to 2017. That was the case for

all political parties in Germany. However, since AfD had extremely Eurosceptic discourses in its manifesto, weighted EU positions seemed like they decreased. Moreover, even though there was a decrease in the average positive discourses, the positives were more than negative ones. When the political parties in Germany were considered independently, a more pro-EU position was observed. However, the Germany country score was going in a more Eurosceptic direction. The reason for that is the AfD was not in the Bundestag in 2013 but got into it in 2017. Thus, a more Eurosceptic polity mood was seen from 2013 to 2017. In conclusion, the hypothesis, which is “Euroscepticism increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis”, is *confirmed*.

H-5: *Peripheral parties that are located on the Left and the Right extremes are significantly more Eurosceptical than mainstream parties.*

This hypothesis is formulated to see whether Left and Right extreme political parties are more Eurosceptic than mainstream political parties are.

Table 26 shows that in 2013, two political parties located at the most left were LINKE and SPD, and two political parties located at the most right were FDP and CDU/CSU. The political parties were listed from the most Eurosceptic to the least Eurosceptic as follows: AfD, LINKE, FDP, CDU/CSU, SPD and 90/Greens. In 2017, two political parties located at the most left were LINKE and SPD, and two political parties located at the most right were AfD and CDU/CSU. The political parties were listed from the most Eurosceptic to the least Eurosceptic as follows: AfD, LINKE, CDU/CSU, 90/Greens, SPD and FDP.

As it is seen in Figures 17 and 18, according to the hypothesis, it was expected that LINKE and FDP being located at extreme right and left would be more Eurosceptic parties than political parties located at the center. It was right for LINKE and FDP, but wrong for AfD. In this regard, AfD was a unique case in 2013. In addition, Figures 19 and 20 show that it was expected that LINKE and AfD would be more Eurosceptic

Table 26: Right Left Position EU Position Relations

Date	Partyname	rile	eupos
2013	90/Greens (Alliance'90/Greens)	-19,595	2,505
	LINKE (The Left)	-34,547	-0,122
	SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany)	-23,568	2,208
	FDP (Free Democratic Party)	14,036	0,621
	CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union)	2,564	1,36
	AfD (Alternative for Germany)	-2,74	-12,329
2017	90/Greens (Alliance'90/Greens)	-21,058	4,129
	LINKE (The Left)	-41,914	1,067
	SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany)	-21,437	4,461
	FDP (Free Democratic Party)	0,578	6,596
	CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union)	2,757	1,639
	AfD (Alternative for Germany)	17,43	-5,876

than other parties would. It was right for these parties. In conclusion, while this hypothesis is confirmed for some parties, not for others. However, it could be said that this hypothesis, which is peripheral parties that are located in the Left and the Right extremes are significantly more Eurosceptical than mainstream parties are, is *confirmed*.




Figure 17: 2013 Right-Left Positions




Figure 18: 2013 Eurosceptic Positions



Figure 19: 2017 Right-Left Positions




Figure 20: 2017 Eurosceptic Positions

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION

7.1.Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the effect of the 2015 Refugee Crisis on the political atmosphere in Germany at both public and party levels. This chapter contains a discussion of major findings as related to the literature on the effect of exogenous crises, how political parties' positions towards European integration change after the Refugee Crisis, and how the Refugee Crisis affected the public Euroscepticism. It also includes a discussion on post-functionalist assumptions regarding the Refugee Crisis and its effects on German Euroscepticism.

This chapter includes a discussion and the future research possibilities to help answer the research questions:

RQ-1: *Did the Refugee Crisis in 2015 affect the political atmosphere in Germany in terms of the salience of and positions related to the European Union at public and party levels?*

RQ-2: *If so, what were the direction and the magnitude of this effect, i.e. negative/positive, increase/decrease?*

RQ-3: *Is there any parallelism between the public and party level effects?*

Whether endogenous or exogenous, major crises that affect millions of people, such as the Refugee Crisis, are expected to produce numerous social, economic, political

and cultural changes. As the literature demonstrates, the changes caused by the Refugee Crisis, have had effects on the political atmosphere of countries. In this altered political atmosphere, as the post-functionalism assumes, the salience of immigration and the EU increased both among the public and in political parties. In addition, as argued by post-functionalists, the Refugee Crisis has affected the position of political parties towards European integration in a negative way, and also the public Euroscepticism by linking immigration to European integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2018a, p. 11).

7.2. Interpretation of Findings

In general, the findings of this dissertation mostly confirmed the statements that had previously been stated in the literature on the effects of crises on the issue salience, anti-immigrant views and Euroscepticism. The hypotheses based on the literature that are confirmed or disapproved will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

7.2.1. Germany as a Country of Immigration: From “Germany is not an Immigration Country” to Merkel’s “We Can Do This!”

This dissertation’s result that the salience of immigration increased both at the public and party levels after the Refugee Crisis agrees with the literature that indicates that the immigration issue became politicized and its salience increased with the Refugee Crisis (Mader & Schoen 2019; Dennison & Geddes 2019; Hooghe & Marks 2018a; Hooghe & Marks 2018b; Sola 2018; Glorius 2018; Gianfreda 2017; Meyer & Wagner 2020; Greussing & Boomgarden 2017; Hatton 2017b).

Crises increase the salience of the issues related, as the literature offers. Even though refugees are the main subject in the Refugee Crisis; and a migrant, a refugee and an asylum-seeker are different terms, these terms are mostly used interchangeably. Although the Refugee Crisis is not directly related to regular migration, it has increased the salience of all types of migration, because people are usually not aware of the differences between these types. If a person comes from another country, then

it does not matter how she or he comes. Thus, it could be said that after the Refugee Crisis there was an increase in the awareness of all kinds of immigration and the politicization of immigration.

The fact that millions of people had to leave their countries and had to seek asylum in other countries, especially the EU countries, and the fact that these countries could not manage such a great crowd in such a short time, was the reason of the Refugee Crisis becoming such a big crisis for the EU. The EU was not ready to deal with this crisis since the Dublin System was insufficient to manage such large crowds. In this regard, it was impossible to expect people and political parties to remain silent on the subject of immigration as a result of such a massive influx of people and in such a chaos. As Hooghe and Marks (2018a) argue, the Refugee Crisis has contributed to the politicization of immigration, increasing its salience and divisiveness among member states' polities. Thus, the salience of immigration increased with the Refugee Crisis in all EU countries.

As shown in the findings chapter of the dissertation, the salience of immigration has increased in Germany after the Refugee Crisis at both the political party and the public levels in line with the post-functionalist literature. Germany has been one of the most popular destinations for refugees since 2015 when the Refugee Crisis peaked, due to its history of accepting immigrants and being a country with many foreigners within its population. In addition to its historical relevance, Merkel's welcoming approach to refugees and the government's immigration policies made Germany the favorite of refugees.

The fact that Germany was one of the countries that accepts the most refugees, with a million in the country by the end of 2015, has affected the salience of immigration in Germany. While the German public was concerned about how this influx of people would affect their own daily lives, way of living, social life, culture and their jobs; political parties were concerned about how they would manage this influx. Furthermore, Germany, as one of the EU's founding and most powerful and effective members, has been one of the countries that has led the debate on the Refugee Crisis

in the EU. The fact that Germany is one of the most influential countries in shaping the EU's policies towards refugees has also made the immigration issue to be highly discussed and politicized in Germany.

Another result is that anti-immigrant sentiments at the public level and anti-immigrant positions at the party level increased after the Refugee Crisis and this result agrees with the literature (Sola 2018; Pirro et al. 2018; Narkowicz 2018; Goodman et al. 2017; Hangartner et al. 2019). Although Germany has been used to discussing the immigration issue as a country that has millions of immigrants, such a rapid and huge influx of immigration has been effective in boosting already existing anti-immigrant discourses. Before the Refugee Crisis, anti-immigrant discourses in Germany were mostly about Turkish groups, which constitute the largest immigrant group in Germany. This anti-immigration rhetoric got a little support from some marginal groups at the public level, but political parties were more cautious about the issue due to the Nazi period of Germany. 'Germany is not a country of immigration' (*Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland*) was the motto of the country for many years (Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 235). Even though the opposite is true, the effort to create this perception in the country reflects the immigration policies.

Despite the fact that Germany is an immigration country with millions of immigrants, before the 2000s, there were insufficient regulations controlling and managing immigration in Germany (Geddes & Scholten, 2016, p. 253). Immigration policy debates were dominated by major political parties and centered on migrants' contribution to Germany's economy and finding a solution to the aging population. However, the Refugee Crisis in 2015 and the influence of AfD, which is the German representative of the rising populist parties in Europe, altered the nature of immigration debates and the actors who shaped these debates. Not just the mainstream parties, but also the smaller political parties have shaped Germany's immigration policy and political atmosphere since then.

The open-door policy adopted by Merkel at the beginning of the Refugee Crisis caused her to be subjected to many criticisms within her own party, by other political

parties and throughout the country. Even other EU member states criticized Merkel for attracting many more refugees to come to the EU borders. While Merkel initially had a far more optimistic approach, she changed her strategy in response to these critiques and started to take much stricter measures. All these were effective in the increase of the salience of immigration and in the increase of anti-immigrant positions.

As post-functionalists argue, the Refugee Crisis has caused the rise of nationalist political parties (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a, p. 11). In this regard, the impact of the AfD regarding the increase in the salience of immigration and the anti-immigrant discourse should not be forgotten. The transformation of AfD from a softly Eurosceptic and non-radical party (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019, p. 12) to an anti-immigration party (Atzpodien, 2020, p. 2) and its becoming a part of the Parliament in 2017 has affected the discussions on immigration in Germany. In other words, AfD was founded as an anti-EU political party, but during the Refugee Crisis, it switched its focus to the securitization of migration (Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021, p. 187).

As Hooghe and Marks (2018a, p. 11) claim, party competition has changed with the Refugee Crisis; and in this altered environment, mainstream political parties had much less choice while seeking an EU-wide solution to this crisis. They also added that nationalist challengers, like the AfD in Germany, pushed national governments to introduce restrictions (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a, p. 11). Thus, the Refugee Crisis was seen as a gift to the AfD (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019, p. 3), because party members have started to declare their xenophobic and anti-immigrant discourses since then. The noteworthy point about the AfD is that it began to securitize the migration after the Refugee Crisis (Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021, p. 187). This proves that AfD used the migration and the refugee issue as a strategic movement. The open-door policy of the Merkel government and the suspension of the Dublin Regulation caused an increase in the numbers of refugees coming to Germany. The AfD used this response of Merkel to the Refugee Crisis as an opportunity to criticize the government and mobilize the voters.

7.2.2. From the Loyal Friend of the EU to a More Eurosceptic Germany

As one of the founders of the idea of European integration, Germany has always been a part and a strong supporter of it. Thus, European integration has always been a part of the German politics. It is obviously not possible to say that Germany is completely free of all kinds of Euroscepticism. There are also people and political parties that support Eurosceptic ideas in Germany, but Germany is one of the countries with the lowest Euroscepticism among the member states.

It is accepted in the literature that when a crisis arises, it is usual for people, political parties, and media to discuss it and its related topics. Therefore, when the Refugee Crisis occurred, it was expected that the salience of this crisis and the issues that are related to the Refugee Crisis such as migration, immigrants and refugees would increase. As stated before in the dissertation, the EU and its member states' involvement in the Refugee Crisis plays a significant role in defining it as a crisis. The Refugee Crisis is such a great event that it becomes a concern for all EU member states and the EU itself. Thus, the Refugee Crisis is considered as a problem of the EU. In this regard, the increase in the salience of the EU was expected, because the Refugee Crisis is a crisis related to the EU. In the literature, it is expected that increase would be at both levels, party and public. As Hooghe and Marks (2018a) argue, the Refugee Crisis has contributed to the politicization of the EU and increasing the salience of the EU by linking immigration to European integration. However, this dissertation falsifies this assumption at the party level. Whilst there was an increase in the salience of the EU at public level, there was a decrease in the salience of the EU at party level in Germany.

Even though there were some political parties, such as 90/Greens, SPD and FDP, where the salience of EU increased in their manifestos, the average among political parties decreased between 2013 and 2017. The decrease of the EU salience in the manifestos of the CDU/CSU and the AfD affected this average. There are reasons why political parties depoliticize the EU during crises. For example, if they are in government (Sitter 2002), fear of losing voters (Hooghe & Marks 2018a; Hooghe &

Marks 2018b), and intra-party and internal conflicts (DeVries 2010; DeVries & Hobolt 2012, Hobolt et al. 2009). Hooghe and Marks (2018b, p. 117) as post-functionalists argue that mainstream parties are flexible on key conflict aspects to the degree that they have ‘durable constituencies of voters’, ‘a self-selected cadre of activists’, ‘a de-centralized decision-making structure’, and a unique ‘programmatic reputation’.

The AfD, as the main opposition and third largest party in 2017 in Germany, was one of the political parties where the EU issues in its manifesto drastically decreased from 2013 to 2017. Whilst the AfD had a much more Eurosceptic position and a higher salience of EU issues in the European Parliament elections, EU issues were not significant in the national parliament elections as much as the EU level elections. Even though there were three times less EU references in 2017 compared to 2013, the AfD was still the second party that prioritized the EU in its manifesto. The CDU/CSU was another party, where the EU issues in its manifesto decreased. As abovementioned, political parties when they are in government could depoliticize the issues related to the European integration. The CDU/CSU as a governing party of a country that shapes the EU policies might have mentioned the EU less in its manifesto in order to avoid referring to the relationship between the EU and the Refugee Crisis and criticizing the EU seriously.

The other result that the dissertation shows is that Euroscepticism increased both at the levels of the party and the public after the Refugee Crisis in Germany. According to post-functionalist arguments, the Refugee Crisis was not a crisis that forced member states to cooperate, because the cost of non-agreement was not very high for most of the member states, and because of domestic politicization (Hooghe & Marks, 2018a, p. 9- 12). The case of Germany confirms this argument.

Germany has traditionally been one of the member states, who was the most committed to the European integration. Euroscepticism has historically been low. Germany has been accepted as an exceptional case, when it comes to Euroscepticism. In other words, Germany has been a marginal option in terms of party-based

Euroscepticism (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002, p. 11). It is also true for public Euroscepticism in Germany. However, the trend of scepticism towards the European integration, which has become increasingly widespread all over Europe since the 1990s, has also affected Germany. It is because of that the European integration could not be linked to economic gains and growth automatically anymore (Busch & Knelangen, 2004, p. 96). After the 1990s, it is clear that the premise generally accepted in Germany, which is that European integration is beneficial for Germany, has steadily waned and public support has begun to decrease (Baluch, 2018, p. 113). However, Germany was still one of the EU member states with the lowest Euroscepticism.

The recent crises of the EU have also affected the public and party-based Euroscepticism in Germany. Critical events, such as the Euro crisis, Brexit and the Refugee Crisis that make member states question the existence of the EU, all had a role in the increase of Eurosceptic sentiments in Germany, as well as in the rest of Europe. Eurosceptic ideas already existed in Germany before the Refugee Crisis, but the EU policies on the crisis and the responses of the then-German government to solve the issue triggered the public and party-based Euroscepticism in Germany.

The AfD was the first Eurosceptic political party, which was at first founded as soft Eurosceptic (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019, p. 12), to gain a major place in German politics (Reher, 2014, p. 37). When the AfD was founded in 2013, it was a party that might be described as the most Eurosceptic political party in Germany despite it is being soft Eurosceptic, and remained in the middle of the right- left spectrum of German political parties. The motivation for the AfD to have such a Eurosceptic manifesto when it was founded was based on the EU's fiscal and monetary policies. Before and during the Euro Crisis, there was no opposition in the Bundestag criticizing the EU policies of the CDU/CSU and SPD coalition. This coalition followed pro-EU policies in accordance with the general political atmosphere in Germany. While criticizing the EU at this moment, the AfD also emphasized the democratic deficit in Germany (Grimm, 2015, p. 267).

The AfD moved closer to the radical right, adopting more and more anti-immigrant, extreme and xenophobic policies from 2013 to 2017. The political context produced by the Refugee Crisis following the Euro Crisis enabled the AfD to express these policies more comfortably. While the impacts of the Euro Crisis were severe but short-lived in Germany, the effects of the Refugee Crisis were much more intense (Lees, 2018, p. 301). The AfD turned the open-door policy of Merkel to its advantage, and began to direct much more aggressive criticism against the EU and the German government. This situation has increased the salience of both the EU and immigration, and has also made the party-based Euroscepticism more visible and caused Merkel to change her policy.

The last result shows that the post-functionalist argument, which is peripheral parties that are located in the Left and the Right extremes are more Eurosceptical than mainstream parties like Christian Democratic, Social Democratic and Liberal parties, is valid for the case of Germany. The political parties in the Bundestag that were located on the Left and the Right extremes were LINKE and FDP in 2013. These parties were the most Eurosceptic ones in the parliament. The AfD was obviously the most Eurosceptic one but it was not in the Bundestag in 2013. The political parties in the Bundestag that were located on the Left and the Right extremes were LINKE and the AfD in 2017, and they were again the most Eurosceptic ones in the Bundestag. Therefore, it could be said that political parties on the extreme right and left of Germany's political spectrum in 2013 and 2017 were the most Eurosceptic ones. The post-functionalist argument that mainstream parties like Liberal and Christian Democratic parties are less Eurosceptic than the extreme political parties is also valid for Germany. Liberal parties such as 90/Greens and FDP, and Christian Democrats such as the CDU/CSU were less Eurosceptic than the extreme ones in both 2013 and 2017.

7.3.Conclusion

This chapter discusses the main findings of the dissertation, which are detailed in the findings chapter. It is seen that the hypotheses of the dissertation, which are structured

on the post-functionalist assumptions on crises are mostly confirmed for the German case. Germany was affected by the Refugee Crisis both at the levels of public and party. As anti-immigrant sentiments increased in the aftermath of the Refugee Crisis, so did Euroscepticism in Germany.

The Refugee Crisis is a watershed for Germany, since it has sparked intense debate in German domestic politics. Given Germany's immigration history, and despite the fact that immigration was an important topic on Germany's agenda before the Refugee Crisis, the discussions have taken on new dimensions in the aftermath of the Refugee Crisis. Debates on immigration and the EU changed the party competition, allowing the AfD, a populist right-wing party, to dominate the debate. These discussions even caused Merkel to change her open door policy. The Refugee Crisis and the German government's responses to this crisis divided both the public and political parties. Whereas one side supports the Merkel's policy, the other sceptic side thought that Germany was attempting to take on more than it was capable of handling.

The Refugee Crisis not only increased the anti-immigration discourse in Germany, but also increased the anti-EU discourse. The opposition parties criticized both the Merkel government and the EU for the extent of the crisis. The AfD was able to express its anti-immigrant views more openly by successfully instrumentalizing the Refugee Crisis. As a result of increasing pressure, the German government had to take a step back and had to follow stricter policies. Germany, one of the most significant actors in determining the EU policies on immigration, also played a role in the externalization of the Refugee Crisis to get rid of the pressure and was a driving force behind the deal between the EU and Turkey. However, Germany is not still one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the EU. Although the EU's policies in particular are criticized, the EU is still largely supported in Germany.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

European integration, since the day it was put forward as an idea, has attempted to deal with a variety of economic, political, social and cultural issues. While some of these issues, whether they were caused by internal or external factors, were short-lived and ineffective, others turned into severe crises. Crises have altered the nature of European integration as well as the relationships that exist between the member states and the integration. It was inevitable that crises would arise throughout the transition from an integration based on only economic relations to the Schengen region, adopting a common currency and taking common political decisions. That the EU has evolved into its current shape is due to the responses it has given to the crises it has experienced. Thus, throughout the history of the European integration project, crises have not been unexpected or unusual. Despite this intense relationship between European integration and crises, relatively few studies in the literature examine crises through the lens of European integration theories. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to fill this gap in the literature.

‘A decade of crisis’ of European integration that began with the European debt crisis in 2010 still continues today. Since 2010, the EU has been struggling with these consecutive crises, each of which began before the previous one came to a conclusion. These crises have had a significant impact on the EU’s policies, its relations with member states, and even the member states’ internal policies. As a result, the dissertation begins with the following argument: Crises can result in social, political, or organizational change. Moreover, crises affect the polity mood/political atmosphere at many levels, including the public level and party level.

The Refugee Crisis is an important part of the EU's decade of crisis. Calling the huge influx of refugees as the Refugee Crisis and linking the Refugee Crisis to a rise in terrorist acts have exacerbated the securitization of immigration by European politicians (Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021, p. 169). Unlike the Euro Crisis and Brexit (Usherwood 2017, 2018), the Refugee Crisis was created by an exogenous shock. It is critical, then, to evaluate the impact of the Refugee Crisis on the political atmosphere of the EU member states. The Refugee Crisis' being an external shock does not negate its influence on the EU and its member states. It has caused policy changes within the EU, created many internal problems and affected the domestic policies of the member states. Therefore, although the Refugee Crisis started as an exogenous shock, it did not remain as an external crisis for the EU.

In addition, the Refugee Crisis is critical for the EU since it is a solidarity and security crisis. The Refugee Crisis is not just a crisis of migration or asylum system for the EU. It is 'a crisis of the political idea of Europe' (Agustín & Jørgensen, 2019a, p. 3). The Refugee Crisis leads to a crisis of solidarity, because every unit has its own understanding of solidarity, and that makes a conflict of solidarity. That is, while the EU promoted the use of solidarity as a means of enforcing member states' responsibility (Agustín & Jørgensen, 2019b, p. 24), each member state has an idea of solidarity based on a nation state (Takle, 2018, p. 14). The Refugee Crisis is also a security crisis. Although this was not the case in the beginning, attempts to link refugees directly to terrorism and, on the other hand, the reality that those who oppose the very existence of refugees also pose a security threat, combine to make the Refugee Crisis a security crisis. The fact that the Refugee Crisis is both a security and a solidarity issue demonstrate how unique it is in comparison to past crises. In this regard, it is useful here to recall the research question of the dissertation: "Did the Refugee Crisis in 2015 affect the political atmosphere in Germany in terms of the salience and positions related to the EU at the party and the public levels?" The research question of the dissertation is a multi-faceted one. If the answer is yes to this question, then "What was the direction and the magnitude of this effect?"

In other words, if the Refugee Crisis affected the political atmosphere in Germany, how were the salience of immigration and EU affected? Did they increase or decrease? How were the positions towards the European integration and immigration affected? Was there any parallelism between the party and the public level?

The assumptions of the post-functionalist integration theory were used while seeking an answer to the research question. So why post-functionalism? Because, first of all, post-functionalism discusses ‘a possibility of disintegration’. That means it could not be said that all crises will inevitably strengthen the European integration. While the Euro crisis, for instance, has led to a much stronger integration between EU members for many different reasons, the Refugee Crisis has resulted in a kind of disintegration. The disintegration mentioned here does not imply the complete collapse of the EU project. On the other hand, it means the member states’ non-compliance with the decisions taken at the EU level, and that these countries take decisions at the national level. The EU’s inability to respond quickly to this unexpected crisis, and the fact that the Dublin system was not created to absorb such a major crisis, made member states to seek national responses to this crisis. The member states have become indifferent to the policies produced at the EU level due to the EU’s failure to handle the Refugee Crisis. Therefore, it is important to examine such a crisis like the Refugee Crisis leading to a decrease in integration from the perspective of post-functionalism, which is a theory of disintegration.

Another answer to the question of why post-functionalism is the conceptualizations of ‘politicization’ and ‘constraining dissensus’ that post-functionalism uses to explain the Refugee Crisis. According to post-functionalism, the primary prerequisite for constraining dissensus is politicization, which is determined by issue salience. Thus, it is possible to benefit from post-functionalist arguments when examining the salience of immigration and of the EU. Besides, in contrast to traditional integration theories, post-functionalism emphasizes the importance of public opinion. Post-functionalism indicates the significance of public opinion on EU politics as a limiting force in EU politics. As a result, this dissertation uses the post-functionalist

assumptions to understand the effects of the Refugee Crisis on the political atmosphere in Germany.

Based on the post-functionalist arguments, the following hypotheses are built:

H.1.a: *The salience of the immigration issue increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

H.1.b: *The salience of the immigration issue increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

H.2.a: *The salience of the EU increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

H.2.b: *The salience of the EU increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

H.3.a: *Anti-immigrant sentiments increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

H.3.b: *Anti-immigrant positions increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

H.4.a: *Euroscepticism increased at the public level after the Refugee Crisis.*

H.4.b: *Euroscepticism increased at the party level after the Refugee Crisis.*

H.5: *Peripheral parties that are located on the Left and the Right extremes are significantly more Eurosceptical than mainstream parties.*

These hypotheses, which were established in order to see the impacts on both the party and the public level in Germany, were examined by using two distinct sets of data for two different levels. The Eurobarometer data was used to study the impacts at the public level, while the data provided by the Manifesto Project was utilized to examine the effects at the party level. Although it is accepted that both data sets have limitations, they are the most suitable data to answer the research question of this dissertation.

The hypotheses of the dissertation were examined with the data from the abovementioned datasets and the following findings were obtained:

1. The salience of the immigration issue increased both at the public level and the party level in Germany after the Refugee Crisis.

2. Whilst the salience of the EU increased in Germany at the public level after the Refugee Crisis, it decreased at the party level.
3. The anti-immigrant sentiments at the public level and the anti-immigrant positions at the party level increased in Germany after the Refugee Crisis.
4. Euroscepticism increased both at the public and the party level after the Refugee Crisis in Germany.
5. Peripheral parties that are located on the Left and the Right extremes are significantly more Eurosceptical than mainstream political parties that are located in the middle of the right left spectrum in Germany.

As can be seen from the findings, that all hypotheses have been confirmed except for the hypothesis that the salience of the EU increased at the party level in Germany. As briefly noted in the discussion section, there are different reasons why the salience of the EU did not increase at the party level in Germany. As a result of all these hypothesis analyses, and in the light of the research question of the dissertation, it can be concluded that the Refugee Crisis had an impact on the polity mood of Germany. These effects were seen both at the party level and the public level. Euroscepticism increased in Germany as anti-immigrant sentiments increased following the Refugee Crisis. However, it should be noted that these increases continued for a while after the Refugee Crisis peaked in 2015, and then started to decline. In other words, when the effect of the Refugee Crisis waned over time, these increases waned as well. These Eurosceptic and anti-immigrant views increased with the effect of the Refugee Crisis and then began to wane, particularly at the public level. In order to see more broadly whether the impact of the Refugee Crisis continues at the party level in Germany, it is necessary to examine the manifestos of the parties in the elections to be held in 2021.

The data obtained in this dissertation shows that Germany has also taken its share from the wave that the populist right parties that have influenced Europe recently. After the Refugee Crisis, populist right parties in Europe have become mainstream. AfD, which became the representative of populist right parties in Germany with its manifesto in 2017, also became a powerful mainstream political party in Germany.

These populist right parties' manifestos and statements by their party leaders express their disapproval of immigrants and refugees, particularly those from culturally diverse backgrounds who are seen as posing a threat to locals' employment opportunities, safety, way of life, and culture (Ünal Eriş & Öner, 2021, p. 186). AfD, although at the time it was founded was a soft Eurosceptic party, despite being one of the most Eurosceptic parties in Germany, became the representative of populist right parties in Germany with its manifesto in 2017. The AfD, which was established as a single-issue party to oppose the euro policies of the EU, has never completely opposed the EU; it has opposed certain policies and wanted to change them. The fact that even the most Eurosceptic party in Germany is a soft Eurosceptic party reveals something about German Euroscepticism. Although Euroscepticism in Germany increased both at the party level and at the public level, which started with the Euro crisis and continued with the Refugee Crisis, Germany is still one of the countries that supports the idea of European integration the most. However, Germany has also been affected by the Eurosceptic trend that has spread all over Europe and the rise of the populist right.

There are very few studies in the literature that examine the effects of the Refugee Crisis with European integration theories, and this is a gap in the literature. In this regard, this dissertation has contributed to the literature studying the effects of The Refugee Crisis on the member states. The bulk of studies in this field have focused on the impact of the Euro crisis. The effects of the Refugee Crisis have been studied in a more descriptive way in the literature. This dissertation, on the other hand, studies the party and the public level together with a holistic perspective, and attempts to comprehend the effects of the Refugee Crisis via the use of Eurobarometer and the Manifesto Project data. This dissertation also studies on a member state, Germany, as a case by using post-functionalism, which is an integration theory or even a theory of disintegration attempted to fill the gap in this field.

The dissertation has its limitations, on the other hand. To begin, as discussed in detail in the Research Design chapter, there are limitations originating from data sources. Due to the fact that political parties release their manifestos just before elections and

there are no elections every year, it is difficult to detect the impact of a crisis in a manifesto right away. In this context, the data presented by the Manifesto Project is limited. In order to see the effects of the Refugee Crisis in Germany at the party level, the manifestos announced in the elections held in 2013 and 2017 were used. While it is impossible to analyze changes directly during non-election years, it has been noticed that the Refugee Crisis, which peaked in 2015, had an effect on the 2017 election manifestos. On the other hand, despite the Eurobarometer's reputation as one of the most reliable and systemic sources of public opinion, some questions were still missing in some years. However, pre- and post-crisis Germany has a large body of relevant data on Eurobarometer that enables one to observe the effects of the Refugee Crisis on Germany at the public level.

Another limitation of this dissertation is its time frame. As the years between 2013 and 2017 were studied in this dissertation, this time frame, might be extended with a more in-depth study. For instance, data from Germany's next election in 2021 could be analyzed to see whether or not the Refugee Crisis is still effective at the party level. On the other hand, the only disapproved hypothesis of this dissertation could be further studied in detail: Why has the salience of the EU not increased with the effect of the Refugee Crisis at the party level? Another future research topic could be a comparative analysis of the Refugee Crisis' effects on the EU across member states. Moreover, it will be interesting to study the effects of the COVID-19 Crisis, one of the most serious problems confronting the EU today, at the EU and national levels. The COVID-19 Crisis is significant for the EU contributing to the voices for closing the borders and emphasizing nationalist interests, which has resulted in growing conflicts among European countries (Öner, 2020, p. 14). Therefore, as a result of the COVID-19 Crisis, it could be expected that an increase in nationalist sentiments, in hostility towards immigrants and refugees.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Yiğit, Gökçe

Date of birth:

Nationality:

Email:

EDUCATION

- 2004- 2009: Bachelor's Degree, Hacettepe University, International Relations
- 2009- 2013: Master's Degree, Cukurova University, International Relations
- 2013-2021: Doctoral Degree, Middle East Technical University, International Relations

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

- 2010: Toros University / Department of International Relations / Research Assistant
- 2010-2013: Çukurova University / Department of International Relations /Research Assistant
- 2013-2019: Middle East Technical University / Department of International Relations / Research Assistant
- 2019-...: Çukurova University / Department of Political Science and International Relations / Research Assistant

PUBLICATIONS

Book Chapter

2021. EU- Turkey Relations in the Context of Human Rights and Democratization: From the Perspective of Migration Dilemma. In A. Bilgin (Ed.), *EU/Turkey Relations in the Shadows of Crisis: A Break-Up or Revival?* (pp. 193- 210). The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.

Conferences

- 2017, September 13-16. Euroscepticism and the Refugee Crisis: The Case of Germany (Paper Presentation). 11th Pan- European Conference on International Relations. EISA, Barcelona, Spain.
- 2018, September 12-15. The Role of Foreign Policy-related Issues on the Rise of Right-wing Populism: The Case of Hungary. 12th Pan- European Conference on International Relations. EISA, Prague, Czechia.

PROJECTS

2017-2018. External Short-Term Expert in the ICMPD Project named as “Support the Implementation of Development-sensitive Migration Policies in Turkey (SIDEM).”

APPENDIX B: TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Bu tezin temel olarak amacı, 2013 yılında başlayan ve 2015 yılında zirve noktasına ulaşan Mlteci Krizinin Almanya'daki siyasi atmosferi kamu ve siyasi partiler dzeyinde etkileyip etkilemediğini anlamaktır. Bu alıřmada siyasi atmosfer kavramından bahsedildiğinde akla gelmesi gereken řeyin temel olarak iki ayağı vardır. Birincisi, Avrupa Birlięi (AB)'nin ve gn belirginlięi ve ikincisi AB ve ge karřı eęilimler. Bu tezde bahsedilen bu iki durum, Almanya'nın Mlteci Krizi sonrasındaki siyasi atmosferini anlayabilmek iin kullanılmıřtır. Bu tez, ncelikle Mlteci Krizi sonrasında Almanya'da AB ve gn belirginlięinin deęiřip deęiřmediğini, ardından kamu ve parti dzeyinde gmen karřıtlıęı tutumlarında bir deęiřiklik yařanıp yařanmadığını anlamayı ve son olarak, Mlteci Krizinden sonra parti temelli Avrupa řphecilięi ve kamusal Avrupa řphecilięinde yařanan deęiřiklikleri gzlemlemeyi amalamaktadır.

Bu tez, giriř ve sonu dâhil olmak zere sekiz blmden oluřmaktadır. Birinci blm, tezin giriř blm olup genel olarak tezde anlatılmak istenenin kısa bir ifadesinden oluřmaktadır. İkinci blm, kamu dzeyinde Avrupa řphecilięi ve parti temelli Avrupa řphecilięi zerine literatrn genel bir incelemesinden oluřmaktadır. Bu blm, tez iin teorik bir arka plan saęlamaktadır. Bu tezde, krizlerin etkileri AB'nin ve gn belirginlięi ve AB'ye ve ge karřı duruř olmak zere iki bařlık altında incelenmektedir. Bu baęlamda, ikinci blm, genel olarak krizler ve zel olarak Mlteci Krizi ile ilgili literatr analiz etmeden nce belirginlik ve Avrupa řphecilięi konusu zerine oluřturulmuř olan teorik ereveyi iermektedir.

İkinci blm, kısaca, Mlteci Krizi'nin Almanya'daki AB ve g algısı zerindeki etkisine ve parti temelli Avrupa řphecilięi ve kamu dzeyinde Avrupa řphecilięine bakmadan nce iřlevsel bir teorik ve kavramsal ereve izmek iin tasarlanmıřtır.

Bu bölüm, Avrupa şüpheciliğinin kavramsallaştırılması, kamu düzeyinde Avrupa şüpheciliğinin anlaşılması, parti rekabeti teorilerinin temeli ve parti temelli Avrupa şüpheciliği üzerine kurulmuştur. Bahsi geçen bölüm, Avrupa şüpheciliğinin kuramsallaştırılması ve nasıl kavramsallaştırılacağı üzerine genel bir tartışma ile başlar. Ve daha sonra kamusal (popüler) Avrupa şüpheciliği, bu bölümün ikinci ana konusu olmaktadır. Kamu düzeyinde Avrupa şüpheciliği tartışmaları sonrasında ise bu bölümde, parti rekabeti teorileri ve özellikle siyasi partilerin Avrupa bütünleşmesi konusundaki duruşlarını anlamada oldukça önemli bir yere sahip olan belirginlik teorisi ve parti temelli Avrupa şüpheciliği tartışılmaktadır.

Bu bölümde, insanların Avrupa bütünleşmesine yönelik duygularını, siyasi partilerin Avrupa bütünleşmesi konusundaki duruşlarını ve Avrupa şüpheciliğinin çeşitlerini anlamak, incelemek ve analiz etmek amaçlanmıştır. Bu amaçlara ulaşmak için bu bölümde cevaplanmış sorulardan bazıları şunlardır: parti rekabeti teorileri siyasi partilerin Avrupa bütünleşmesine karşı şüpheci duruşunu nasıl açıklıyor, parti temelli Avrupa şüpheciliği kavramsal olarak nasıl tanımlanmış, analiz edilmiş ve kuramlaştırılmıştır, Avrupa şüpheciliği zaman içerisinde değişmiş midir, Avrupa şüpheciliğinin ulusal siyasi sistemler üzerinde bir etkisi var mıdır, Avrupa şüpheciliği üye ülkelerde aday ülkelere daha farklı olarak mı ortaya çıkmaktadır, Avrupa bütünleşmesinin dinamik ve çok boyutlu yapısına siyasi partilerin yaklaşımında sahip oldukları ideolojinin ve yürütmekte oldukları stratejinin rolü nedir ve son olarak, siyasi partiler, seçim rekabeti bağlamında stratejik teşvikler tarafından mı yoksa ideolojik taahhütler tarafından mı yönlendirilirler?

Tezin üçüncü bölümü, temel olarak krizin ne olduğu ve literatürde krizlerin nasıl ele alındığı, nasıl kavramsallaştırıldığı sorularına cevap vermektedir. Bununla birlikte bu bölüm, Avrupa bütünleşme teorilerinin krizleri nasıl açıkladığını da ele almaktadır. Hükümetlerarasıcılık, yeni-işlevselcilik ve post-işlevselcilik olmak üzere üç ana bütünleşme teorisinin krizlerle ilgili varsayımları tartışılmaktadır. Bu bölümde, genel olarak AB krizlerini açıklamada bahsi geçen üç teorisinin artıları ve eksileri tartışılmaktadır.

Bilindiği üzere, Avrupa bütünleşmesi projesi, son yıllarda birbiri ardına yaşanan ve biri bitmeden diğeri başlayan siyasi, ekonomik, toplumsal krizlerle mücadele ederek ayakta kalmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu krizlerle mücadele etmek ve başa çıkmaya çalışmak artık AB için bir rutin haline gelmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle, krizler, “AB için yeni normal” (Haughton, 2016, p. 5) gibi görülmektedir. 2010'lu yıllar, tüm üye ülkeleri etkileyen bir mali krizle başlamış ve daha sonra İngiltere'nin üyelikten çekilmesi krizi ve AB üye ülkelerini olduğu kadar AB dışında da birçok ülkeyi etkileyen Mülteci Krizi ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu krizlerin çoğunun etkileri sürmekle birlikte son zamanlarda ise Birlik, tüm dünyada olduğu gibi COVID-19 krizi ile başa çıkmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bahsi geçen krizler, yalnızca yaklaşık olarak son on, on beş yıl içerisinde meydana gelen krizlerdir. Dolayısıyla bu kadar kısa bir süre içerisinde AB'nin ne kadar fazla krizle başa çıkmaya çalıştığını anlamaya çalışmak önemlidir. AB, sadece son yıllarda krizlerle karşılaşmamıştır elbette. Yani krizler, Avrupa bütünleşme süreci için şaşırtıcı veya olağanüstü şeyler değildir. Krizler, ilk günden itibaren Avrupa bütünleşmesinin şekillenmesinde oldukça etkili olmuştur. Öte yandan, Avrupa'daki mevcut kriz ortamını karakterize eden şey, bu sürecin karmaşıklığı, uzunluğu ve yarattığı karşılıklı bağımlılıktır (Anderson, 2021, p. 765). AB, art arda meydana gelen ve sonu gelmeyen bir kriz döngüsüyle mücadele etme durumuna saplanıp kalmıştır.

Modern Avrupa, dışsal şoklara verilen reaksiyonlarla şekillenmiştir ve şekillenmeye devam etmektedir (Anderson, 2021, p. 765). Bir bütün olarak Avrupa bütünleşme projesi, De Gaulle'ün Avrupa kurumlarını boykot etmesinin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan 1966'daki boş sandalye krizi, Almanya'nın yeniden birleşmesinden sonra gelişen kriz dönemi, 1992'de Avrupa Birliği Antlaşması'nın ve 2005'te Anayasa Antlaşması'nın onay krizi gibi birçok krizle mücadelenin tarihidir (Schmitter, 1970). Avrupa bütünleşme projesi, bu krizlere bütünleşme projesinin verdiği tepkilerle farklı biçimler almaktadır. Özellikle Maastricht sonrası dönem, küreselleşmeden tutun AB'nin genişlemesine kadar dışsal bir değişim sürecine tabidir (Bickerton et al., 2015, p. 707). Dahası, 2010'dan sonra meydana gelen AB krizleri süreci, çeşitli içsel ve dışsal şoklardan oluşmaktadır (Dinan, 2018, p. 21). 2009'dan bu yana yaşanan Avrupa borç krizi, bu krizler arasında en uzun süreli ve en ikonik olanıdır. Ayrıca

Rusya'nın Kırım'ı ilhakı ve doğu Ukrayna'daki isyana verdiği destek; AB'ye büyük bir mülteci ve düzensiz göçmen akını olan Mülteci Krizi ve İngiltere'deki Avrupa şüpheciliğinin zirveye ulaştığı Brexit, AB'nin son dönemde uğraştığı krizlere diğer örneklerdir. En başından beri, Avrupa bütünleşme projesinin bu krizlerle başa çıkma yöntemleri, Avrupa bütünleşmesinin yönünü belirlemiştir. Aslında Avrupa bütünleşme projesi, bir krizin sonucu olarak ve iki Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra kalıcı bir barış ve ekonomik refahı sağlamak için, yani bu krizlerin etkileriyle baş edebilmek için ortaya atılmış bir projedir. Kısacası, krizler Avrupa bütünleşme projesinin dönüştürülmesinde bir katalizör görevi görmüştür ve görmeye devam etmektedir. Bahsi geçen krizlerin sonucunda görülmüştür ki; AB ve üye devletler, refah, kimlik, güvenlik ve yönetim ile ilgili uzun vadeli çeşitli zorluklarla karşı karşıyadır (Haughton, 2016, p. 5). Ve günümüzde AB, bu sorunlarla başa çıkmaya çalışırken bitmeyen bir dönüşüm sürecinin de içerisinde yer almaktadır.

AB, kurulduğu günden bu yana krizlerle mücadele içerisinde olmuştur. Mevcut kriz ortamını öncekilerden ayıran şey ise bu dönemin birden fazla krizin etkili olduğu bir dönem olması ve bahsedilen bu krizlerin hem üye devletler hem de Avrupa kurumları üzerinde aşırı yük oluşturmalarıdır (Grimmel, 2018, p. 1). Bu krizlerin hiçbiri – Euro krizi, Brexit ve Mülteci Krizi – AB için henüz bitmiş veya etkisini kaybetmiş değildir. Bununla birlikte, COVID-19 Krizi gibi yeni krizler de ortaya çıkmaktadır. Anderson'ın “poli-kriz” (2021, s. 773) olarak adlandırdığı bu süreçteki gibi, bu krizler artık kümülatif bir örtüşme durumundadır. Son yıllarda yaşanan bu krizler, siyasallaşma sürecinde kilit rol oynamış ve oynamaktadır. Bu yüzden, Euro Krizi ve Mülteci Krizi'nin Avrupa bütünleşmesini önemli ölçüde siyasallaştırdığı söylenmektedir (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019, p. 1012). Ayrıca, son dönemdeki bu krizler, AB'nin bu sorunlara çözüm bulamadığını açıkça ortaya koymuştur. Bununla birlikte, üye devletler bu noktada isteksiz olduklarını ve kendi çıkarlarını tehdit eden herhangi bir krizle baş edemeyeceklerini bildirmişlerdir. Öte yandan mevcut kriz durumu, bu krizlerin sadece krizin kendisiyle ilgili olmadığını, başka alanlarda da sorunlara yol açtığını göstermektedir. Örneğin, Mülteci Krizi, AB için sadece mültecilerle ilgili bir kriz demek değildir, yani bu kriz hiçbir zaman sadece Birliğin göç politikası ile ilgili olmamıştır. Bu kriz, aynı zamanda ekonomik, kültürel ve politik birçok konuyla da

ilgilidir. Dolayısıyla bu krizler, tüm üye ülkeleri ve AB'nin kendisini ve kurumlarını etkilemiştir. Tüm bunların ışığında, bu krizler, üye ülkeleri Avrupa bütünleşme projesinin varlığını sorgulatır hale getirmiş, bu projenin sürdürülebilirliği gündeme gelmiştir. Sonuç olarak, tezin üçüncü bölümünde literatürde krizlerin nasıl kavramsallaştırıldığı ve bütünleşme teorilerinin krizleri nasıl açıkladığı ele alınmıştır. Bununla birlikte, Avrupa Birliği'nin genel olarak krizlerle nasıl mücadele ettiği ve özelde Mülteci Krizi'nin Avrupa Birliği üzerindeki etkileri özellikle post-işlevselcilik teorisinin yaklaşımıyla incelenmiştir.

Tezin dördüncü bölümünde ise, Mülteci Krizi bir AB krizi olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu bölüm, bir dış şok olarak başlayan Mülteci Krizi'nin, AB ve üye ülkeleri için nasıl bir iç sorun haline geldiğini ve bu krizin AB'nin üye ülkelerle ilişkilerini nasıl şekillendirdiğini açıklamaktadır. Bu bölüm aynı zamanda Mülteci Krizi'nin etkisini anlamak için neden teorik çerçeve olarak post-işlevselciliğin seçildiğini de açıklamaktadır. Dahası, Mülteci Krizi ile ilgili hangi post- işlevselci argümanların öne sürüldüğü hakkında detaylı bilgiler de vermektedir.

Krizlerin Avrupa bütünleşmesinin şekillenmesi üzerinde önemli bir etkisi olduğu tezin önceki bölümlerinde ifade edilmişti. AB, kurulduğu ilk günden bu yana birçok krizle başa çıkmak zorunda kalmış ve bu durum, bütünleşmenin derecesi ve yönü üzerinde etkili olmuştur. AB'nin son yıllarda yaşadığı ekonomik ve siyasi krizler dönemi, AB'yi, üye ülkeleri ve üye ülkelerin AB ile ilişkilerini dönüştürmüştür. Bu krizlerin en önemlilerinden biri olan Mülteci Krizi, AB'yi ve üye ülkeleri etkileyen ve uzun dönem etkisini sürdüren krizlerden biri olmuştur. Mülteci Krizi, ilk etapta AB için dışsal bir şok olmasına rağmen, AB'nin iç politika oluşturma süreçlerini ve üye ülkelerin iç siyasetini son derece etkileyen bir kriz olmuştur. AB ve üye devletlerin bu krizle baş etmede karşılaştıkları zorluklar, krizi zaman içinde derinleştirmiş ve aynı zamanda krizin uzun süreli olmasına neden olmuştur. Özellikle AB'nin Mülteci Krizi'ni yönetirken yaşadığı bu zorluklar, AB'nin yoğun bir şekilde eleştirilmesine neden olmuş ve üye ülkelerin ortak bir Avrupa çözümü aramak yerine kendi ulusal çözümlerine odaklanmalarıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Sonuç olarak yaşanan bu süreç, Avrupa şüphecilığının artmasına neden olmuştur.

Yukarıda da bahsedildiği gibi krizler, AB tarihinin şekillenmesinde oldukça önemli bir rol oynamıştır ve oynamaya devam etmektedir. Fakat buna rağmen, Avrupa bütünleşme teorileri özellikle son yıllardaki kriz dönemine kadar krizleri anlamakla ve açıklamakla yeteri kadar ilgilenmemiştir. Bununla birlikte, Avrupa bütünleşme teorileri, AB'nin yaşadığı bir krizin bitmeden diğerinin başladığı bu kriz döneminin ardından odaklarını krizlerin etkisine doğru kaydırmıştır. Her ne kadar tek bir bütünleşme teorisinin herhangi bir krizi tam anlamıyla ve tüm yönleriyle açıklayabilmesi mümkün görünmese de bu tez, özellikle post-işlevselcilik argümanlarının Mülteci Krizi'ni açıklamada çok uygun olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu tezde post- işlevselciliğin temel açıklamaları desteklenmektedir. Bu bağlamda, bu tezde Avrupa bütünleşme sürecini ve Mülteci Krizi'nin bütünleşme süreci üzerindeki etkilerini anlamak için kamuoyunu, siyasi partileri ve bu partilerin manifestolarını analiz ederken post- işlevselciliğin faydalı olacağı görüşü savunulmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, tezin dördüncü bölümünde, Mülteci Krizi bir AB krizi olarak ele alınmış ve bir dış şok olarak başlayan Mülteci Krizi'nin, AB için nasıl bir iç sorun haline geldiği incelenmiştir. Bununla birlikte, Mülteci Krizi'ni açıklamak için kullanılan post işlevselci yaklaşımın temel argümanları da ortaya konmuştur.

Tezin beşinci bölümü ise, tezin araştırma tasarımının ortaya konduğu bölümdür. Bu bölümde öncelikle örnek ülke olarak Almanya'nın seçilmesinin nedenlerini açıklanmaktadır. Sonrasında ise bu bölümde araştırma sorusu sorulmakta ve tezin hipotezlerinin gerekçeleri detaylı olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu bölüm, ayrıca, kullanılan veri kaynaklarını ve bu kaynakların seçilme nedenlerini de açıklamaktadır. En önemlisi, bu bölüm, kullanılan kaynaklardan elde edilen verilerin tez için nasıl işlevsel hale getirildiğini ayrıntılı olarak açıklamaktadır.

Literatürde çok sayıda araştırmanın, Mülteci Krizi, göçmen karşıtı tutumlar ve Avrupa şüpheciliği arasında bağlantı kurduğu görülmektedir. Bu çalışmalarda, mülteci veya göçmen sayısının oldukça kısa sürede artmasıyla kamuoyunda ve siyasi partilerde göçmen karşıtlığının ve Avrupa şüpheciliğinin artacağı iddia edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, Mülteci Krizi'nde de olduğu gibi ani ve dramatik bir artış karşısında göçün belirginliğinin hem kamu düzeyinde hem de siyasi partiler düzeyinde artması

beklenmektedir. Bununla birlikte, Mülteci Krizi daha çok AB'nin bir sorunu olarak görüldüğü için literatürde Mülteci Krizi sonrasında AB'nin belirginliğinin artması beklentisi de bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca, Mülteci Krizi'nin AB ile olumsuz bir şekilde ilişkilendirilmesi, yani AB'nin bu krizle başa çıkamamakla ve bu krizin şiddetini artırmak ile suçlanması nedeniyle, literatürde Mülteci Krizi ile birlikte AB karşıtı söylemlerin siyasi partiler ve kamuoyu düzeyinde arttığı fikri savunulmaktadır.

Literatürde, Mülteci Krizi sonrasında AB üyesi ülkelerdeki AB ve göçmen karşıtlığı karşıtlığını inceleyen çalışmalar bulunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bu tez, en güçlü ve etkili AB üye ülkelerinden biri olan Almanya'yı bir örnek olarak ele alarak literatürdeki bu argümanların geçerliliğini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, tezin beşinci bölümünde öncelikle şu soruya yanıt aranmıştır: Neden Almanya örnek olarak seçilmiştir? Daha sonra hipotezler, detaylı bir şekilde açıklanmış ve son olarak kamuoyunun ve siyasi partilerin krize tepkisini anlamak için kullanılan veriler detaylandırılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, tezin bu bölümünde neden Almanya'nın örnek ülke olarak seçildiği açıklanmış, tezin hipotezleri detaylandırılmış ve hipotezleri test etmek için kullanılan veriler ortaya konmuştur.

Tezin altıncı bölümünde, birincil araştırmadan elde edilen temel bulgular sunulmaktadır. Manifesto Projesi'nin Almanya'daki siyasi partilerin seçim manifestolarını analiz ederek sağladığı verilerden ortaya çıkarılan bulgular ve Avrupa Parlamentosu, Avrupa Komisyonu ve diğer AB kurumları tarafından kamuoyunu izlemek için yapılan Eurobarometer anketlerinden elde edilen bulgular, bu bölümde sunulmuştur. Manifesto Projesi'nden ve Eurobarometer'den elde edilen bu veriler, bu tezin araştırma sorusu olan ve en basit şekliyle Mülteci Krizi'nin Almanya'yı nasıl etkilediğini sorgulayan bu sorunsalı anlamak için kullanılmıştır. Bu araştırma sorusunun üç bileşeni vardır; 2015 yılındaki Mülteci Krizi'nin kamu ve parti düzeyinde AB'nin belirginliği ve AB ile ilgili olarak kamunun ve siyasi partilerin nasıl duruşlar sergilediği soruları açısından Mülteci Krizi'nin Alman siyasi atmosferini etkileyip etkilemediği; eğer bir etki söz konusuysa bu etkinin yönünün ne tarafa doğru olduğu (negatif mi pozitif mi?) ve bu etkinin büyüklüğü; ve son olarak, kamu ve parti düzeylerindeki değişimler arasında herhangi bir paralellik olup

olmadığı bu bölümde detaylı bir şekilde açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu araştırma konusunu ele almak için altıncı bölümde literatüre dayalı olarak ortaya atılan hipotezlerin doğrulanıp doğrulanmadığı da belirtilmiştir.

Tezin yedinci bölümünde, dışsal krizlerin etkisi, siyasi partilerin Mülteci Krizinden sonra Avrupa bütünleşmesine yönelik tutumlarının nasıl değiştiği ve Mülteci Krizinin kamusal Avrupa şüpheciliğini nasıl etkilediğine ilişkin literatürle ilgili olarak tezin önemli bulguları üzerine bir tartışma sunmaktadır. Bu bölüm, ayrıca, Mülteci Krizi ve bu krizin Almanya'daki Avrupa şüpheciliği üzerindeki etkilerine ilişkin post-işlevselci varsayımlar üzerine bir tartışmayı da içermektedir. Sonuç olarak, bu bölümde, tezin altıncı bölümü olan bulgular bölümünde detaylandırılan tezin ana bulguları tartışılmaktadır. Krizler üzerine post- işlevselci varsayımlar üzerine kurgulanan tezin hipotezlerinin çoğunlukla Almanya örneği için doğrulandığı görülmektedir. Bir diğer deyişle Almanya, Mülteci Krizi'nden hem kamu hem de parti düzeyinde etkilenmiştir. Mülteci Krizi'nin ardından göçmen karşıtı duygular arttıkça, Almanya'daki Avrupa şüpheciliği de artmıştır.

Tezin sekizinci bölümü ise sonuç bölümü olarak tezin araştırma tasarımını, bulgularını ve tezde ortaya atılan temel tartışma konularını tekrar gözden geçirmektedir. Bu bölüm ayrıca, tezin teorik ve metodolojik sınırlarını ortaya koymakta ve gelecek için olası araştırma fırsatlarını ve çalışma konularını da tanımlamaktadır.

Bu tezde birçok kez dile getirildiği gibi, Avrupa bütünleşmesi, ilk gününden itibaren krizlerle mücadele etmiş ve bütünleşme süreci, bu krizlere verilen cevaplara göre zaman içerisinde şekillenmiştir. Sözü geçen krizler, 1965 yılında yaşanan boş sandalye krizi, birçok üye ülkenin birbirine yakın zamanlarda yaşadığı finansal kurumların çöküşü krizi (Avrupa Borç Krizi) veya İngiltere'nin AB üyeliğinden çekilmesi (Brexit) gibi içsel şokların veya AB sınırlarına gelen büyük mülteci akınları (Mülteci Krizi) gibi dışsal şokların sonuçları olabilir. Bahsedildiği gibi, krizler ister iç kaynaklı ister dış kaynaklı olsun, her biri AB'yi bir bütün olarak ve AB'nin üye ülkelerinin her birini farklı yoğunluklarda da olsa bir şekilde etkilemiştir. Krizlerin

yarattığı etkilerin sonucunda oluşturulan politikalar, krizler sona erse de yürürlükte kalmaya devam etmektedir. Dolayısıyla, krizlerin ani etkileri zaman içerisinde azalsa da AB'nin bu krizlere verdiği cevaplar, AB'yi zaman içerisinde sürekli olarak yeniden şekillendirmektedir. Bir diğer deyişle, krizlerin anlık sonuçları kısa sürede sona erse de yansımaları uzun süre devam etmektedir. Sonuç olarak, krizlerin Avrupa bütünleşmesi tarihinde kayda değer bir rol oynadığı rahatlıkla söylenebilir.

Genel olarak krizlerin Avrupa bütünleşmesi tarihinde bu denli önemli bir yeri olmasına rağmen Avrupa bütünleşme teorileri, krizleri tanımlama, krizlerin nedenlerini belirleme ve sonuçları hakkında kapsamlı ve detaylı bir bilgi sunma noktasında yetersiz kalmaktadırlar. Bu bağlamda bu çalışmada, AB'nin bir uluslararası örgüt olarak ve üye devletlerinin krizlere verdiği reaksiyonların bütününü hiçbir Avrupa bütünleşme teorisi tarafından tam olarak açıklayamadığı ve AB krizlerini anlayabilmek için krizler ile Avrupa bütünleşmesi arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemek gerektiği kabul edilmektedir. Herhangi bir Avrupa bütünleşme teorisi, bir krizi tüm yönleriyle açıklayamasa da bahsi geçen bu teoriler, krizler hakkında önemli argümanlar öne sürmekte ve krizleri tüm yönüyle olmasa da bazı yönleriyle açıklamaktadırlar. Yani, her bir bütünleşme teorisi, her bir krize farklı bir şekilde yaklaşmakta ve kendi bakış açısıyla bu krizleri ele almaktadır.

Hükümetlerarasıcılık, yeni-işlevselcilik ve post-işlevselcilik gibi Avrupa bütünleşmesini kuramsallaştıran bütün ana akım teori okulları, krizleri Avrupa bütünleşme sürecinin ayrılmaz bir parçası olarak görmektedirler (Lefkofridi & Schmitter, 2015, s. 4). Literatüre bakıldığında akademisyenlerin krizlerin temel statüsü konusunda hemfikir oldukları görülmektedir, ancak krizlerin sonuçları ve (siyasallaşma da dâhil olmak üzere) bütünleşmenin veya ayrışmanın itici güçleri ve nedenleri konusunda anlaşamamakta oldukları görülmektedir (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019, s. 997). Hükümetlerarasıcılık, bütünleşme krizlerinin sebeplerini çoğunlukla bütünleşme sürecine dışsal bir müdahalede ararken, yeni-işlevselcilik ve post-işlevselcilik teorileri için krizler, önceki bütünleşme süreçlerinin bir sonucudur. Bir yanda yeni-işlevselcilik, uluslararası düzeyde yayılma süreçlerini vurgularken, diğer yanda post-işlevselcilik, bütünleşmeye yönelik yerel Avrupa şüphesinin altını

çizmektedir (Schimmelfennig, 2017, s. 317). Bununla birlikte yeni-işlevselcilik için krizlerin sonuçları pozitif iken post-işlevselcilik, krizlerin negatif sonuçlarına odaklanmaktadır. Görüldüğü gibi, her bir bütünleşme teorisi krizlere farklı bir bakış açısıyla yaklaşmakta, aynı krizi birbirinden oldukça farklı şekillerde açıklamaktadırlar. Herhangi bir teorinin diğerinden üstün olduğunu kesin bir dille ifade etmek mümkün değildir. Her biri krizlerin farklı yönleriyle ilgilenmekte, böylelikle bu teoriler, aynı krizi farklı gözlüklerle inceleme imkânı sağlamaktadırlar. Tüm bu bilgilerin ışığında, bu tezde, nispeten yeni olan ve hem kamuoyu hem de siyasi partileri odak noktası haline getirmiş olan post-işlevselcilik teorisinin argümanları teorik çerçeve oluşturmak üzere kullanılmıştır. Post-işlevselcilik, bu tezde Mülteci Krizi'ni açıklamak için en iyi bütünleşme teorisi olarak kabul edildiğinden seçilmiştir.

Mülteci Krizi, AB için kritik öneme sahiptir, çünkü bu kriz, dış etkenlerin başlattığı bir krizin AB ve üye devletler üzerindeki etkisini, AB'nin göç ve sığınma politikalarının ne kadar yetersiz ve işlevsiz olduğunu ve Schengen sisteminin sınırlarını göstermektedir. Mülteci Krizi, AB için dışsal bir şok olmasına rağmen, AB'de yeni iç sorunların ortaya çıkmasına ve hali hazırda var olan sorunların da derinleşmesine neden olmuştur. Bu krizin AB için ekonomik, kültürel, sosyolojik ve örgütsel birçok sonucu vardır. Mülteci Krizi, birçok AB üye ülkesinde zaten yükselişte olan popülist partilerin güçlenmesi için uygun bir ortam yaratmıştır. Popülist siyasi partilerin yükselişi ve bunun sonucunda parti rekabetinde yaşanan kayma, popülist partilerin göç ve AB konusundaki söylemlerinin ana akım siyasete yaygınlaşmasının yanı sıra ana akım siyasi partilerin AB ve göçmenlik politikalarının kısıtlanmasıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Böylece bir dış şok olarak başlayan Mülteci Krizi, AB üyesi ülkelerin ve bir uluslararası örgüt olarak AB'nin iç politikalarını önemli ölçüde şekillendirmiştir.

Mülteci Krizi'nin patlak verdiği dönemde AB, halihazırda Euro Krizi'nin etkilerini atlatmaya çalışmaktaydı. Böylesi bir ortamda bazı AB üye devletleri, bu kadar kısa sürede bu kadar ciddi siyasi krizlerle uğraşmak zorunda kaldığından, Avrupa bütünleşme projesini desteklemek için mücadele etmişlerdir. Diğer AB üyesi ülkeler

ise bu krizlerin sorumlusu olarak AB'yi gördüklerinden daha AB karşıtı bir tutum sergilemişlerdir. AB'nin mültecilerle ilgili yetersiz düzenlemelerinin yanı sıra bu krizle bu kadar kısa sürede baş etmeye çalışması, bazı üye ülkelerin Mülteci Krizi'nden AB'yi sorumlu tutmasına neden olmuştur. AB, Mülteci Krizi süreci içerisinde çözümün değil, sorunun bir parçası olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, üye ülkeler çözümü AB'de değil, ulusal arenada bulmaya çalışmışlardır. Yani, Webber'in (2019, s. 3) de iddia ettiği gibi, Mülteci Krizi, sektörel ve dikey parçalanmayla sonuçlanmıştır. AB, birlik dışından ülkelerle ikili anlaşmalar (AB-Türkiye Göç Anlaşması) yaparak bu krizi dışsallaştırma ve Avrupa Birliği İltica Destek Ajansı ve AB Sınır ve Sahil Güvenlik Ajansı gibi ulus üstü oluşumlar kurma gibi önemli çabalar sarf etmeye çalışsa da bu çabalar krizi çözme anlamında büyük ölçüde sonuçsuz kalmıştır.

Literatürde genel olarak krizlerin AB ve üye ülkeleri üzerindeki sonuçlarını Avrupa bütünleşmesi teorileri ile açıklamaya çalışan çalışmalar bulunmaktadır. Ancak bu çalışmaların daha çok Euro Krizi'nin etkilerine odaklandığı görülmektedir. Mülteci Krizi'nin etkilerini Avrupa bütünleşme teorileri ile açıklamaya çalışan çalışmaların sayısı, Euro Krizi'nin etkilerine odaklanan çalışmalara kıyasla oldukça azdır. Dolayısıyla bu tez, Mülteci Krizi'nin Almanya'nın siyasi atmosferi üzerindeki etkisini anlamak için post-işlevselci varsayımları kullanarak bu boşluğu doldurmaya amaçlamaktadır. Öte yandan, literatürde krizlerin etkilerine ilişkin çalışmalar daha çok ya sadece kamu düzeyine ya da sadece siyasi partiler düzeyine odaklanmıştır. Bu tez ise iki düzeyi bir arada ele alarak hem kamuoyu hem de parti düzeyindeki literatüre katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, bu tez, Mülteci Krizi'ni anlamak ve açıklayabilmek için post-işlevselcilik teorisini kullanmaktadır. Peki neden post-işlevselcilik teorisi seçilmiştir? Post-işlevselci teorinin Mülteci Krizi ile ilgili argümanlarının birçoğu doğrulandığından (Webber, 2019, s. 8), bunların AB'nin en önemli ve etkili üyelerinden biri olan Almanya üzerinde test edilmesinin önemli olduğu düşünülmektedir. Post-işlevselcilik, ulus ötesi baskının neden zayıf olduğunu ve kriz sırasında üye devletlerin neden iş birliği yapmadığını açıklamak için Mülteci Krizi'ni

iç siyasallaşma açısından analiz etmektedir. Mülteci Krizi, göç konusunu Avrupa bütünleşmesine bağlayarak siyasi çatışmayı şekillendirebilecek bir sosyal bölünmenin bazı özelliklerine sahip olan ve uzun zamandır var olan ulus ötesi bir ayrışmayı şiddetlendirmiştir (Hooghe ve Marks, 2018, s. 11). Post-işlevselcilik, Mülteci Krizini açıklarken bu ayrışmaları vurgulayan tek teoridir. Dolayısıyla, Mülteci Krizi'ni anlamaya çalışırken post işlevselci yaklaşımı kullanmanın yararlı olacağı düşünülmüştür.

Diğer yönden, bir parçalanma teorisi (*disintegration theory*) olarak, Mülteci Krizi'nin yarattığı parçalanmayı açıklamada post-işlevselciliğin kullandığı en önemli iki silah, siyasallaşma (*politicization*) ve kısıtlayan uyuşmazlıktır (*constraining dissensus*). Post-işlevselciler olarak, Hooghe ve Marks, parçalanmanın kesin olacağını tahmin etmiyorlardı, ancak göç ve AB oldukça politize olduğundan ve dışlayıcı kimlik yükseldiğinden bu yönde artan bir baskı olacağını tahmin ediyorlardı. Dolayısıyla, böylesine politize olmuş bir siyasi ortamda, siyasi liderlerin karşı karşıya kaldıkları artan kısıtlamaları referandumlardan kaçınarak, 'devre dışı bırakma' (*opt-out*) kapsamını genişleterek, farklılaştırılmış bütünleşme uygulayarak ve yetkiyi 'çoğunlukçu olmayan düzenleyici kurumlara' devrederek "çözmeye" çalışabileceklerini iddia etmektedirler (Hooghe & Marks, 2008, s. 22). Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma, post-işlevselcilik argümanlarının Mülteci Krizi'ni açıklamada oldukça uygun olduğunu kabul etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, post-işlevselciliğin temel açıklamaları desteklenmekte ve bu teorinin Avrupa bütünleşmesini ve Mülteci Krizinin bütünleşme üzerindeki etkilerini anlamak için kamuyu, siyasi partileri ve manifestolarını analiz ederken faydalı olacağı savunulmaktadır.

Şimdiye kadar verilen bilgiler ışığında, bu tezin araştırma sorusu temel olarak şu argümana dayanmaktadır: krizler; ekonomik, sosyal, politik, kültürel vb. değişikliklere sebep olmaktadır (Christensen et al. 2016, Anderson 2021, Haughton 2016, Grimm 2018, Riddervold et al. 2021, Nabers 2009, Schimmelfennig 2018, Gänzle et al. 2021, Hooghe ve Marks 2018). Bu argümandan hareketle krizlerin siyasi atmosferi kamu ve siyasi partiler düzeyi gibi pek çok düzeyde etkilediği kabul edilmektedir. Bu çalışma, 2015 yılında zirve yapan Mülteci Krizi'ne odaklanmakta

ve bu krizin Almanya'da hem kamu hem de siyasi partiler düzeyinde AB'nin ve göçün belirginliğini ve AB ve göçe karşı duruşlarını nasıl etkilediğini sormaktadır. Bu ana araştırma sorusunun üç bileşeni vardır:

1. 2015 yılındaki Mülteci Krizi, Avrupa Birliği'nin kamuoyu ve parti düzeyindeki belirginliği ve konumu açısından Alman siyasi atmosferini etkiledi mi?
2. Eğer öyleyse bu etkinin yönü ve büyüklüğü ne yöndeydi? (negatif/pozitif veya artış/azalma?)
3. Kamu ve siyasi partiler düzeyindeki eğilim arasında herhangi bir paralellik var mı?

Bu araştırma sorularına dayalı olarak oluşturulan hipotezler, Avrupa bütünleşme teorileri, belirginlik ve siyasi partiler ve kamu düzeyinde Avrupa şüpheciliği ile ilgili literatürlerden türetilmiştir.

Bu tezde Almanya örnek ülke olarak seçilmiştir. Bilindiği üzere AB üyesi devletler Mülteci Krizi'ne karşı verdikleri tepkilerde AB çatısı altında birleşmemiş, ortak bir çözümde anlaşılamamış ve her ülke bu sorunu kendi ulusal yöntemleriyle çözmeye çalışmıştır. Bu anlaşmazlık durumu, Mülteci Krizi konusunda, ülkelerin kendi iç siyasetlerinde de geçerli bir durum olmuştur. Aynı şekilde Almanya'da da her siyasi parti ve toplumun her kesimi krize farklı tepkiler vermiştir. Dolayısıyla kamunun veya siyasi partilerin bir bütün olarak hareket ettiği söylenemez. Bazıları mülteci sorununun bir felakete dönüşmesinden AB'nin sorumlu olduğuna inanırken, diğerleri AB'nin ortak bir çözüm getirmesi gerektiğine inanmaktaydı. Bazıları Merkel Hükümeti'ni eleştirirken, diğerleri Merkel Hükümeti'nin açık kapı politikasını bu krize çözüm olarak görüyordu. Dolayısıyla hem kamu hem de siyasi partiler düzeyinde Mülteci Krizi'ne karşı ortak bir Alman tepkisi olduğunu iddia etmek mümkün olmasa da Mülteci Krizi'nin Alman Avrupa şüpheciliği ve Almanya siyasi atmosferi üzerindeki etkisini analiz etmek oldukça önemlidir.

Almanya, Mülteci Krizi'nin etkisini birçok yönden analiz etmek için ilginç bir ülkedir. Öncelikle, Almanya Mülteci Krizi'nden en çok etkilenen AB üyesi ülkelerden biridir. 2019 yılının sonunda tüm dünyada 26 milyon mülteci ve 45.7 milyon ülke içinde yerinden edilmiş kişi vardı. Tüm bu dünyadaki mültecilerin %10'u ve ülke içinde yerinden edilmiş kişilerin bir kısmı AB içerisinde yaşıyordu (European Commission, 2021). Dolayısıyla Mülteci Krizi, tüm AB üyesi ülkeleri bir şekilde etkilemiştir. Ancak, tüm ülkeleri aynı şekilde etkilememiştir. Almanya, mültecilerin ana varış noktası olması ve en yüksek mülteci kabul oranına sahip olması nedeniyle Mülteci Krizi'nden en çok etkilenen AB üye ülkelerinden biridir. Mülteci Krizi sırasında kendi ülkesi ve hatta AB sınırları içerisine en fazla sığınmacı ve mülteciyi kimin kabul ettiği konusunda Almanya açık bir şekilde galip gelmiştir. EUROSTAT verilerine göre Almanya'da 2015 yılında iltica ve ilk kez sığınma başvuru sayısı 476.510 iken, 2016 yılında 745.160'a yükselmiştir. Başvuru sayısında 2017 yılında başlayan düşüş, halen devam etmekte olup 2020 yılında bu sayı 121.955 olmuştur (EUROSTAT, 2021). Ancak, bu sayı hala AB üye ülkeleri arasında en yüksek sayıdır. AB'deki mültecilerin payı toplam nüfusuna göre %0,6 iken, Almanya'da 2019'daki oran toplam nüfusuna göre %1,4 olup AB üye ülkeleri arasında en yüksek orandır (European Commission, 2021). Dolayısıyla, AB üye ülkeleri arasında en fazla mülteci kabul eden ülke olarak Almanya'nın üzerinde Mülteci Krizinin etkisini incelemenin önemli olduğu düşünülmektedir.

Almanya, yalnızca mültecileri en çok kabul eden ülke olduğu için değil, aynı zamanda Avrupa bütünleşmesinin geleneksel itici gücü olan bir ülke olduğu için de ilginç bir örnektir (Baluch, 2017, s. 113). AB'nin kurucu üyelerinden biri olarak Almanya, en başından beri bütünleşme sürecine rehberlik etmede kilit bir oyuncu olmuştur. Bu nedenle, önde gelen bir bütünleşme lideri olarak, Almanya'nın Avrupa projesine hem kamusal düzeyde hem de siyasi partiler düzeyinde desteği tarihsel olarak diğer AB üye ülkelerinden çok daha yüksek olmuştur. Avrupa'da Avrupa bütünleşmesi konusunda elit mutabakatının bu kadar güçlü olduğu ve kamuoyunun bu kadar Avrupa yanlısı bir ruh hali içinde olduğu Almanya'dan başka bir ülke yoktur (Lees, 2002, p. 244). Durum böyle olunca, Avrupa bütünleşmesinin her düzeyde her zaman yaygın bir desteğe sahip olduğu ve Avrupa şüpheciliğinin tarihsel olarak en

alt seviyede olduğu göz önüne alındığında, Mülteci Krizi'nin ardından kamuoyunda ve siyasi partilerde herhangi bir değişiklik olup olmadığını görmek oldukça önemlidir.

Almanya'nın Mülteci Krizinin etkisini görmek için ilginç bir örnek olmasının bir başka önemli nedeni de dönemin Alman Hükümeti'nin krize verdiği tepkidir. Başka hiçbir AB üyesi ülke, Merkel Hükümeti'nin verdiği tepkiyi vermemiştir. Merkel, krizin başında göçmen yanlısı bir duruş sergilemiş ve Almanya'nın sınırlarını mültecilere açık bırakmayı seçmiştir. Bu krizden en çok zarar gören Macaristan gibi sınır ülkelerinin yükünü hafifletmek için başka bir AB üyesi ülkeden mültecilerin Almanya'ya girişini düzenleyen Dublin Yönetmeliğini askıya almıştır. Bu duruş pek çok kişi tarafından takdir edilirken, aynı zamanda AB'ye ve Almanya'ya daha fazla mülteci çekme korkusuyla da geniş çapta eleştirilmiştir. Ayrıca, Merkel'in bağlı olduğu kendi siyasi partisinin bazı üyeleri de Merkel'in politikasını "fazla cömert" olmakla eleştirmiş ve durumun "ulusal bir felaket" olmaya yaklaştığı konusunda Merkel'i uyarmıştır (Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 Ekim 2015, Holmes & Castañeda, 2016, s. 14 tarafından alıntılanıldığı şekliyle). Almanya Şansölyesi Angela Merkel'in Avrupa Mülteci Krizi'nin başlangıcında Almanya'nın sınırlarını mültecilere açık tutma kararı, göç ve mülteci konularını AB'nin ve üye ülkelerin gündemine getirmiş ve Almanya'daki Almanya için Alternatif (AfD) gibi popülist partilere aşırı göç karşıtı duruşlarıyla seçmen desteğini artırma fırsatı vermiştir (Mader & Schoen, 2019, s. 83). Ancak Merkel, Mülteci Krizi sırasında mülteci politikasını değiştirmiş, kamuoyunun tepkisiyle karşılaşınca ve olası bir seçim kaybıyla karşı karşıya kalınca sığınmacılara karşı daha kısıtlayıcı bir yaklaşım benimsemiştir (Zaun & Servent, 2021, s. 158). Görüldüğü gibi, Mülteci Krizi konusunda diğer tüm konularda olduğu gibi tek bir görüşün hâkim olduğu söylenemez. Bir yandan kamu genel olarak mültecileri desteklemeye ve korumaya oldukça hazırken, diğer yandan mültecilere ve mülteci yerleşimlerine yönelik düşmanlık çarpıcı biçimde artmıştır (Jäckle & König, 2018, s. 2). Bu bağlamda, politikalar da zaman içinde değişmiştir. Sonuçta, Merkel'in Mülteci Krizi'ne ilk tepkisi ve ardından politikasındaki değişiklik, Almanya'yı Mülteci Krizi'nin Avrupa şüpheliği üzerindeki etkilerini görmek açısından ilginç bir örnek haline getirmiştir.

Bu tez, daha önce de bahsedildiği gibi, Mülteci Krizi'nin Almanya üzerindeki etkilerini anlamak için bir Avrupa bütünleşme teorisi olan post-işlevselciliği kullanmaktadır. Mülteci Krizi'ni açıklamada post- işlevselci varsayımların yararlı olduğunu kabul etmektedir, çünkü Mülteci Krizi, bütünleşmenin derinleşmesine neden olmamış (Schimmelfennig, 2018, s. 969), aksine bütünleşme sürecinde bir tür parçalanmaya neden olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, bir dağılma (*disintegration*) teorisi olan post-işlevselcilikten başka bir teorinin Mülteci Krizini daha iyi açıklayacağı düşünülemezdi. Avrupa bütünleşmesine nispeten yeni bir bakış açısı olarak karşımıza çıkan post-işlevselcilik, yukarıda da bahsedildiği gibi, siyasallaşmanın önemini vurgulamaktadır. Hooghe ve Marks'ın (2018a, 2018, 2019) da post-işlevselciler olarak ifade ettiği gibi, Mülteci Krizi ile birlikte göçün ve AB'nin siyasallaşması, hem kamu düzeyinde hem de siyasi partiler düzeyinde Avrupa şüpheciliğinin artmasına ve göçmen karşıtı fikirlerin güçlenmesine neden olmuştur. Dolayısıyla post-işlevselcilik, Avrupa bütünleşmesinde kamuoyunun önemini vurguladığı için de önemlidir. Bu bağlamda, Mülteci Krizi'nin Almanya'da hem kamu hem de parti düzeyindeki etkilerini anlamak için post- işlevselci varsayımlar kullanılmaktadır.

Post-işlevselcilik tarafından oluşturulan argümanlara dayanarak, bu tezde aşağıdaki hipotezler oluşturulmuştur:

H.1.a: Mülteci Krizi sonrasında kamu düzeyinde göçmenlik konusunun önemi artmıştır.

H.1.b: Mülteci Krizi sonrasında siyasi partiler düzeyinde göçmenlik konusunun önemi artmıştır.

H.2.a: Mülteci Krizi'nden sonra AB'nin kamu düzeyinde önemi artmıştır.

H.2.b: Mülteci Krizi sonrası siyasi partiler düzeyinde AB'nin önemi artmıştır.

H.3.a: Mülteci Krizi'nden sonra kamu düzeyinde göçmen karşıtı duygular artmıştır.

H.3.b: Mülteci Krizi sonrasında siyasi partiler düzeyinde göçmen karşıtı eğilimler artmıştır.

H.4.a: Mülteci Krizi sonrasında kamu düzeyinde Avrupa şüpheciliği artmıştır.

H.4.b: Mülteci Krizi sonrasında siyasi partiler düzeyinde Avrupa şüpheciliği artmıştır.

H.5: Sol ve Sağ uçlarda yer alan siyasi partiler, ana akım partilerden önemli ölçüde daha fazla Avrupa şüphesisidir.

Almanya'da Mülteci Krizi'nin hem siyasi partiler hem de kamuoyu üzerindeki etkilerini görmek amacıyla ve post- işlevselci varsayımlar aracılığıyla kurulan bu hipotezler, iki farklı düzey için iki ayrı veri seti kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Siyasi partiler düzeyinde ölçüm yapabilmek için Manifesto Projesi, kamu düzeyinde ölçüm yapmak için ise Eurobarometer anketleri kullanılmaktadır. Bir göç ülkesi olan ve AB'nin en güçlü ve kurucu üye ülkelerinden biri olması nedeniyle ilgi çekici bir ülke olan Almanya, Mülteci Krizi'nin etkilerini analiz etmek için vaka ülke olarak seçilmiştir. Avrupa kıtasına gelen mülteci ve göçmen akını nedeniyle 2015 yılı AB için kriz yılı olarak ifade edildiğinden tezde kullanılacak zaman dilimi 2013 ve 2017 yılları olarak belirlenmiştir. 2015 yılı Mülteci Krizinin zirve yaptığı yıl olarak kabul edildiğinden, Almanya'da 2015 yılından önce yapılan son seçimler olan 2013 yılı ve 2015 yılından sonra yapılan ilk seçimler olan 2017 yılı analiz edilmiştir. 2013 yılı kriz öncesi dönem, 2017 yılı ise kriz sonrası dönem olarak tanımlanmaktadır.

Yukarıda belirtilen veri setlerinden elde edilen bulgularla tezin hipotezleri incelenmiş ve bu tezde aşağıdaki sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır:

1. Mülteci Krizi'nden sonra Almanya'da göçmenlik konusunun önemi hem kamu hem de siyasi partiler düzeyinde artmıştır.
2. Mülteci Krizi sonrasında Almanya'da AB'nin önemi kamu düzeyinde artarken, siyasi partiler düzeyinde azalmıştır.
3. Mülteci Krizi'nden sonra Almanya'da kamuoyunda ve siyasi partiler düzeyinde ise göçmen karşıtlığı artmıştır.
4. Almanya'daki Mülteci Krizi'nden sonra hem kamuoyunda hem de siyasi partiler düzeyinde Avrupa şüphesiliği artmıştır.
5. Sol ve Sağ uçlarda yer alan çevre partileri, Almanya'da sağ sol spektrumun ortasında yer alan ana akım siyasi partilerden önemli ölçüde daha fazla Avrupa şüphesisidir.

Bu sonuçlardan da anlaşılacağı üzere Almanya'da siyasi partiler düzeyinde AB'nin öneminin arttığı hipotezi dışında tüm hipotezler doğrulanmıştır. Tezin tartışma bölümünde de belirtildiği gibi, Almanya'da siyasi partiler düzeyinde AB'nin öneminin artmamasının birçok farklı nedeni vardır. Tüm bu hipotez analizleri sonucunda ve tezin araştırma sorusu ışığında, Mülteci Krizi'nin Almanya'nın siyasi atmosferini etkilediği sonucuna varılmaktadır. Bu etkiler, hem parti düzeyinde hem de kamuoyu düzeyinde görülmektedir. Mülteci Krizi'nin ardından göçmen karşıtlığının artmasıyla Almanya'da Avrupa şüpheciliği de artmıştır. Ancak bu artışların 2015 yılında zirveye ulaşan Mülteci Krizinden sonra bir süre daha devam ettiğini ve daha sonra düşüşe geçtiğini belirtmek gerekmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, Mülteci Krizi'nin etkisi zamanla azaldıkça bu artışlarda da azalma görülmüştür. Bu Avrupa'ya karşı şüpheli ve göçmen karşıtı görüşler, Mülteci Krizi'nin etkisiyle artmış ve ardından özellikle kamu düzeyinde zayıflamaya başlamıştır.

Bu tezde elde edilen veriler, Almanya'nın da son dönemde Avrupa'yı etkisi altına alan popülist sağ partilerden nasibini aldığını göstermektedir. 2017 yılındaki manifestosu ile popülist sağ partilerin Almanya'daki temsilcisi haline gelen AfD, Almanya'daki en Avrupa şüpheli partilerinden biri olmasına rağmen halen yumuşak bir Avrupa şüpheli partidir. Ülkenin tarihi ve aşırı milliyetçiliğe karşı siyasi duyarlılığı göz önüne alındığında, Almanya'da aşırı sağ bir partinin yükselişi önemlidir (Ünal Eriş ve Öner, 2021, s. 173). AB'nin Euro politikalarına karşı çıkmak gayesiyle tek bir politik gündemi olan bir parti olarak kurulan AfD, hiçbir zaman AB'ye tamamiyle karşı çıkmamış, AB'nin belirli politikalarına karşı çıkmış ve bunları değiştirmek istemiştir. Almanya'daki en Avrupa şüpheli partinin bile yumuşak bir Avrupa şüpheli parti olması, Almanya'daki Avrupa şüpheliği hakkında bir fikir vermektedir. Almanya'da Avrupa şüpheliği, Euro kriziyle başlayıp Mülteci Krizi ile devam eden süreçte hem siyasi partiler düzeyinde hem de kamu düzeyinde artmasına rağmen, Almanya hala Avrupa bütünleşmesi fikrini en çok destekleyen ülkelerden biridir. Ancak tüm Avrupa'ya yayılan bu Avrupa şüpheli akımdan ve popülist sağın yükselişinden Almanya da etkilenmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, Avrupa bütünleşme projesinin tarihi boyunca krizler hiçbir zaman beklenmedik veya olağandışı olmamıştır. Avrupa bütünleşmesi ve krizler arasındaki bu yoğun ilişkiye rağmen, literatürde nispeten az sayıda çalışma krizleri Avrupa entegrasyon teorilerinin merceğinden incelemektedir. Bu nedenle, bu tez temel olarak literatürdeki bu boşluğu doldurmaya çalışmaktadır. 2010 yılında Avrupa borç kriziyle başlayan Avrupa entegrasyonunun 'on yıllık krizi' bugün hala devam etmektedir. 2010 yılından bu yana AB, her biri bir öncekinin sona ermesinden önce başlayan bu ardışık krizlerle mücadele etmektedir. Bu krizler AB'nin politikalarında, üye ülkelerle ilişkilerinde ve hatta üye devletlerin iç politikalarında önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. Mülteci Krizi, AB'nin son dönemlerde yaşadığı kriz döneminin önemli bir parçasıdır. Euro Krizi ve Brexit'in aksine, Mülteci Krizi dışsal bir şok tarafından yaratılmıştır. O halde, Mülteci Krizi'nin AB üye devletlerinin siyasi atmosferi üzerindeki etkisini değerlendirmek kritik önem taşımaktadır. Bununla birlikte, bu tez siyasi partiler ve kamuoyunu bütüncül bir bakış açısıyla ele almakta ve Mülteci Krizi'nin etkilerini Eurobarometer ve Manifesto Projesi verileri üzerinden kavramaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda bu bütüncül bakış açısı literatürdeki tek yönlü araştırmalara bir alternatif oluşturmaktadır.

Öte yandan, tezin elbette ki sınırları da bulunmaktadır. Başlangıç olarak, tezin araştırma tasarımı bölümünde ayrıntılı olarak tartışıldığı gibi, veri kaynaklarından kaynaklanan sınırlamalar vardır. Örneğin, siyasi partilerin manifestolarını seçimlerden hemen önce yayınlamaları ve her yıl seçim olmaması nedeniyle, bir krizin bir manifesto üzerindeki etkisini hemen tespit etmek oldukça zordur. Bu bağlamda Manifesto Projesi'nin sunduğu veriler sınırlıdır. Bu çalışmada, Mülteci Krizi'nin Almanya'da siyasi partiler düzeyindeki etkilerini görmek için 2013 ve 2017 yıllarında yapılan seçimlerde açıklanan manifestolardan yararlanılmıştır. Bu doğrultuda, seçim dışı yıllardaki değişiklikleri doğrudan analiz etmek mümkün olmasa da 2015 yılında zirveye ulaşan Mülteci Krizi'nin 2017 seçim beyannamelerine de etki ettiği görülmüştür. Bir diğer sınırlama ise, Eurobarometer ile ilgilidir. Bu veri kaynağı, kamuoyunun ölçülmesinde en güvenilir ve sistemik kaynaklarından biri olmasına rağmen, bazı yıllarda bazı soruların eksik olduğu fark edilmiştir. Bu eksikliklere rağmen, yine de Mülteci Krizinin Almanya üzerindeki etkilerini kriz

öncesi ve sonrası kamu düzeyinde gözlemlemeyi sağlayan Eurobarometer, Almanya ile ilgili yeterli veri sağlamıştır. Bu tezin bir diğer sınırı da zamandır. Bu tezde 2013-2017 yılları incelenmiştir. Ancak bu süre, daha derinlemesine bir çalışma için uzatılabilir. Örneğin, Almanya'nın 2021'deki bir sonraki seçimlerinden elde edilen veriler, Mülteci Krizi'nin siyasi partiler düzeyinde hala etkili olup olmadığını görmek için analiz edilebilir. Bununla birlikte, tezin onaylanmayan tek hipotezi olan Mülteci Krizinin parti düzeyindeki etkisiyle AB'nin önemi artmıştır neden doğrulanamadı sorusu çalışılabilir. Gelecekteki bir diğer araştırma konusu ise günümüzde etkisini sürdüren COVID-19 Krizi'nin üye ülkeler veya genel olarak AB üzerinde etkisini araştırmak olabilir.

APPENDIX C: THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : YİĞİT

Adı / Name : GÖKÇE

Bölümü / Department : Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English):

THE EFFECT OF THE 2015 REFUGEE CRISIS ON THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE- PARTY AND PUBLIC LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES: THE CASE OF GERMANY

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